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Preface 
This publication is the outcome of a conference held by the National 
Centre for Development Studies on 3 June 1997. I am grateful to Satish 
Chand for agreeing to undertake the editing of the conference papers for 
publication in this volume. He has been very ably assisted in this task 
by members of the publications staff of the Centre-Maree Tait, Mamie 
Griffith and Tracey Hansen-and I extend my thanks to them for their 
consistently fine efforts. 
Raising productivity in the countries of the South Pacific is seen as 
extremely important to their economic growth and development. 
Because of past policies, particularly policies towards foreign 
aid-both in donor countries and in the South Pacific countries 
themselves-real wages are well above levels that will provide 
employment for most of the potential labour force and well above levels 
justified by labour productivity. This is so, even if all other impediments 
to investment were removed. As we have seen in Papua New Guinea, 
these other impediments to investment can be substantial. The labour 
market in Papua New Guinea has been effectively deregulated and real 
wages have fallen very substantially, but private sector employment has 
not increased. 
But improving productivity, particularly labour productivity, must 
be one of the goals of any strategy to create a more favourable 
xi 
investment climate. It is depressing to see that private, formal-sector 
jobs have hardly increased over the past decade or so in most South 
Pacific countries, while they experience fertility rates that are still 
relatively high. Migration is a safety valve for some countries. For 
others, this is not an option and the unemployed and the 
underemployed have to find sustenance in the agricultural sector or in 
the informal sector, whether in legal or illegal activities. 
The National Centre for Development Studies is strongly committed 
to finding ways to improve productivity in the South Pacific countries. 
It believes that it is making an important contribution to this through its 
training of graduates from these countries. It also sees that it can make a 
contribution through research and discussion of ways to improve 
productivity. Hopefully, this volume is a step along this path. 
Ron Duncan 
Executive Director 
National Centre for Development Studies 
Asia Pacific School of Economics and Management 
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Introduction 
Satish Chand 
The island nations of the South Pacific, including Papua New Guinea, 
are different in all respects except for their common poor economic 
performance. Annual per capita growth in gross domestic product 
(GDP) has ranged between -1 .8 per cent in Kiribati to 1 .2  per cent in 
Western Samoa over 1970 to 1993 (Chand 1997) . The future for these 
states is not very promising given rapidly growing populations which 
previously had relatively easy access to the labour markets of Australia 
and New Zealand-but these privileges are likely to be wound down in 
future. Similar privileges to export markets in the industrial world via 
the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement 
(SPARTECA), the Lome Convention between the European Union and 
African, Caribbean and Pacific countries and other country-specific 
bilateral trade agreements are going to diminish in value as trade 
barriers are lowered through the GATT and APEC process. Progress on 
the economic front in the States of the South Pacific will have to be 
sourced from within these countries rather than from abroad. Some, 
Papua New Guinea in particular, have significant potential for growth 
from exploitation of their natural resources. In contrast, a large number 
of the Pacific island countries have limited resources left to be exploited, 
hence any further gains in production will have to be sourced from 
improvements in total factor productivity. Even for countries which 
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have natural resources to exploit, growth from total factor productivity 
gains can be significant. This volume addresses this important issue of 
productivity performance in the South Pacific island economies. 
We start with lessons from theory, then proceed to country-specific 
studies beginning with Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Tonga. In terms of 
country-studies this volume does not cover all of the South Pacific 
islands, but the lessons drawn from theory and the few country studies 
are applicable to the region as a whole. The longer term aim is to extend 
the coverage both in terms of theory and application. 
Neil Vousden surveys the lessons from growth theory for small 
island states that aim to raise economic performance (Chapter 1) .  
Vousden discounts smallness and isolation as insurmountable hurdles 
for growth by citing countries like Mauritius that have overcome these 
handicaps. The important lesson from growth theory, both old and new, 
is the crucial role of human capital accumulation and free markets in 
raising output and economic efficiency. Both of the above in the 
neoclassical model impact on the level of income, the transition 
between steady states could be stretched out such that in the interim 
growth effects would be realised. In so far as endogenous growth theory 
is concerned, human capital accumulation has permanent growth 
effects, but any such long-run effects are a bonus in the current context. 
The policy messages from this chapter include the freeing up of market 
forces to raise economic efficiency, the removal of impediments to 
investment, both domestic and foreign (the latter particularly important 
for inflow of technology and acquisition of human capital), and policy 
stability including security to private property so as to enhance private 
investment. 
Theodore Levantis and Satish Chand explore the link between crime 
and low labour productivity in Papua New Guinea, arguing for a 
public sector role in curbing crime to allow growth of private-sector 
investment (Chapter 2). Such investments will generate employment, 
and entice people away from crime and into legitimate value-adding 
employment. A computable general equilibrium model is used to show 
that a 117 per cent increase in resources devoted to crime prevention 
will raise welfare to a maximum amount, equivalent to one per cent of GDP. 
The link between labour market deregulation and employment in 
Papua New Guinea is explored by Theodore Levantis and George Fane 
who point out that the scenario for high wages was created by the 
Australian administration, and a result of advice from Australian trade 
union officials in particular (Chapter 3). The Minimum Wages Board, 
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according to Levantis and Fane, pushed wages above equilibrium 
levels in the formal sector exacerbating the unemployment problem 
with 1991 private sector employment 5 per cent lower than the 
corresponding figure for 1971. 
Paul McGavin presents a strong case for building a national 
productivity culture in Papua New Guinea (Chapter 4). The role of 
institutions and the government in particular, is stressed. 
Chapter 5 is the first of two chapters in this volume on Fiji. Satendra 
Prasad provides a general overview on productivity and performance 
in Fiji, moving on to consider the reasons for the low productivity of the 
Fijian sugar and garment industries. A number of policy recommen­
dations are made to reverse the deteriorating productivity trends in the 
economy. For example, Prasad argues that security of land tenure for 
sugarcane farmers is crucial in raising productivity in the sugar 
industry. Within the garment sector, the challenge according to Prasad, 
is to maintain the supply of skilled labour at competitive wage rates. 
The challenge for the total economy is to restore private sector confidence 
to enhance long-term investment in skill acquisition and infrastructure. 
Another challenge for the Fijian economy is the deregulation of its labour 
market, a difficult task in the context of strong labour unions. 
Eci Nabalarua addresses the issue of employee motivation in the 
public sector as a source of productivity growth (Chapter 6) .  Nabalarua 
attributes the low commitment of Fijian public sector employees to the 
low degree of industrialisation of the economy, and the benevolent 
work culture propagated by several interest groups in the country. 
Michael Hess looks at the constraints to productivity in Tonga 
(Chapter 7). Hess takes a management perspective to productivity with 
particular focus on human resource development issues. Hess 
attributes the lack of vocational training as one constraint to 
productivity. Another constraint is the lack of transparency between 
rewards and effort in the labour market, due to cultural factors. The 
preconditions to increased efficiency are a trained and motivated 
workforce-neither of these are present in the current context. The 
success of Tongans in overseas labour markets is used as evidence to 
support the claim that labour market reform at home can lead to 
productivity improvements. 
Growth in the long term with the given resources can arise only 
from improvements in productivity. The island nations of the South 
Pacific lag behind the rest of the world both in levels and rates of 
productivity growth. The chapters in this volume investigate some of 
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the reasons for this deficiency and explore means of rectifying the 
identified deficiencies. The studies presented here are by no means 
exhaustive, it is only the beginning of the long road ahead. 
Finally I would like to thank the contributors for their papers, Maree 
Tait, Mamie Griffith and Tracey Hansen for their assistance in 
proofreading and copy editing of the manuscript, Ron Duncan for 
encouragement and support, and AusAID for their financial support. I 
hope your efforts are not in vain. 
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Labour productivity and growth 
in Pacific island economies: 
some theoretical issues 
Neil Vousden 
The Pacific island economies present a unique economic challenge. 
These countries, most of them rich in natural resources, continue to 
experience per capita rates of growth significantly below most of their 
trading partners and below other similar small countries elsewhere in 
the world such as Mauritius. This situation is the outcome of 
consistently low productivity growth and capital accumulation 
combined with high levels of population growth. In some, failure to 
absorb a rapidly growing workforce threatens economic and social 
problems of crisis proportions. In the others, although the situation is 
less alarming in the short run, the long-term future is bleak unless 
changes are implemented to enhance growth performance. 
The literature on the theory of economic growth offers many 
insights into the growth process. Indeed, the proliferation of 
theoretical and empirical research which has accompanied 'new' 
theories of endogenous growth offers a whole new menu of 
determinants of growth, including prescriptions for activist industry 
policies to promote growth. In seeking answers to the special problems 
of the Pacific island economies from this body of theory, the 
policymaker is entitled to be confused .  Many of the models are ad hoe, 
focusing on some aspect of the growth process which the author 
thinks is important and / or neglected by previous theories. Moreover, 
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attempts to test the new theories empirically have been few, partly 
because the models include variables (such as knowledge) which are 
difficult to measure. A body of theory on which 'the dust has not 
settled' provides a shaky foundation for real-world policy formulation. 
Fortunately, it is possible to distil certain key elements which are 
common to most growth theory, avoiding unresolved controversies 
while acknowledging some of the more recent developments. To this 
end, I provide a brief survey of the main elements of this literature, 
including the main empirical tests. This is then used as a basis for the 
second half of the chapter which analyses specific policy issues 
relevant to labour productivity and growth in the Pacific island 
economies. In particular, the following are discerned as areas in which 
progress can be made. 
• Human capital accumulation and acquisition of frontier 
technology are two necessary components of productivity 
growth. Increased foreign investment provides a relatively 
low-cost means of acquiring both via technology diffusion. 
Thus, consideration should be given to identifying policies 
which will create a more favourable climate for foreign 
investment. 
• The low growth rates in the Pacific islands may also be partly 
attributed to conditions in the countries' labour markets. 
Reduction of unemployment will yield increased short-term 
growth. Low levels and growth rates of labour productivity 
also present scope for longer-term improvement. In countries 
where there are significant labour market distortions, policies 
to reduce these distortions should be considered while 
making allowance for cultural factors. 
• One disincentive to greater investment is the system of land 
tenure which is primarily traditional/communal ownership, 
but without widespread adoption of long-term leasehold . 
This creates problems of access and security of tenure for 
investors, discouraging new capital formation. A move 
towards a system of legally-sanctioned private property 
rights would promote growth by reducing investor risk. 
Labour productivity would rise for two reasons: (i) increased 
capital accumulation would raise the average and marginal 
product of labour; (ii) more secure property rights would 
increase the return to effort and so may cause worker and 
managerial effort to rise. 
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• Although the small island economies exhibit a high degree 
of openness to trade, in the sense that their total merchandise 
trade is a high percentage of GDP, their import-competing 
sectors continue to be sheltered from foreign competition 
with effective ad valorem import duties ranging from 10 -40 
per cent. There are several ways in which increased trade is 
thought to promote growth and these are discussed. Further 
trade liberalisation is seen to be another means of breaking 
the link between income and population growth. In 
particular, such liberalisation is often seen as a 'back-door ' 
means of securing labour market reform. 
Theories of g rowth 
In the past decade, a number of new models of economic growth have 
been developed in response to perceived inadequacies of the existing 
neoclassical paradigm. Much has been made of the 'new growth 
theory'; however, in many ways it differs only slightly from its 
predecessor. To see this, it is worth enumerating the features common 
to all growth models. First, they all incorporate a produced 
'accumulable' factor, which is some durable input whose stock 
increases over time-it may be physical capital, human capital, 
technical knowledge or something else. Second, if an increase in the 
productivity of the inputs producing the accumulable factor occurs at 
some point of time, there will be an increase in the rate of 
accumulation and the growth of output in subsequent periods. A key 
difference between the neoclassical and endogenous growth models is 
how long this increased growth lasts-in neoclassical growth theory, 
the increase in the growth rate eventually converges to zero whereas 
in endogenous growth theory the increase can be permanent. The 
source of this difference between the two models is their assumptions 
about the income share of the accumulable factor. If this share is low, 
as in the neoclassical model, any given increase in, say, capital, in one 
period does not yield such a large increase in production of capital, 
thus dampening the accumulation process causing it to converge. If 
the share is high, as in the endogenous growth models, then any 
increase in capital inputs will yield a larger increase in production of 
new capital, causing the accumulation process to continue for longer, 
possibly indefinitely, in which case permanent growth effects are 
possible. Third, all models allow for ongoing technical change. 
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However, in the neoclassical model, this is exogenously given, 
whereas endogenous growth models attempt to explain or 
'endogenise' technical change. 
Although the relationship between the two classes of models is so 
simple, the predictions and policy implications of the alternative 
approaches can differ widely. In particular, the simple business of 
increasing the income share of capital can involve the assumption of 
increasing returns and/ or externalities, features which are attractive to 
those who wish to argue for an activist industry policy. Because the 
models are still so poorly understood by policymakers and because 
the interventionist message is so tempting to politicians and interest 
groups, it is important to consider the details of the various models 
and assess their empirical relevance. 
The Neoclassical  Model 
The Solow-Swan neoclassical growth model has proved a remarkably 
resilient tool for both economic theorists and policy advisers (Solow 
1956). It has the advantage of the best theories: it is extremely simple, 
yet captures the main features of a dynamic economy. Briefly, it 
assumes a single output, produced using labour and capital in a 
constant-returns-to-scale technology with diminishing, and eventually 
exhausted, marginal returns to each factor. The single output may be 
used for either present consumption or investment in accumulation of 
capital. A constant, exogenously given, ratio of savings to income is 
commonly assumed but can be endogenised without affecting the 
results. The model predicts that long-run growth rates of per capita 
income will equal the (assumed) exogenous rate of technical progress. 
Changes in savings rates or government policies will affect the levels 
of the steady-state output and capital stock but will have no long-run 
effect on the growth rate. If all countries experience the same rate of 
exogenous technical progress, then they will all converge to a common 
growth rate over time. Countries exhibiting differences in savings 
behaviour, institutions, cultural norms, government policies, and so on 
may be expected to have different levels of steady-state GDP and 
different capital-labour ratios but their long-run growth rates would 
all be anchored to the common rate of technical progress. 
Critics of the neoclassical model have pointed out that: (i) its 
prediction that countries' growth rates will converge conflicts with the 
observed persistent, wide disparities in national growth rates; (ii) its 
results contradict the notion that a country can grow faster if it saves 
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more or if its government pursues better economic policies; and (iii) it 
does not actually explain growth, the only permanent growth in the 
model being due to exogenous technical change. 
Attempts to resolve these apparent shortcomings of the 
neoclassical model took several forms. The first was a more careful 
analysis of what is meant by 'convergence' and the circumstances in 
which it might be expected to occur. The second approach was 
concerned with extending the definition and role of capital in the 
model to give a better fit to the data and open the possibility of policy­
sensitive long-run growth. The third line of attack was to endogenise 
the technical progress parameter which drives growth in the Solow 
model and provide a more complete theory of the growth process. 
This part of the literature, which constitutes the bulk of so-called 
endogenous growth theory has attracted the most attention, not least 
because much of it provides a new rationale for activist government 
policy. However, as will be argued below, there are good reasons to be 
cautious in using this new class of models as a basis for policy 
formulation. 
Convergence 
In its simplest form, the convergence hypothesis states that growth 
rates are negatively related to national income-poor countries grow 
more rapidly than rich countries. Because this hypothesis is not 
supported by data based on a heterogeneous sample of countries, it 
could be argued that the neoclassical model does not adequately 
account for the full range of growth experience in the real world. On 
the other hand, the simple convergence hypothesis is more likely to be 
supported when tested on data from a set of similar countries or 
regions (OECD countries or the states of the United States). This 
suggests that the discrepancy in the wider sample of countries may be 
due to differences in steady-state income levels. If the time taken to 
approach this steady state level is relatively long, then cross-country 
variation in growth rates may simply reflect variation in transitional 
growth rates as countries adjust to different steady-state (long-run) 
levels of income (Mankiw 1995; Sachs and Warner 1995a). Such an 
interpretation would not only allow the neoclassical model to account 
for disparities in rates across countries, it would also allow national 
savings behaviour and institutional and policy parameters to affect 
growth (via their effect on the long-run steady-state level of income). 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) define conditional convergence to be 
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convergence by each economy to its own steady state. The hypothesis 
that an economy grows more rapidly the more it is below its steady 
state turns out to be supported by a range of studies (Barro and Sala-i­
Martin 1995). 
The importance of the share of capital 
Despite this helpful re-interpretation of the Solow model, it has 
another empirical shortcoming: the differences in levels of per capita 
income which it predicts are much lower than those actually observed. 
Moreover, given the usual income share of capital (about one-third for 
the United States), the rate of convergence to the steady state is more 
rapid than indicated by empirical studies. These problems were 
addressed by Mankiw, Romer and Weil ( 1992) who show that the 
predictions of the neoclassical model yield a much closer fit to the data 
if capital's share is approximately twice its usual value. They estimate 
that this may be reasonably accomplished if the definition of capital is 
widened to include human capital. A large increase in the share of 
capital means that changes in savings and productivity parameters 
have greater leverage on the final steady-state level of income because 
each increase in the capital stock causes a larger increase in output 
(and investment) the larger is the weight of capital in the production 
function. This also means that the adjustment to the long run will be 
more protracted and, indeed, closer to observed transition times. Thus, 
incorporating human capital in this simple way enables predictions of 
the modified neoclassical model to yield a reasonable approximation 
of the data. 
Endogenous growth models I: external ities to capital 
An alternative to expanding the definition of the capital stock is to 
assume that there are externalities to capital. Then, as capital 
accumulates, the real share of capital consists of the direct payment to 
owners of capital plus the indirect returns to other factors via a 
positive capital externality. The basic idea developed by Romer (1986) 
is that when a firm accumulates capital, it adds not only to its physical 
capital stock but also to its stock of technical knowledge, an example 
of 'learning-by-doing'. However, unlike physical capital, a firm's 
knowledge is a public good and so there are knowledge 'spillovers' or 
positive externalities which cause the economy-wide effect of a firm's 
capital accumulation to be greater than the effect of the increased 
physical capital on the firm's own production. Thus the aggregate 
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share of capital for the economy as a whole is greater than the 
conventionally measured payments to owners of capital. Unfortunately, 
these spillovers are difficult to measure and they would need to be 
very large indeed if they are to double capital 's share of income. 
Nevertheless, models of this type and more reduced-form models in 
which capital's share (at least in the part of the economy which 
produces new capital) is simply assumed to be one-so-called 'AK' 
models-provide the simplest example of the class of endogenous 
growth models developed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. These 
models represent a polar case in which capital's share is large enough 
(unity in the ' AK' models) to enable economies to grow perpetually 
with no convergence to a long-run steady-state level of income. This 
also seems at odds with empirical studies which suggest that countries 
typically make 2 per cent of the adjustment to their steady state each 
year and move halfway towards their steady state in 35 years 
(Mankiw 1995, Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995:Chapters 11-12). 
Endogenous growth models II: expla in ing technical change 
Because the rate of technical change is taken to be exogenous in the 
neoclassical model, a number of growth economists have tried to open 
the black box and provide a theory of how technology changes over 
time. Because this element of the model is now being endogenised, the 
term 'endogenous growth' has been applied to this new theory. 
Although there is now an extensive literature characterised by a large 
range of very specific (and frequently ad hoe) models, it is possible to 
provide a fairly simple classification of the main approaches and 
results. A common feature of all these models which links them with 
the concerns of Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) is that they all 
represent different ways of rationalising a much higher aggregate 
share of the accumulable factor (such as capital) than in the simple 
neoclassical model. 
Learning-by-doing models. This class of models is typified by that 
presented in Lucas (1988). Lucas assumes two sectors in the economy, 
a 'high-tech' sector (for example advanced manufacturing) and a 
traditional sector (for example agriculture). Each sector uses two 
factors of production, unskilled labour, which can move freely 
between sectors, and sector-specific human capital. To capture the 
basic idea of learning-by-doing, human capital in each firm is 
assumed to accumulate at a rate proportional to the allocation of 
labour to the sector, a process which is external to the firm but internal 
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to the industry, so that individual agents do not take into account the 
effect of their own labour allocation decision on human capital 
accumulation. The high-tech sector is assumed to have a higher 
intrinsic rate of learning-by-doing than the traditional sector and so is 
identified as the high-growth sector-if workers are moved from the 
low to the high-tech sector, the increase in the growth of the high-tech 
sector will more than offset any fall in the rate of growth of the other 
sector, yielding a net increase in the economy's rate of growth. The 
model yields long-run growth rather than convergence to a finite level 
of output. Moreover, the externality associated with human capital 
accumulation is seen by some as providing a reason for government 
policies such as tariffs or subsidies which shift resources towards the 
high-tech sector, promoting human capital accumulation in that sector 
and increasing the economy's rate of growth. In a trading economy, 
such intervention would have the potential to change the economy's 
long-run comparative advantage from the low-tech to the high-tech 
good. 
Differentiated intermediate goods. In this class of models, which 
have been analysed by Romer (1990), Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991 )  
and Grossman and Helpman (1991) firms produce a final good using a 
factor such as labour and several intermediate goods which may, for 
convenience, be thought of as different types of capital. The 
production process for the final good is such that there are increasing 
returns to the number of varieties of intermediate good available and 
used. An imperfectly competitive research and development sector 
produces designs for new intermediate goods. Since all researchers 
have access to the existing knowledge which is assumed proportional 
to the number of existing varieties, the number of new varieties 
designed in any one period is assumed proportional to the number of 
existing varieties. Thus, when one researcher designs a new good, he 
adds to the body of knowledge available to all researchers, increasing 
the marginal product of all researchers in producing new designs and 
increasing the rate of growth of final output. This spillover or 
externality is central to the growth process in these models and, as in 
the Lucas learning-by-doing model, provides a rationale for 
government intervention; in this case a subsidy to research and 
development to stimulate production of new input varieties and 
permanently increase the rate of long-run growth. 
A variant on this horizontal innovation framework is the 'quality 
ladders' (or vertical innovation) model of Grossman and Helpman 
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(1991), in which there is a single intermediate good used in final good 
production at any point of time, with a new variety replacing the 
existing variety if it is of a higher quality. This model yields similar 
results to the differentiated inputs case discussed above with the 
important difference that a new input replaces rather than augments 
previous inferior quality inputs. Despite this difference, the basic 
mechanism of growth is similar. The state of knowledge is embodied 
in the blueprint for the latest and best variety and this knowledge is 
available to all. The higher the quality of the latest variety, the more 
know ledge is available to researchers trying to design something 
better. This spillover from the last design adopted provides a rationale 
for subsidy of research and development similar to that offered by the 
"variety-of-inputs' model. 
Empirical evidence for endogenous growth models. Endogenous 
growth theory initially appeared to offer a convincing explanation of 
why growth experience differed so widely across countries. It 
provided a framework in which national economies could achieve 
perpetual growth per capita, but did not preclude growth rates 
converging for some countries. It also provided a channel for savings 
propensities, national institutions and government policies to have 
permanent growth effects rather than merely transitional effects as in 
the neoclassical model. It encouraged economists to think more 
systematically about the underlying determinants of technological 
change. Finally, it offered a new set of reasons for government to use 
trade and industry policy to promote growth actively by encouraging 
resources to move into "high-growth' sectors. 
Although this theory has encouraged economists to think more 
deeply about the growth process, there are serious doubts about its 
relevance. Empirical tests consistently reject the scale effects which are 
at the heart of the "spillovers' models of Lucas, Romer, Grossman and 
Helpman and others. These models assume increasing returns to scale 
in the sector which produces the accumulable factor, be it blueprints 
for new goods, human capital or physical capital. This means that 
accumulation, and hence growth rates, will be increased when the 
scale of the sector producing the accumulable factor increases and, in 
most cases, when the scale of the economy as a whole increases. For 
example, in the differentiated inputs model of Romer ( 1990) and 
Grossman and Helpman (1991 ), growth is faster the larger the scale of 
the research and development sector. In the Lucas two-sector model, 
the growth rate is an increasing function of the scale of the "high-tech' 
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sector. In both these classes of models, it is also true that, ceteris 
paribus, larger economies grow more rapidly than smaller ones. 
However, there is no convincing evidence for scale effects in growth. 
At the very simplest level, the hypothesis that larger countries grow 
faster is clearly rejected by the data. More sophisticated econometric 
tests of aggregate and sectoral scale effects have also found scale to be 
insignificant as a source of growth (Backus, Kehoe and Kehoe 1992; 
Chand and Duncan 1997; Chand and Vousden 1995) . 
Another implication of increasing-returns models is that 
permanent changes in government policy can have permanent effects 
on the growth rate. However, this is at odds with the time series 
evidence on growth rates for the United States over the last 100 years. 
As noted by Jones ( 1995), despite large and permanent changes in 
certain policy parameters over the period, United States growth rates 
have exhibited no persistent changes. 
Beyond the general empirical shortcomings of endogenous growth 
theory, it should be remembered that the theory is essentially 
concerned with growth via development of a 'high-tech' sector with 
knowledge spillovers. This limits its applicability to Pacific island 
economies which are primarily agriculture and service economies 
with relatively small manufacturing sectors (manufacturing 
constitutes less than 10 per cent of GDP) with limited scope for the 
sort of spillovers captured in the endogenous growth models. Such 
economies do stand to benefit from development of their own human 
capital in conjunction with diffusion of foreign technology. However, 
that is readily accommodated and understood within the simpler 
framework of the neoclassical growth model. 
Govern ment i ntervention and endogenous g rowth 
Beyond the lack of empirical support for endogenous growth theory, 
there is a further problem facing any policymaker tempted by its 
interventionist message. Because the models typically employ ad hoe 
functional forms and assumptions and because many of the variables 
are difficult to measure (for example know ledge, research and 
development externalities, learning-by-doing), using the models as a 
basis for policy setting is fraught with risk. As Lucas notes in his 
influential paper ' [i]n the model, "picking winners" is easy. If only it 
were so in reality!' (Lucas 1988:31 ) .  Incorrect policy settings based on 
bad estimations of a bad model have the potential to do enormous 
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harm to any economy, particularly small, undiversified economies 
such as those in the Pacific islands. 
A related point is that even if one can confidently identify an 
intervention which will permanently increase growth, there is no 
guarantee that the policy in question is good for the economy. Indeed, 
endogenous growth economists have been quick to point out that 
higher growth rates do not necessarily correspond to higher welfare. 
To see this, suppose that a Pacific island government sees a particular 
industry (for example a high-tech fishing industry) as potentially 
'high-growth' and that a high permanent subsidy is required to shift 
resources into this sector. In general, the distortion created by this 
subsidy results in a high economic cost in all periods-the 'static' 
effect of the subsidy is a permanent fall in the level of income in all 
periods. However, by channelling resources into the high-growth 
sector, the subsidy will also fuel growth, lead to a higher growth rate 
in perpetuity so that, as time passes, the higher GDP resulting from 
growth will more than offset the static loss of GDP from the subsidy. 
Thus, there are net short-term losses to the economy to be weighed 
against longer term gains. Whether the economy gains in present 
value terms will then depend on its relative valuation of the present 
and the future as measured by its discount rate. In theory, it is always 
possible to fuel growth, but at what cost? There are numerous 
examples (the former Soviet Union for one) where the costs of 
subsidising growth are huge and not necessarily confined to the short 
term. In fact, the weight of evidence is that government interference in 
resource allocation does not even have beneficial growth effects. Sachs 
and Warner (1995a) classify 117 countries1 from the Heston-Summers 
data set according to whether they satisfy two basic criteria for 
market-oriented economic policies : security of private property rights 
and open international trade. Their results are striking. For the group 
of 88 poor countries in the sample (those with 1970 GDP below 
US$4,000), of the 12 countries that satisfy both criteria, none achieved 
low growth (defined as less than 2 per cent per annum) while 10 
achieved 'fast growth' (more than 3 per cent per annum) . Of the 76 
countries that failed both criteria, only 7 achieved fast growth while 51 
experienced slow growth. Thus the probability of a country which 
pursues anti-market policies achieving a high growth rate is only 9 per 
cent (7 / 76) while there is a zero probability of a country which follows 
sound market-oriented policies falling below a 2 per cent growth rate, 
and an 83 per cent (10/ 12) chance of such countries achieving fast 
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growth. Viewed in this way, and uncontaminated by the statistical 
problems associated with many cross-country regressions, there is a 
clear message here for all governments of developing countries and 
for Pacific island economies in particular. Adherence to sound market­
based policies is a safe means of ensuring high growth. Without such 
policies, the prospects of a growth rate above 2 per cent are poor. 
What theory should pol icymakers trust? 
Endogenous growth theory as it stands has not stood up well to 
empirical testing. Moreover, the theory is still developing and it would 
be foolish to use it as the basis for experiments on real economies. 
Fortunately, there are a number of elements which are common to both 
old and new growth theory which provide a solid basis for policy 
formulation. The first point is that, in its simplest form, endogenous 
growth theory is really just the neoclassical growth model with an 
infinite convergence time so that the economy grows forever rather 
than converging to a steady-state level of output and capital. Because 
the convergence time in the neoclassical framework is now estimated 
to be about 70 years (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995; Mankiw 1995) this 
should not be a point of great concern. If an economy can achieve 
higher transitional growth, that is higher growth for more than 60 
years, it will be as good a result from the viewpoint of current 
generations as permanently higher growth. Second, the growth 
outcome for the economy is better, ceteris paribus, the higher the level 
of factor productivity in the sector that produces accumulable inputs 
such as physical and human capital. In the neoclassical model this 
means a higher long-run level of output and thus a higher transitional 
growth rate whereas in the endogenous growth models it will mean a 
permanently higher growth rate. Thus, in either theory, anything 
which increases the level of factor productivity in the part of the 
economy that produces an accumulable factor will increase growth. In 
particular, the statement that savings behaviour, institutions and 
policy cannot affect growth rates in the neoclassical model is only true 
beyond the lifetime of most currently alive individuals. Improved 
permanent factor productivity growth will of course increase the rate 
of long-run growth in all models. This points to a simple policy rule: 
change the institutions and government policies which are responsible 
for a country's factor productivity and factor growth being low 
relative to other countries and higher growth should follow. 
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Growth and natural-resource-rich economies 
A common feature of many economies in this study is their relative 
abundance of certain natural resources. This might be a source of 
pessimism given the observation that many resource-rich economies 
such as Russia and Venezuela have had extremely poor growth while 
natural resource-scarce economies such as Switzerland, Korea, Taiwan 
and Japan have experienced rapid growth. In cross-country 
regressions Sachs and Warner ( 1995b) find a significant negative 
association between natural resource wealth and growth over the 
period 1970-89. Such observations have led a number of economists to 
explore the hypothesis that there is some intrinsic aspect of natural 
resource abundance that leads to reduced growth. Several theories 
have been offered to explain such a phenomenon. Matsuyama (1992) 
uses an endogenous growth model of an economy with two sectors, 
agriculture and manufacturing. Manufacturing is a sector with 
learning-by-doing as in the Lucas model. This makes it the high­
growth sector so that anything (such as an abundance of land) which 
attracts resources into agriculture reduces learning-by-doing in the 
high-growth manufacturing sector and retards long-run growth. In the 
light of the reservations about such a framework offered it is difficult 
to find this rather elegant explanation convincing. 
Another, related explanation, is based on the 'Dutch Disease' 
model used to explain the effects of resource booms in the 1970s. A 
large and growing resource sector causes a real appreciation of the 
currency and thus causes sectors such as manufacturing to contract. If 
the manufacturing sector is characterised by positive spillovers and 
has a higher natural rate of growth than the other sectors then the 
shrinkage of that sector may be seen as causing the economy to grow 
below its optimal rate. 
A more likely explanation, implicit in Olson (1982), is that the 
presence of rents makes resource-rich countries more prone to 
wasteful rent-seeking behaviour, sometimes institutionalised in the 
form of inefficient labour market arrangements (such as short work 
hours and restrictive work practices). There is some further empirical 
support for this in a recent paper by Graham ( 1995) who incorporates 
interaction terms in a cross-country regression using the Barro and Lee 
data set. Graham's findings are illuminating. Among the explanatory 
variables, he finds strong and significant interactions between 
mineral-fuel resource rents (as a measure of natural resource 
Labour productivity and growth in Pacific island communities I 1 7  
dependence) and a number of policy and political variables. In 
particular, he finds a significant interaction between mineral-fuel rents 
and government consumption, with the negative effect of government 
consumption on growth being more pronounced for mineral fuel­
dependent economies. Mineral-fuel exporters are also found to derive 
a greater boost to growth from openness to trade. This leads Graham 
to conclude that the negative relationship between mineral-fuel rents 
and growth of per capita income is highly dependent on the policy 
mix of the economy suggesting that 'the negative resource 
dependence-growth relationship is not an iron law' (Graham 1995). 
Finally, his study finds a significant interaction between political 
instability and resource rents, providing some support for the view 
expressed above that the poor growth performance of some resource­
dependent economies may be due to the growth-retarding effects of 
rent-seeking behaviour. In common with Sachs and Warner (1995b ) ,  
Graham finds no significant effect for terms-of-trade volatility on the 
growth rate, in contrast to the popular view that fluctuating 
commodity prices are an impediment to growth for resource-based 
economies. Although Graham's analysis is concerned with rents 
associated with mineral fuel deposits, his results are in line with what 
the theory would predict for resource rents generally. 
A general conclusion to be deduced from this literature is that the 
growth rates of resource-rich economies are more sensitive than 
resource-scarce economies to political factors and government policies. 
Thus, for such economies, it is even more crucial to get the institutions 
and policy settings right. This is particularly true for the economies 
being considered in this study. When the policies are right, there is 
good evidence that economies with a relative abundance of natural 
resources can achieve high growth rates regardless of country size 
(Indonesia and Tunisia to take a large and a small example). Moreover, 
there does not appear to be any substance to the fear that a resource­
abundant country which pursues its comparative advantage and, say, 
specialises in agricultural products, will permanently lock itself out of 
growth via manufactures-the cases of Tunisia and Malaysia are good 
examples of countries which were able to move from primary 
products to manufacturing when their comparative advantage 
changed and did not suffer a 'growth penalty' as a result. 
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Tech nology diffusion, foreign investment and human 
capital formation 
One clear and unambiguous message from all of the empirical studies 
of growth is the importance of a growing skilled workforce. Whether 
such human capital accumulation has the sort of spillover effects 
assumed in the endogenous growth literature is unimportant-growth 
accounting estimations indicate that human capital growth will be an 
important factor in income growth whatever the mechanism (Mankiw, 
Romer and Weil 1992; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). In addition, 
country-by-country analysis indicates that countries with low growth 
performance also exhibit a very low rate of growth of human capital. 
However, the implication seems to be that a growing pool of human 
capital is necessary for growth but not sufficient (Russia being a good 
example of a country with a highly educated workforce but dismal 
growth performance). Since a relatively high proportion of the 
workforce in the Pacific island economies is unskilled it is tempting to 
advocate increased education spending as a solution. Unfortunately, 
things are not so simple. Recent World Bank research has produced 
two disturbing conclusions which suggest that the ability of education 
spending to promote growth may be limited in the absence of other 
policies. In the first of these studies, Pritchett (1996a), empirical 
analysis of new data sets shows that growth in educational attainment 
per worker has had no significant positive effect (and possibly a weak 
negative effect) on output per worker. In the second study, Pritchett 
(1996b) shows that public investment in many developing countries is 
frequently inefficient in creating public capital and so is not 
necessarily a source of increased economic growth. 
These two results may well be linked. If those being educated are 
mainly going into jobs in the public sector where investments are 
unproductive, then increasing education expenditure may not be 
translated into higher growth. This is a good example of how human 
capital accumulation may not lead to economic growth. There are two 
lessons here. First, mechanisms have to be found to improve the 
quality and performance of public investment. Second, where it is 
feasible, the investment activity may be transferred to the private 
sector. 
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In addition, increasing the stock of human capital will have no 
effect (other than increasing government spending on education) 
unless there is also an increase in the demand for skilled labour. In 
most economies in the study, there is limited employment for the more 
highly educated part of the workforce, leading to emigration of skilled 
workers. This has been the case in Fiji, for example, which has recently 
experienced a high rate of emigration of such workers. Clearly, the 
policy framework must not place impediments in the way of business 
creating employment for a skilled workforce. 
Foreign investment represents an important solution to both sides 
of this problem. On the one hand, foreign companies create a demand 
for skilled labour. On the other hand, they provide a low-cost means of 
training labour as well as a conduit for diffusion of foreign technology. 
Countries wishing to acquire superior foreign technology have three 
options: they can engage in their own research and development; they 
can imitate state-of-the art foreign products and processes; and they 
can obtain the technology via international spillovers from 
multinational firms. For a small economy, the first of these options is 
the most expensive, followed by the second with the third option the 
lowest-cost means of 'catching up' to the world's best.2 The foreign 
investment route facilitates human capital formation (and 
employment) as well as transferring important knowledge to the 
economy as a public good, thus increasing factor productivity. 
It is therefore important that governments wishing to promote 
growth should try to reduce cultural, institutional and policy 
impediments to a healthy inflow of foreign investment. In the case of 
the Pacific islands, the impediments are many and include excessive 
government regulations, reluctance to admit foreign investment and 
skilled foreign workers combined with unpredictable government 
treatment of multinationals, wages which are high relative to 
productivity, and insecure property rights. 
Property r ights 
There is strong evidence that a clearly defined legal regime of secure 
property rights is institutionalised by most countries when they reach 
a certain stage of development (Feeny 1988). There is also evidence 
that countries which have not made property rights secure in this way 
have generally experienced some difficulty in attracting foreign 
investment and have not been able to achieve, or at least sustain, high 
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growth. The Pacific island economies are a good example of this, 
combining a cultural predisposition towards common rather than 
private property with limited government commitment to security of 
land tenure for private agents. For example, in Fiji 83 per cent of land 
is in traditional ownership while for Papua New Guinea the figure is 
97 per cent. In the Kingdom of Tonga, all land is owned by the King 
with each citizen guaranteed a piece of land. In each of these cases, 
trade in land titles is illegal. 
The sort of institutional change associated with a move to a system 
of secure property rights over land is typically the outcome of a 
political process. A common property regime is sustained as a self­
reinforcing equilibrium in which the gains to individual agents from 
claiming more property for their own use are outweighed by the cost 
of disruption if others do the same (Rapaczynski 1996). This 
equilibrium is disturbed when the value of land increases beyond a 
certain point and disruptive conflicts occur or the government bows to 
political pressure from influential interest groups for the state to 
implement an enforcement mechanism. When the gains to the 
participants exceed the potentially large fixed costs of introducing a 
legal system of private property rights, such a system is implemented. 
A range of factors influence the demand for and supply of institutional 
change. In this case, the demand for change is increased by anything 
which increases the demand for land, thus driving up land rents. 
Thus, improvements in a country's terms of trade, new technology 
which raises the marginal product of land, income growth, emergence 
of alternative income-producing uses for the land and increased 
foreign investment may all be expected to increase the demand for 
secure property rights. 3 
On the other side of the political market, the supply of a secure 
private property rights regime by the state will also depend on a 
number of factors. The supply of institutional change will be larger, 
the lower the cost of introducing the change, the greater the private 
stake of policymakers, the greater the dependence of the ruling group 
on support from foreign firms. Supply of this change will clearly be 
reduced if the ruling group believes in, or gains financially from, a 
common property regime. 
Whatever the outcome, it is clear that ultimately a system of legally 
sanctioned private property rights can only be implemented and 
sustained if the constituency is prepared to accept it or at least there is 
not widespread violent opposition to it. Moreover, experience in a 
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number of countries tells us that such a system will usually be 
implemented as the growth process proceeds.4 This suggests that one 
approach to encouraging emergence of secure property rights is to 
remove the other impediments to market activity-liberalise trade, 
remove capital restrictions, simplify access for foreign investors, 
deregulate the labour market. Such policies will for a while promote 
higher growth. This growth will increase the opportunity cost of land 
and increase the pressure for an institutional change with respect to 
property rights. 
The problem with this laissez-faire approach is that political markets 
are known to be imperfect. Policymakers are subject to political 
capture by the most highly organised pressure groups and the same 
forces which induce governments to underprovide imported goods 
(via trade restriction) may induce them to underprovide secure 
property rights. Thus, there may be a case for economists to pressure 
the government to reform the property rights regime before it would 
be otherwise inclined to. However, in the case of the Pacific island 
economies, there is a further complication. The cultural attachment to 
traditional ownership (which has reversed some private property 
regimes implemented by colonial powers) creates a strong bias against 
a move to private tradeable property. Given this strong cultural 
affinity with common ownership, it is unclear whether the best course 
is to urge the state to take a stronger line in changing the property 
rights system or whether it would be more prudent to create the other 
conditions for a market-based economy to flourish and allow the 
property rights regime to evolve. It is certainly important that the state 
should not itself contribute to insecurity of property rights by leaving 
open the possibility of seizure of assets of foreign companies. 
Labour markets 
There are three aspects of labour markets that affect growth in the 
Pacific islands. The first is the high levels of unemployment which are 
endemic in all of these economies. This means that each economy is 
operating well below capacity and has scope for growth to move it out 
to its own production frontier. The second and related problem is the 
presence of minimum wage floors, either in the form of a legislated 
minimum or a high reservation wage in the private sector. The third 
and perhaps most serious problem is the low level of labour 
productivity in most sectors throughout the region. Low labour 
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productivity reduces the long-run steady state level of GDP and so 
reduces growth rates for the foreseeable future. 
Because the high rates of unemployment may be remedied by 
increasing the demand for labour, it is tempting to advocate 
government spending on employment programs. However, this 
would be the incorrect response for two reasons. The first is the 
obvious one that numerous growth studies have found high 
government consumption expenditure to be negatively related to 
growth. The second is that the poorly devised governance structures 
in the public sectors result in incorrect incentives for workers and 
managers leading to higher public sector wages and lower worker 
effort than in the private sector. Because the public sector tends to be 
large, this puts upward pressure on the reservation wage of a worker 
entering the private sector and also drives up the minimum working 
conditions which workers are prepared to accept in the private sector. 
An expansion of the public sector to accommodate existing 
unemployed workers will exacerbate this problem, driving up wages 
and reducing worker productivity in b oth sectors of the economy. It 
will not offer any permanent solution to the unemployment problem 
but will in fact make matters worse by retarding growth (increased 
public sector borrowing requirement, higher interest rates reducing 
private capital accumulation) and creating fewer employment 
opportunities for a growing workforce in the future. 
In many cases Pacific island economies have attempted to ensure 
minimum living standards for workers by implementing legislated 
minimum wages. This will clearly aggravate the employment 
problem. However, as McGavin (1997) has noted, the legal minimum 
wage may not always be the binding constraint. Because of 
'subsistence affluence', the reservation wage tends to be high in any 
case. This view is supported by the experience in Papua New Guinea 
where wage deregulation in 1992 did not result in any significant fall 
in wages in Port Moresby below the previous legal minimum. 
Two reasons for low labour productivity have already been noted: 
a large public sector with a suboptimal governance structure and a 
strong culturally determined preference for leisure. Another factor in 
at least two cases may be labour unions. Although unions do not play 
an important role in most Pacific island economies, both Fiji and 
Papua New Guinea have a high proportion of unionised workers 
outside the subsistence sector. As well as bargaining for higher wages, 
unions also bargain for better working conditions for their members. 
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These frequently take the form of longer breaks, less on-the job 
monitoring of performance, higher manning ratios, and so on. The 
phenomenon of such 'effort bargaining' has recently received attention 
in the labour literature (Andrews and Simmons 1995)5 and provides 
another rationale for reduced worker productivity. The ability of 
unions to bargain for lower worker effort may be reduced by import 
competition so that a more liberal trade regime may provide a back­
door means of increasing worker productivity in unionised industries. 
In the majority of cases where unions are absent, some productivity 
improvement can be expected by a contraction of the public sector 
(reducing its effect on the reservation wage), an improvement of 
governance structures in the public sector, increased import 
competition and, in the longer term, a better educated workforce. 
It should be noted that higher productivity is not without cost. 
When individuals work harder, they are giving up valuable leisure 
time. Correct growth accounting should ideally allow for the loss of 
wellbeing due to reductions in leisure and increased job stress. Growth 
is not just about producing more goods and services but also about a 
better way of life. It is therefore essential that the attractive elements of 
the way of life in the Islands be preserved. However, some change is 
essential if the present combination of high population growth and 
low productivity growth is not to lead to economic decline and social 
disruption. 
I nternational trade 
The literature on international trade and growth suggests a number of 
ways in which trade liberalisation can affect growth. Many of these 
effects are based on the increasing returns models of Romer, Grossman 
and Helpman and others and must be treated with caution until more 
empirical support can be found for these models. A common effect, 
often referred to as the integration or scale effect, is based on the 
expansion of the size of the market which occurs when two economies 
start trading with each other-producers now can sell their products 
to the foreign market as well as the domestic market, leading to an 
increase in the scale of their output. If this increase in scale occurs in a 
high-growth sector (one with increasing returns and spillovers) then 
the economy's growth rate will increased as discussed. A bilateral 
reduction in tariffs would yield a similar effect. There are two good 
reasons to ignore this effect in the present study. First, the empirical 
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support for scale effects in growth is poor. Second, this effect is not 
attainable through any form of unilateral trade liberalisation. It relies 
on reciprocity and a bilateral view of the gains from trade. For small 
open economies there are good reasons to focus on the growth effects 
of unilateral rather than bilateral trade reform. First, there are strong 
arguments why unilateral trade liberalisation has favourable growth 
effects for small countries. Second, domestic vested interests 
frequently use non-liberalisation by trading partners as an excuse for 
deferring domestic liberalisation altogether. It is therefore important 
that the growth-enhancing effects of unilateral reform be emphasised. 
Another common effect, sometimes referred to as the allocation 
effect is typified in the Lucas model (see also Grossman and Helpman 
1993). In fact this is really just a sectoral scale effect, referring to the 
change in growth which is induced when trade shifts resources 
between sectors. If resources move from the low-tech sector to the 
high-tech sector in the Lucas model, the growth rate increases. 
Although both unilateral and bilateral changes in tariffs can, in theory, 
produce this outcome, its empirical relevance is dubious in the present 
context because it also is driven by increased scale. Other effects 
emanating from the endogenous growth literature are primarily 
concerned with the effect of trade on development of new goods and 
processes and are of more relevance to industrial countries which are 
technology leaders than to the Pacific island economies. 
To find important causal links between trade and growth, it is 
therefore necessary to look beyond the endogenous growth models for 
effects that operate in the absence of spillovers and increasing returns. 
This area is relatively unexplored, but a number of possib ilities seem 
relevant to the Pacific island economies. 
As a general point, international trade increases the exposure of an 
economy to market forces and ultimately exerts pressure on it to make 
its own institutions and policies more compatible with market activity 
and discipline.6 Opening an economy up to international trade changes 
the relative prices faced by domestic producers and consumers and can 
put upward pressure on land rents, increasing the political pressure 
for increasingly valuable land to be subject to a legal system of private 
property rights (Feeny 1998) . This is an important pre-requisite for 
growth in the Pacific island economies . 
Increased import competition can also serve as a 'back-door ' 
means of reforming labour markets. While there is disagreement 
among empirical economists about the size of the effects (Richardson 
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1995), a wide range of theoretical models predict that increased 
exposure to imports will increase unemployment and reduce domestic 
wages. In models with labour market distortions and bargaining over 
work practices, trade is generally thought to induce increased labour 
productivity by reducing the 'size of the cake' that firms and workers 
are bargaining over (see Campbell and Vousden 1995) although the 
likely size of such an effect in the Pacific island economies is unclear. 
While the increase in labour productivity will tend to increase growth, 
trade liberalisation is not a perfect substitute for labour market reform. 
It must be accompanied by direct deregulation of the labour market if 
unemployment is to be contained.  
Protection of domestic industries tends to reduce labour 
productivity for another reason. A tariff often reflects a government's 
commitment to protect an industry. If the industry knows that this is 
the government's objective and that the tariff is designed to ensure the 
industry's viability (sometimes called 'made-to-measure protection'), 
then the industry will tend to 'cost-pad' in much the same manner as a 
regulated industry (Tornell 1993) .  As a result, protected firms will tend 
to be characterised by overstaffing and inefficient work practices. In 
this environment, removal of protective barriers will drive up labour 
productivity. 
It is also worth mentioning a rather different effect of trade which 
works through the increase in the variety and/ or the quality of 
products available through increased trade. Availability of this more 
attractive menu of goods may cause workers' preference for income 
relative to leisure to increase and thus drive down their reservation 
wage. This will drive down wages generally and may be an important 
effect in economies such as those in the Pacific islands where import 
barriers have been traditionally high. 
As a final point it should be observed that growth in Pacific island 
economies will generally be increased by the reduction in the cost of 
imported inputs when trade is liberalised (Lee 1993). This will 
facilitate factor accumulation and growth in much the same way as an 
increase in the productivity of labour. 
G rowt h and i neq uality 
One concern which is sometimes voiced when governments undertake 
market reform is that the reform process may lead to a significant 
increase in inequality. Aside from an innate social preference for a 
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more equal distribution of income, increased inequality has potential 
to impede growth for several reasons. The first is that very large 
increases in inequality may lead to high levels of social conflict which 
will threaten the very workings of the society with grave implications 
for economic growth (Venieris and Gupta 1986; Persson and Tabellini 
1994; Benhabib and Rustichini 1996). 
Second, an increase in the incomes of the poor will increase 
savings ratios. Third, there is evidence that reduced inequality leads to 
increased investment in education and faster human capital 
accumulation (Birdsall, Ross and Sabot 1995) . Certainly several cross­
sectional studies suggest a negative association between inequality 
and economic growth (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Persson and Tabellini 
1994; Clarke 1995). However, these studies tell us nothing about 
causation. A more recent time-series study by Deininger and Squire 
(1996) finds no significant relationship between growth and inequality, 
although this is probably because the measured changes in inequality 
over time tum out to be very small. On the other hand, this study does 
establish a significant positive causation from growth to a reduction in 
poverty. 
Thus, there is reason to be optimistic about the effects of the reform 
process on inequality. On the one hand, there is little evidence to 
suggest that economic reform systematically leads to any large 
permanent increases in inequality. On the other hand, there seems to 
be strong evidence to support the view that the growth which 
normally accompanies reform will raise the real incomes of the poor, 
thus mitigating likely social conflict outcomes. Of course, short-term 
shifts in income distribution can create political pressures which, if 
handled badly, can disrupt or reverse change. For this reason, it is 
important that safety net programs are in place to lessen the impact of 
change on displaced workers, and so on. The adjustment process will 
also be less painful and subsequent productivity growth more assured 
if the workforce meets certain minimum standards of education. 
Equality at a low level of education is a poor basis for productivity 
growth. Thus, universal primary school education should be a priority 
in the allocation of public funds (notwithstanding the reservations 
expressed about more ambitious education programs) .  With these 
qualifications, increases in labour productivity resulting from the 
policy changes recommended will overcome short-term problems in 
income distribution and raise the incomes of the lower-paid workers 
over time. 
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Pol icy concl usions 
Although endogenous growth theory has contributed to our 
understanding of many aspects of the growth process, particularly by 
directing attention to the determinants of technical change, empirical 
tests suggest that it has some way to go before it offers a model of 
growth which can be used with assurance for policy formulation. The 
safe course is to use an extended form of the neoclassical model 
incorporating human capital as an input and try to identify 
institutional and policy changes which will increase long-run steady­
state productivity and income and hence promote higher rates of 
transitional growth for the following 60-70 years. For the case of the 
Pacific island economies this end is best served by improving the 
operation of labour markets, removing impediments to foreign 
investment, reducing import barriers and encouraging the 
implementation of a legally-sanctioned system of property rights in 
land. This last objective would be best served if enforcement by the 
state is accompanied by other market-based reforms which would 
over time increase political pressure for such institutional change to 
occur. Such changes would be expected to increase the level and rate 
of growth of factor productivity as well as increasing the supply of, 
and demand for, human and physical capital. 
There is strong evidence to suggest that if the appropriate market­
based policies are in place, then high growth will follow while the 
prospects of achieving high growth without such policies are poor 
indeed. The Pacific island economies require a large policy shift in 
most of the areas mentioned if they are to escape the potentially dire 
consequences of the combination of high population growth and low 
productivity growth. 
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Notes 
The author is grateful to Ron Duncan and Chris Manning for helpful 
comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
Eighteen of the 135 countries in the data set are omitted because of 
missing data. 
See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995). 
See Chand and Duncan (1993) for a more formal model of the 
demand for secure land access. 
See Feeny (1988) for a discussion of the experiences of Thailand, 
Burma and the Philippines. These examples show how long a 
process is involved in moving from a system of communal 
ownership without land tenure rights for individuals to a system 
with such rights. 
There are at this stage no studies of this issue for developing 
countries. 
Several of the island governments are highly dependent on trade 
taxes for revenue. Where there is no other viable tax base, this may 
be inevitable. But it has to be recognised that freeing up trade will 
mean finding alternative tax sources and that such reforms will 
take time to implement and may be politically unpopular. 
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The nexus between crime and 
productivity in Papua New Guinea 
Satish Chand and Theodore Levantis 
Crime raises the costs of doing business, in tum lowering labour and 
total factor productivity. Shift work and intensive use of capital and 
equipment in a climate of high crime is not possible; the consequence 
being low productivity of both factors of production. This chapter 
provides a brief survey of the extent of crime; then proceeds to consider 
the reason for the crime problem in Papua New Guinea, and finally 
suggests policy options in combating crime. 
Papua New Guinea is renowned for its crime and has thus acquired 
a reputation as being an undesirable country to visit. The country is 
shunned as a tourist destination despite its natural endowments being 
comparable to neighbouring tourist destinations such as Fiji and 
Indonesia- Fiji has more than 20 times as many tourists as Papua 
New Guinea. Prospective businesses are deterred from establishing in 
Papua New Guinea due to the high risk of crime-related losses and the 
high security costs that are necessarily incurred. Despite these 
disincentives to investment, Papua New Guinea attracts significant 
amounts of foreign direct investment, almost all of which is directed to 
the extractive sector to capitalise on the rich mineral resource 
endowments of the country. The returns from such investments must be 
sufficient to offset what may be thought of as the crime premium. 
Crime in Papua New Guinea is particularly disturbing due to its 
brutal nature. Violent robberies, pay-back murders and rape are 
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regularly reported in the daily newspapers. Though crime is present to 
some degree throughout the country, violent and property crime is 
endemic in the urban centres-Port Moresby and Lae in particular. 
Given the extent of crime in Papua New Guinea and the detrimental 
impact of this crime on GDP and growth, a social cost-benefit analysis 
of increased outlays on controlling crime is important. Becker 
(1968:170) observes that ' . . .  crime is an economically important activity 
or "industry", notwithstanding the almost total neglect by economists'. 
This claim is highly relevant to present day Papua New Guinea. 
The extent and cost of cr ime in Papua New G u i nea 
As an indication of Papua New Guinea's crime problem, Levantis 
(1997a) conservatively estimates the annual property crime rate in 
Papua New Guinea's urban centres at 33,000 incidences per 100,000 
population-double that of neighbouring Australia-and the violent 
crime rate at 2,000 crimes per 100,000 population-ten times that of 
Australia and six times that of Fiji .  Since the latter is a Pacific nation of 
similar culture and level of development, Papua New Guinea's 
reputation as a nation overwhelmed by crime and violence appears 
well earned.  Based on field surveys in Port Moresby, Levantis also 
found that 14.8 per cent of the urban work-force engaged in crime as 
their primary source of income. In 1995 as a percentage of GDP the 
losses to victims by way of theft amounted to 2 per cent (Table 2 .1 ) .  
Table 2 . 1  Papua New Guinea: estimates of  di rect losses due to 
crimes of larceny, 1 995 
Direct losses 
Thefts (transfers to criminals) 
Private expenditure on security 
Public expenditure on law enforcement 
Total d i rect lossesb 
(K'OOO)a 
1 1 4 ,464 
49 , 602 
1 06,41 1 
270 ,477 
a 1 kina equivalent to approximately US$0.72. 
Per cent of GDP 
2 . 0  
0 .8  
1 .8 
4.7 
b Total direct losses exclude the value of direct losses by victims of vandalism or 
violent crimes. 
Source: Levantis, T., 1997a. The labour market of Papua New Guinea: a study of 
its structure and policy implicat ions, PhD Thesis, The Austra lian National 
Universi ty, Canberra:Tables 3.4 and 3.5. 
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Private expenditure on security for protection against crime was a 
further 0.8 per cent of GDP and this was despite public expenditure on 
law and order amounting to 1 .8  per cent of GDP.1  In aggregate, the 
direct financial cost of crime for 1995 was 4.7 per cent of GDP. Over and 
above these financial penalties are psychic costs incurred by victims of 
crimes due to violence or vandalism. 
Besides these direct costs of crime, there are repercussions from 
crime that reverberate throughout the community, resulting in 
substantial external costs. For example, as crime increases, so does fear 
and anxiety in the community. As Sah ( 1991 :1,272) argues, ' [c]rime and 
the fear of crime have a deep negative impact on the well-being of 
individuals and societies' . In the urban centres of Papua New Guinea, 
fear of attack has restrained population mobility, particularly after dark. 
For these reasons, the high incidence of crime gives an unpleasurable 
aspect to living in Papua New Guinea's urban centres. Crime's impact 
on fear, anxiety, and freedom in the community therefore represents an 
important cost, quantification of which in monetary units is difficult. 
In the course of a crime of larceny, external costs by way of damage 
to property or person inevitably occur. Businesses not only have to wear 
losses due to theft but are required to provide substantial security costs 
to try to protect themselves from criminal activity. As a specific example, 
a hire company in Port Moresby reported that on average each of their 
cars gets stolen four times a year. The danger of operating at night 
makes double shifts, and hence intensive use of plant and equipment, 
impractical. Accordingly, only if a business is particularly lucrative will 
it operate in Papua New Guinea and so overcome these impositions on 
costs and efficiency. Thus, external costs due to loss of potential output, 
will be very large though very difficult to measure. 
Private sector activity in urban Papua New Guinea has been 
stagnant over the last thirty years. Whereas urban population increased 
four-fold between 1968 and 1995, formal employment opportunities 
have remained virtually static (Figure 2 .1 ) .  Papua New Guinea is 
locked in a low growth trap where unemployment and crime is on the 
rise while business activity is stagnant or declining. 
Besides the implications for the supply of output there are also 
consequences of crime for demand, in particular, the demand for tourist 
services and the flow-on effects to production that tourism brings. The 
seemingly enormous potential for development of the tourist industry is 
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unrealised, basically due to crime. A proposed trek across the Kokoda 
trail, a visit to the Sepik River, or a drive to the highlands is inevitably 
preceded by desperate warnings and tales of woe about previous tours 
from the locals. One cannot understate the impact this has had on 
production. 
Figure 2.1 Papua New Guinea: trends in urban population and formal 
employment, 1 986-95 
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Source: Levantis, T., 1997a. The Labour Market of Papua New Guinea: a study of its 
structure and policy implications, Economics Division Working Paper, National Centre 
for Development Studies, The Austral ian National Universi ty, Canberra:Table 1 .3. 
The causes of c rime in Papua New G u i nea 
According to the economic theory of crime (see Becker 1968), a person 
will engage in criminal activity so long as there are expected net gains 
to utility. Extended to Papua New Guinea, the above logic states that 
the environment must be such that  there are superior opportunities in 
crime relative to those available elsewhere. One of the causal factors is 
undoubtedly the high level of surplus labour in urban centres. 
According to the 1990 Census the level of surplus labour in Papua New 
Guinea's urban centres was around 30 per cent and has likely 
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worsened since then. It is a usual theoretical and empirical finding in 
the economics of crime literature that surplus labour is a particularly 
strong causal variable in the incidence of crime (see Yamada et al. 1993 
and Benson et al. 1992). Like most developing nations, Papua New 
Guinea is without a social security system and so the lack of 
'legitimate' employment opportunities forces people to seek alternative 
sources of income. The informal sector, home to many workers in Asia, 
is undeveloped in Papua New Guinea. This may be due to two reasons. 
First, government regulation regarding informal business activity­
inherited from Australia-is not conducive to such activity. The 
opportunities in street vending, for example, are severely curtailed by 
various government regulations (Lodewijks 1987). Second, the fixed 
costs of crime prevention are prohibitive for the operation of informal 
business, the majority of which lack economies of scale. 
While the high rate of surplus labour is an important contributor to 
crime, Levantis (1997a) found that more than 70 per cent of those 
depending on illegitimate activities as a way of living were content in 
their activity and were not seeking formal employment. Clearly, the 
story goes beyond unemployment and points to the significant 
opportunities in crime. A feature of the crime sector of Papua New 
Guinea is the lack of deterrence. It is an occupational hazard of crime 
that there will be costs in the form of sanctions if caught. The lower the 
probability of being sanctioned and the weaker the sanctions the lower 
will be the expected costs and so the more attractive will crime be 
relative to legitimate forms of earning income. Whoever said 'crime does 
not pay' was probably not referring to crime in Papua New Guinea. In a 
study of the law and order problem in Papua New Guinea, Clifford et al. 
(1984) suggest 'crime may be the business with the best profits and the 
least risk' . The risk of being caught by the police is extraordinarily low. 
According to Levantis (1997a), the typical probability of being arrested 
for crimes of larceny is just over 3 per cent. Then there is the poor 
conviction rate, most often due to inefficiently prepared police 
prosecutions.2 In the event that one is unfortunate enough to be 
apprehended, convicted and imprisoned then there is no need to 
despair because there still remains a good chance of escaping the 
corrective institution. Gupta (1991 ) gives mention to the fact that 'the 
probability of escape or release from jail is high' and an examination of 
the case studies in Clifford et al. (1984) would lead one to quickly 
conclude that, in so far as security is concerned, Papua New Guinea's 
prisons are very much the antithesis of Alcatraz. Consider, for example, 
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that in mid-1993, there were 2,000 prison escapees at large (National 
Centre for Development Studies 1993), and to put this into perspective, 
the total prison population has hovered around 4,000. When all of these 
considerations are factored in, the expected probability of sanction for 
crimes of larceny is barely 1 per cent. 
Optimal expenditure on law and order 
A computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of Papua New Guinea 
developed by Levantis (1997c) is used here to assess the benefits of 
applying greater public resources to law enforcement and, in particular, 
to determine the optimal level of spending on law and order. The model 
is a static general equilibrium model structured in a way typical of the 
ORANI family of models (Dixon et al. 1982) . As Dervis (1975:78) 
succinctly explains, this type of model is characterised by ' . . .  neo­
classical production functions and price responsive demand functions, 
linked around an input-output matrix in a Walrasian general 
equilibrium model that endogenously determines quantities and prices' 
(cited in Dixon et al. 1982:5). 
Importantly, and essential for a CGE model of Papua New Guinea, 
crime is incorporated as a labour force activity and an industry. Further, 
external costs produced by crime are incorporated within the model. 
The model makes conservative estimates of the external costs due to 
property damage in the course of the performance of crimes and due to 
lost production opportunities. A conservative approach is necessary 
because the extent of lost production opportunities, while unambiguous 
in their enormity, will never be able to be determined accurately. Some 
reference to survey results of business costs and comparisons with Fij i  
are used in determining the extent of  these costs. The difficulty of 
measuring the external costs due to psychic effects means that they are 
not considered in the model, so the results here can be considered as 
those pertaining to the lower bound. 
Critical to estimating the impact of increasing expenditure on law 
and order is to provide an appropriate elasticity of the incidence of 
crime with respect to changes in law and order expenditure. Although 
there have been a number of attempts in the literature to estimate this 
elasticity, these are almost always applied to United States data. Lack of 
data prevents any reliable estimate being made for Papua New Guinea. 
In any case, estimating this elasticity is complicated by the fact that 
increases in crime are likely to be met by policy responses resulting in 
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increases in law and order expenditure. Law and order expenditure 
must therefore be endogenous in any econometric model. In his classic 
empirical study, Ehrlich (1973) used an appropriate simultaneous 
equation model as did Benson et al. (1992). If we average the results of 
the two studies we have an elasticity of the incidence of crime with 
respect to changes in law and order expenditure of -1 .09.3 We consider 
it reasonable to say that law enforcement is less efficient and so less 
effective in Papua New Guinea than in the United States, and we want 
to be conservative in our estimates, a reasonable estimate to apply in the 
model is -0.5. This is less than the lower figure of -0.66 from Benson et al. 
(1992) . 
By iteration, we determine with the CGE model that it is optimal to 
increase expenditure on law and order by 117 per cent or to increase it 
to K194.6 million from its 1994 level of K89.6 million. A feature of the 
CGE model is its ability to determine an equivalent variation measure of 
the change in social welfare, and to disaggregate this measure into 
various components. Figure 2.2 shows the relationship between 
increasing expenditure on law and order and the equivalent variation. 
Naturally, as expenditure increases, the marginal benefits of increasing 
expenditure decrease, and so the relationship is concave. In increasing 
expenditure by K105 million, the net gain to welfare, as measured by 
the equivalent variation, increases by K68 million or 1 . 17 per cent of 
GDP. This result is contingent on the elasticity of crime used in the 
model. By iteration, it was found that the elasticity would have to be 
reduced to a very low -0.16  for a 5 per cent increase in expenditure on 
law and order not to provide a net benefit to social welfare. Unless it is 
believed that the impact on crime of increasing resources in law and 
order is this trivial, increasing expenditure on law and order would 
unambiguously improve social welfare. 
In Table 2.2 we decompose the equivalent variation measure into 
various components. In particular, we focus on the effects on welfare of 
the re-allocation of unskilled labour resources and of changes in 
aggregate labour supply, the impact on welfare due to changes in 
markets subject to tax distortions, and the effect of increasing 
government expenditure on law and order. The unskilled labour market 
is subdivided into five sectors; the village and plantation sectors which 
are rural-based, and the urban formal, informal (legitimate) and crime 
sectors which are urban-based. There is no open unemployment in the 
model as all surplus labour is assumed to move into informal employment 
or crime. 4 The labour resource re-allocation effects are the changes in 
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welfare of each sector given that the plantation sector is the numeraire. 
Put another way, the welfare result for each sector is to be interpreted as 
the change in welfare due to labour resources moving to, or from, the 
plantation sector, and changes in welfare occur because each sector is 
subject to distortions. 
The urban formal sector is subject to a distorting wage for unskilled 
labour, and the informal sector wage is affected by Harris-Todaro style 
distortions. Consistent with the surplus labour model described in Corden 
(1974), it is assumed that village production is characterised by productive 
units comprising of a family or extended family where surpluses to 
production are shared, but only with those actually working the land. 
Persons who leave to find employment elsewhere lose their entitlement to 
the surplus. In this way, there is a distortion in village sector labour of the 
difference between the marginal and average products. A person engaged 
in crime receives a return for their efforts, but contributes nothing to 
production and in fact causes negative externalities. The distortion from 
the involvement of labour in crime is therefore substantial with the value of 
the marginal product negative due to these externalities. 
Figure 2.2 Papua New Guinea: the impact of law and order spend ing on 
welfare 
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The net benefit to welfare due to the re-allocation of unskilled labour 
resources is substantial at 3.0 per cent of GDP (Table 2.2). This is by and 
large due to the reduction of labour resources in crime. In Table 2.3 we 
detail the movements in labour resources and see that the 117 per cent 
increase in expenditure on law enforcement causes a decline of nearly 32 
per cent in those relying on crime as a way of living. The distortion in 
village labour means that the movement of labour resources into the 
village sector causes a decline in welfare of 0.08 per cent of GDP, while the 
movement of unskilled labour resources into urban formal employment 
sees a contribution to welfare of 0.04 per cent of GDP. The net negative 
impact on welfare of the change in aggregate skilled and unskilled labour 
supply is 0.02 per cent of GDP, however, a strong qualification to this 
result is that it is based on an assumption that the opportunity cost of 
leisure is zero. Another important contributor to welfare is the income tax 
component. This is due to the increased supply of skilled labour who are 
payers of income tax. The opportunity cost of increased government 
expenditure on law and order of KlOS million is a cost to welfare of 1 .82 
per cent of GDP. Overall, the net welfare effect is a 1 .17 per cent increase. 
The arguments so far have been based on static considerations. 
Table 2.2 Papua New Guinea : decomposition of the equivalent 
variation at the optimal expenditure on law and order 
(1994 kina) 
Change Per cent of GDP 
(K'OOO) 
Labour resource re-allocation effects 
Vi l lage sector -4 ,735 -0.08 
Formal urban and mining sector 2 , 230 0 .04 
I nformal sector - 1 75 -0.00 
Crime sector 1 73.629 1 70 , 949 3.00 2.96 
Effect of a change in the labour supply - 1 ,264 -0.02 
Impacts on welfare due to tax distortions 
Production tax distortions -360 -0 .01  
Tax distortions on intermediate inputs -902 -0.02 
Consumption tax distortions -629 -0 .01  
I ncome tax distortions 4 830 2,939 0.08 0.05 
Effect of increase in government 
spending on law and order - 1 05,000 - 1 . 8 2  
Total equ ivalent variation 
(sum of components) 67,625 1 .1 7  
Note: The labour resource re-allocation components are t o  b e  interpreted a s  the 
effects of labour moving between the respective sectors and the plantation sector­
the plantation sector is the numeraire. 
Source: Authors' estimations. 
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Table 2.3 Papua New Guinea: impact on employment 
Change Per cent change 
Unski l led employment levels 
Vi l lage sector 
Plantation sector 
Formal urban and mining sector 
I nformal sector 
Partici pation in crime 
Ski l led employment l evels 
Plantation sector 
Formal urban and mining sector 
Source: Authors' estimations. 
1 0 ,31 8 
-3, 1 49 
3,896 
982 
- 1 7 , 1 85 
- 1 , 483 
2 ,936 
Attacki n g  crime with a 'big push'  of resou rces 
1 .76 
-5 .72 
1 3.26 
3.68 
-31 . 9 5  
- 1 4 . 3 1  
2 . 3 1  
Three complementary means of attacking the crime problem in Papua 
New Guinea are considered. First, labour market deregulation, 
allowing wages to adjust to supply and demand forces, will alleviate 
some of the unemployment. This is being done through labour-market 
reforms, including wage deregulation. Second, relaxation of regulations 
restricting informal sector activity would allow this sector to grow, 
helping to draw labour out of crime. But surplus labour is only part of 
the problem. Third, effectiveness of the law-enforcing mechanisms has 
to be improved. Of particular concern is the ineffectiveness of the police, 
the corrective institutions, and the legal systems. If an objective of the 
government is to reduce crime, then more resources will have to be 
devoted to these areas. 
Organised crime in urban Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby in 
particular, has a sharp pyramidal structure (Harris 1988) . The line 
workers who engage in theft and robbery do so on the instruction of 
their superiors. The employees in the organisation are highly 
specialised, those high on the hierarchy engage in disposal of items 
obtained by the line workers. The lower rungs of the crime industry are 
characterised by easy entry and exit, so the bottom rung of the pyramid 
is competitive. Alternative employment sources could entice workers 
out of the bottom rung, hence flatten the structure. The current pyramid 
organisation is difficult to break by law-enforcing agencies. A flatter 
pyramid would be easier for the police and the judiciary to infiltrate. 
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It is argued that outlays to curb crime have to be made in significant 
'lumps' if a program of improved law enforcement is to be successful in 
achieving its goal. The current practice of increasing outlays in a piece­
meal fashion may be ineffective in that forces within the economy 
gravitate towards a low equilibrium trap. Suppose the growth of 
business (both formal and informal) is the key to drawing labour from 
crime and hence to lowering of the organised-crime pyramid, but the 
business sector is prevented from growing due to the high costs 
associated with crime. Consider a scenario where unemployment rises, 
say due to population growth with stagnant employment opportunities 
(Figure 2.1) .  The increase in unemployment feeds into crime, which in 
tum will cause an increase in costs for business. This will further affect 
their viability and cause a contraction in the number of businesses which 
will again feed into unemployment and crime. 
Consider a simple model to depict this predicament. In Figure 2.3 we 
plot the number of firms (N) against the growth rate of firms ( N ), and 
assume the existence of multiple-equilibria as shown. Outlays that push 
the economy beyond NT number of firms (the T superscript is for 
threshold) will push the economy out of the low equilibrium trap, after 
which internal forces will cause the economy to gravitate to EH, the high 
equilibrium where N1 number of firms operate. As an example, putting a 
few more police on the street will make business at the margin profitable, 
hence attract a few fresh entrants. But these new entrants will only 
remain viable when the extra policing is present, the withdrawal of this 
outlay will cause exit of the new firms and push the number of firms back 
to N0• It is clear that in this scenario, small outlays on crime control are 
going to be effective in the short run and only until the resources are 
spent after which the economy reverts back to the low equilibrium, EL. 
The low equilibrium is a trap in that it requires a ' lumpy' allocation 
to enable crossing of the threshold and hence movement to the high 
equilibrium, EH'5 The threshold here acts as a trigger point beyond 
which the private marginal benefit of getting a potential criminal off the 
street is more than the cost-arbitrage holds at EH. It is proposed that 
Papua New Guinea is currently in this low equilibrium trap. 
The extent of expenditure required to reach the threshold is a 
negative function of the deterrence effect of crime. This threshold can be 
reached by raising crime deterrence and through encouraging private 
sector growth via direct incentives, the mix between these two 
determined by equalisation of the social returns from each. Within the 
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latter means, if areas could be designated where security was 
guaranteed by the public sector then firms may grow in numbers 
without further incentives. An alternate strategy may be to provide 
insurance against property damage and subsidies by the public sector 
for private provision of such services. Further to this, some coordination 
by the public sector to collect a nucleus of firms together may be 
necessary. The employment generation would have an externality on 
aggregate output beyond what is captured by the individual firm, hence 
the benefit of a coordination role of government. 
Figure 2.3 Papua New Guinea: growth and number of smal l  businesses 
. N =- J1li dt 
Pol icy recommendations 
N 
Already, 5 per cent of government expenditure goes to law enforcement, 
yet this study concludes that a substantial increase in resources for law 
enforcement is justified. The estimates from the CGE analysis are 
conservative. 
An increase of 117 per cent, equivalent to K105 million in 1994 
prices, in spending on law enforcement will therefore provide a net 
gain to social welfare of at least 1 .4 per cent of GDP. If this amount of 
spending is sufficient to push the economy out of its low equilibrium 
trap and past the threshold then permanent gains will be realised.  
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Notes 
Of the total of K106.4 million spent on law and order, K29.5 million 
was spent on prison operations and K76.9 million on police 
services. 
Clifford et al., 1984 report that in 1983 just 55 per cent of cases 
brought before both the National Court and the district courts led to 
convictions. 
This is based on the average of the following elasticities 
1 .  /3 1 = elasticity of crime with respect to the probability of being 
caught 
2. /3 2 = elasticity of probability of being caught with respect to police 
expenditure 
3. /3 3 = elasticity of probability of being caught with respect to 
crime. 
f3 1 . f3 2 We then determine our elasticity as a = ----
l - /3 1 . /33  
This i s  consistent with survey findings in Levantis 1997a. 
See Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) for an analogous 
application to industrialisation. 
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Labour market reform in Papua 
New Guinea: a quantitative 
assessment of the welfare 
effects 
Theodore Levant is and George Fane 1 
Labour market regulation in Papua New Guinea reached a new level 
in 1972 with the introduction by the then Australian administration of 
a Minimum Wages Board. On the advice offered by leading Australian 
trade union officials the Minimum Wages Board immediately took on 
an agenda of substantial increases in urban minimum wages. By 1975, 
real minimum wages had increased an extraordinary 118 per cent; 
over the same period, real minimum wages in the regulated rural 
sector increased just 2 per cent.2 After Papua New Guinea's 
independence in 1975, and until 1992, policy of the Minimum Wages 
Board reverted to increases in minimum rates either partially or fully 
compensating for changes in the cost of living, and so real minimum 
wages declined slightly between 1976 and 1992. Whereas urban wages 
had been about 40 per cent above rural wages in the period 1968-71, 
the gap had reached 190 per cent in 1975, and was still over 170 per 
cent in 1992. Papua New Guinea also inherited institutionalised 
annual leave loadings, penalty rates, and fringe benefits, so that wages 
have made up only about 60 per cent of total labour costs in Papua 
New Guinea. 
The consequences for output, employment and unemployment in 
Papua New Guinea in the two decades following the minimum wage 
rises of 1972-75 are consistent with the predictions of neo-classical 
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economics. Private sector urban regulated employment in 1971 was 
just over 95,000, but the impact of the subsequent hike in real wages 
saw this fall 17 per cent by 1974 to under 79,000 and recover little after 
that. Incredibly, by 1992, private sector employment in urban centres, 
at 90,000, was still 5 per cent below its level of 1971 . Papua New 
Guinea's experience of urban employment stagnation during these 
two decades contrasts starkly with the experience of neighbouring 
developing countries in the Asia Pacific region, where GDP grew with 
unprecedented rapidity in the 1970s and 1980s, and this rapid overall 
growth was associated with even faster rates of growth of urban 
employment and manufacturing output. Stagnation in private sector 
employment in Papua New Guinea has been in conjunction with high 
and persistent rural to urban migration which has led to growing 
concerns of underemployment and of social problems. Crime in 
particular has become severe. The proportion of the urban population 
with formal jobs roughly halved from 48 per cent in 1971 to 24.5 per 
cent in 1992, and Papua New Guinea's notoriety for crime has 
exacerbated the lack of job opportunities by frightening off both 
foreign investment and potential foreign tourists. 
An ordinary least squares regression of private sector urban 
regulated employment and real average weekly earnings for 28 annual 
observations in the period 1969-96 gave the following results 
Mr = 2.57 + 0.00 12t - 0.28�Wt - 0 .092�_1 - 0 .46Lt-l 
(2.75 ) *  (0.68) (-1 .77) (-1 .83) (-2.66) 
(DW= 1 .59; R2 = 0.33) 
L is the natural logarithm of private sector regulated urban 
employment, the operator � indicates the change in a variable from 
the previous year; and W is the natural logarithm of real average 
weekly earnings.3 The variable t is time in years since 1968, which was 
included to proxy assumed trends in technology and the capital stock. 
DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic, which is between the upper and 
lower possible bounds for significance at the 5 per cent level; t­
statistics are shown in parentheses under the respective coefficients; an 
asterisk indicates significance at the 5 per cent level. 
The coefficients on the change and the lagged change in wages 
both just fail to be significant at this level; the point estimate of the 
long-run elasticity of private regulated urban employment with 
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respect to real earnings is 0.2. Since this elasticity is obtained from an 
aggregate regression of total skilled and unskilled regulated urban 
employment on average earnings, it cannot be directly compared with 
the results reported later using the CGE model, in which there are 
separate equations for skilled and unskilled employment. 
The 1982 report to the Papua New Guinea government by Garnaut 
and Baxter (1984) argued that the early decisions of the Minimum 
Wages Board had resulted in levels of wage costs which were 'far too 
high for internal balance' (1984:98). Views such as these contributed to 
the Minimum Wages Board retracting its strong regulatory stance in 
the late 1980s, culminating in the sweeping reforms of the 1 992 
Minimum Wages Board determination. The urban minimum wage for 
newly hired unskilled adult employees was slashed from K61 .60 to 
K22.96 per week. However, the Minimum Wages Board made it illegal 
for employers to reduce the nominal wages of adult employees who 
had been hired before the 1992 decision, and to compensate for recent 
price increases, the minimum wage for these continuing employees 
was increased from K61.60 to K62.83 per week. 
The new minimum of K22.96 applied nationally across all rural and 
urban based employees and to 1997 has remain unadjusted. Except 
perhaps in very rare and exceptional circumstances, the new national 
minimum wage appears not to have been binding. In a survey 
conducted across Lae and Port Moresby in 1995 by Levantis (1997b) 
the lowest weekly wage recorded for any adult employee was K30. 
Nevertheless, the effects of wage regulation appear to have persisted 
long after 1992 with Levantis (1997c) in a survey of informal market 
activities finding that earnings in unregulated activities were still well 
below those in regulated activities. Of all those earning K62.83 per 
week (the minimum for workers hired before 1992) or less in regulated 
activities, Lev antis (1997b) found that 31 per cent were earning exactly 
K62.83 per week. Firms in the regulated sector appeared to be faced by 
a de facto minimum wage for unskilled workers which was well above 
the new minimum of K22.96 per week, and also above the average 
wage of employees with comparable skills in the unregulated sector. 
Given the well established surplus labour problem in Papua New 
Guinea's urban centres it is perhaps surprising that employers did not 
grasp the opportunity given by the Minimum Wages Board to hire 
new labour at very much reduced rates. But there are a number of 
constraints to an employer 's ability to reduce wages-not least of 
which is the high reserve price for labour as demonstrated by average 
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earnings in informal activities, at K41 per week in 1995 (Levantis 
1997c), well exceeding the national minimum. Another reason for the 
persistence of a de facto minimum wage is the desire to maintain 
harmonious labour relations and paying very different wages to 
workers doing the same jobs would have generated grievances and 
perhaps industrial unrest. These grievances would have also had 
negative implications for staff morale and loyalty-and perhaps given 
rise to insider-outsider type losses in efficiency. 4 In effect, efficiency 
wages have been paid to newly hired workers so that their wages 
continued to exceed that available for comparable workers in the 
unregulated sector. 
The average weekly wage of all those now earning K62.83 or less in 
the regulated sector in 1995 was K56.02. It is plausible to assume these 
workers would have been earning the minimum wage of K62.83 per 
week in the regulated sector in 1992, if they were able to find jobs in 
the regulated sector. In 1995 prices, the 1992 minimum wage of K62.83 
corresponds to K79.48. From this we can roughly estimate that the 
average real wage in the regulated sector of members of this group 
was 41 .9 per cent higher in 1992 than in 1995: the average nominal 
wage was K62.83 in 1992, but only K56.02 in 1995, and the price level 
was 26.5 per cent higher in 1995. We classify as 'unskilled' those 
workers who earned K62.83 or less per week in the regulated sector in 
1995. All other workers are classified as 'skilled'. With this definition 
of unskilled workers, unskilled wages in the regulated sector would 
have been 41 .9 per cent higher in 1995 had the Minimum Wages Board 
continued to fully index minimum wages.5 
The main objective of this chapter is to assess the effects on 
aggregate welfare, employment and wages in each sector, of restoring 
the pre-1992 minimum wage rate for unskilled workers. To do this we 
perform a simulation using a CGE model for Papua New Guinea 
where unskilled wages in the regulated sector are raised by 41 .9  per 
cent in real terms. 
A computable general  eq u i l i bri u m  model of Papua New 
Guinea 
The model used is taken from Levantis (1998). It differs from other 
single-period CGE models, such as the Orani model (Dixon et al. 1982), 
mainly in its explicit treatment of the labour market, the informal 
sector, and crime. It is based on full optimising behaviour; the 
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parameters of the behavioural relationships describing consumption 
and production were mostly derived from Vincent et al. (1991)  and are 
documented in Levantis (1998). 
The treatment of the skilled labour market is standard: the supply 
of skilled workers is assumed to be exogenous and the wage for 
skilled workers is assumed to adjust to equate demand to this 
exogenous level of supply. The unskilled labour market is modelled 
along the lines suggested by Harris and Todaro (1970), except that 
unregulated urban activities take the place of open unemployment in 
the Harris-Todaro model. In our tables, those engaged in these 
activities are classified as employed in crime, or in the 'legal 
unregulated' sector. In the Census these people would have mostly 
been classified as unemployed. 6 
The workings of the unskilled labour market can be explained by 
referring to the first column of Tables 4.1 and 4.2, which summarise the 
levels of employment and wages in the base situation (the actual 
situation in 1995). The average unregulated rural wage was taken to be 
the national minimum of K22.96 per week, whereas earnings for 
unskilled workers in urban areas averaged K56.02 per week in 
regulated activities, but only K40.57 per week in unregulated activities. 
Taking a weighted average across regulated and unregulated urban 
unskilled activities, gives average urban earnings of K44.70 per week. 
Average urban unskilled earnings are therefore 95 per cent above rural 
earnings, and it is assumed that this differential would persist even in 
the complete absence of labour market regulation. We model this 
difference by assuming that each unskilled worker can choose to supply 
either 1 unit of urban labour, or 1 .95 units of rural labour.7 Labour 
market equilibrium then requires that the urban unskilled wage is 95 
per cent above the rural unskilled wage. 
The basic Harris-Todaro structure of the unskilled labour market 
can be represented by the following equations in which w is the wage, L 
is the level of employment, and the superscripts r, R, and U denote the 
rural, regulated urban, and unregulated urban sectors respectively.8 
[1 + a].wr =S. WR+[l-s].wu 
s=LR (wR )![Lu (wu ) + LR (wR )], 
L' (w' )+[l+a ]. [Lu (wu )+LR (wR )]=L I 
( 1 )  
(2) 
(3) 
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Equation 1 requires the weighted rural wage to equal the average 
urban wage; the parameter a is 0 .95 in our model. The average urban 
wage is defined as the regulated wage multiplied by the share, s, of 
urban workers with regulated jobs plus the unregulated urban wage, 
multiplied by the share, 1-s, of urban workers with unregulated jobs. 
Equation 2 defines the share of urban workers with regulated jobs in 
terms of the functions, LR ( wR ) and Lu ( wu ) , which show how the 
demand for workers in each category depends on the wage for that 
category. Equation 3 requires the total demand for labour (with urban 
labour weighted to reflect its greater social cost than rural labour) to 
equal the total supply of labour, Lr. .  With the unskilled urban 
regulated wage, wR , set exogenously by the Minimum Wages Board, 
these three equations determine the variables wR ,  wu , and s. In the 
CGE model, the three employment levels, i; ,  LR and Lu are not 
literally functions only of the three wage levels, wr ,  wR , and wu . 
Rather, there is a derived demand for each type of labour in each 
sector, and the demands and supplies for the outputs of the various 
sectors are simultaneously determined. 
We denote the values of the marginal product (VMP) of labour in 
the three sectors by vr ,  v R ,  and vu . Let dY denote the total value of 
all the extra physical amounts produced due to any small exogenous 
change in which the total supply of labour is kept constant. Note that 
dY differs from the increase in the total value of output by excluding 
the revaluation effects of price changes. By definition 
dY = v r .dL r + v u  .dL u + v  R .dL R (4) 
0 = dU + [l + ] . [dLu + dLR] (5) 
If the wage in the rural sector is equal to the value of the marginal 
product of labour in the rural sector, then, multiplying both sides of 
Equation 5 by vr = wr I and subtracting it from Equation 4 gives 
dY =[ v u -[ l+a ] w r ] . dL u + [ v R - [ l+a ] w r ] . dL R (6) 
Equation 6 provides a decomposition of the change in aggregate 
real output due to any arbitrary re-allocation of labour among sectors. 
The first of the two terms on the right side is the amount of labour 
drawn from the rural sector into the unregulated urban sector, dLu , 
multiplied by the size of the 'distortion' in the unregulated urban 
sector, defined as the excess of the values of the marginal product of 
unregulated urban labour over its opportunity cost in the rural sector. 
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The second term on the right side of Equation 6 gives an exactly 
analogous expression for the regulated urban sector. 
Equation 6 is a simplified version of the equation used to 
decompose the efficiency gains from labour re-allocation in the full 
CGE model. One complication ignored, but included in the full CGE 
model, is that within the rural sector a distinction is made between the 
plantation and the village sectors. The plantation sector wage is 
considered to be equal to the values of the marginal product of labour, 
but for village sector labour there is assumed to be a distortion 
because villagers who migrate are assumed to lose their claims to rents 
on family land.9 The decomposition of the welfare effects reported 
below for the full CGE model therefore uses the plantation wage as 
the opportunity cost of labour in defining the distortion in each other 
labour market, and omits the change in employment in the plantation 
sector (rather than in the whole rural sector) from the right side of 
Equation 6. The employment change terms in the amended version of 
Equation 6 should therefore be thought of as the amount of labour 
drawn from the plantation sector into each other sector. 
It is assumed that the wage equals the values of the marginal 
product of unskilled labour in the regulated urban sector and within 
the legal part of the unregulated urban sector but due to labour 
market regulation, wages and values of the marginal products in the 
regulated sector exceed those in the unregulated sector. The distortion 
in the regulated sector, defined as the excess of the values of the 
marginal product of regulated labour over its opportunity cost in the 
plantation sector, is therefore equal to the regulated urban wage minus 
1 .95 times the wage in the plantation sector. The value of this 
distortion is Kl,154 per employee per year. This is the direct efficiency 
gain of moving a worker from the plantation sector to the regulated 
urban sector. The direct impact on the value of output at constant 
prices of diverting a worker to the unregulated urban sector from the 
plantation sector is -K341 .  
Crime is  included in  the full CGE model as  an unregulated urban 
activity and is the most important distortion not included in Equation 
6. Consistent with the findings of Levantis (1997c) crime is considered 
an important labour market activity in Papua New Guinea. 10 The 
values of the marginal product of criminal 'workers' is negative-for 
every one kina of net earnings of criminals, it is assumed that the 
victims of crime suffer a loss of (1 + 8) kina. The net earnings of each 
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criminal are assumed to be a decreasing function of the number of 
criminals, and the size of the criminal population is assumed to adjust 
to equate the net earnings per criminal to the wage in unregulated, 
legal, urban activities. The consumption of criminals is treated just like 
the consumption of other citizens, and the net earnings of criminals 
are therefore modelled as transfers, rather than waste. The difference 
between the costs of crime to its victims, and its benefits to criminals is 
treated as waste, and is referred to as 'the net external cost of crime'. 
The first term on the right side of Equation 6 is actually decomposed 
into two terms, one for legal and one for criminal activities in the 
unregulated urban sector. The term for criminal activities is 
[ v c - [1 + a ] w r ] • d L c 
here vc is the values of the marginal product of each criminal and c is 
the increase in the number of criminals. Since each criminal has net 
earnings of wu , the values of the marginal product per criminal is 
vc = -8 . ( 1  + y) .wu 
where y (which is negative) is the elasticity of earnings per criminal 
with respect to the number of criminals . 11 The time wasted by 
criminals in criminal activity is not part of the external cost of crime as 
defined above; rather, it is measured by the term [ 1  +a ]  w r .  
Measuring the welfare effects of wage regulation 
The results of the simulations using the CGE model measure the 
effects of an increase of 41 .9  per cent in the real wage for unskilled, 
regulated, urban activities. This is our estimate of the increase needed 
to restore the minimum wage to its real level in 1992. In reporting the 
simulations, we distinguish three main situations, 'base' (B), 
'regulated' (R), and 'equivalent' (E). These situations are defined as 
follows: 
Situation B ('base') : the wage for unskilled workers in the regulated 
sector is K56.02 per week, as in 1995, and the consumer price index is 
at its actual level of 1995. 
Situation R ('regulated') : the minimum real wage for unskilled 
workers in the regulated sector is increased by 41 .9 per cent relative to 
situation B, so as to restore the real wage level of 1992. In adjusting the 
nominal wage, allowance is made for the endogenous effect of 
regulated wages on the consumer price index. 12 
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Situation E ('equivalent' in its effect on welfare to raising the 
minimum wage) : the minimum wage for unskilled workers in 
plantations and in the regulated sector is held at the same level, in real 
terms, as in 1995 ( that is as in situation B), but foreign grants received 
by Papua New Guinea are adjusted endogenously to make welfare 
equal to the level attained in situation R. 
To avoid the misleading welfare effects which would arise in a one­
period model in which government spending does not explicitly enter 
utility, net foreign assets and all real investment and real government 
spending are held constant. By definition, the required change in foreign 
grants received by Papua New Guinea between situations B and E is the 
equivalent variation (EV) of increasing the minimum unskilled wage by 
41 .9 per cent. Because increasing the minimum unskilled wage reduces 
welfare, the equivalent variation is negative. The two simulations 
reported in section 4 are (1) an uncompensated increase in the real wage, 
that is, a movement from B to R, and (2) a compensated increase in the 
real wage, a movement from E to R. 
Useful insights into the sources of the welfare effects measured by 
the equivalent variation can be obtained by disaggregating the 
equivalent variation into its components. This is achieved by dividing 
the finite change into a large number of small changes, in each of 
which utility is constant, and applying the method of Harberger (1971) 
in each small change-the equivalent variation in any small change is 
equal to the sum across all distorted markets of the product of the 
change in the level of activity in that market and the size of the 
distortion. The distortion is defined as the excess of the marginal social 
benefit of the activity over its marginal social cost a definition which is 
consistent with classifying as 'undistorted' those markets in which 
whatever is bought and sold has a marginal social benefit equal to its 
marginal social cost. Tables 3 and 4 give the results of this 
disaggregation. Equation 6 provides a simplified version of how the 
welfare effects of labour market distortions are disaggregated into the 
amounts corresponding to the re-allocation of labour among sectors; 
additional effects (Table 3.5) also arise from changes in the levels of 
activities subject to distorting taxes. 
Resu lts 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 summarise the effects of reintroducing the minimum 
wage of 1992 on the rural and urban labour markets. The proportionate 
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fall in unskilled regulated urban employment is only about a third of 
the proportionate increase in the real wage, so demand for unskilled 
regulated urban labour is relatively wage inelastic . As a result, total 
earnings in this market are increased by the increase in the minimum 
wage. To offset the extra rents accruing to regulated urban labour, the 
unregulated urban labour force increases by more than the reduction 
in the regulated urban labour force, and so correspondingly, the 
unskilled rural labour force falls. The actual fall in rural employment 
is just under 3 per cent, the proportionate falls in village and 
plantation employment are roughly equal. The fall in rural 
employment is matched by an increase of 9,000 workers in the total 
urban labour force. A further 5,000 workers are displaced from the 
regulated urban sector, and so 14,000 workers are drawn into the 
unregulated urban sector. Of these, about 1 ,000 find their way into 
legal informal employment, the remaining 13,000 take up crime as a 
way of living. 
Table 3.1  Papua New Guinea: simulated changes in  wages 
Situation B E R I ncrease I ncrease 
Base Welfare High min.  B to R E to R 
equiv. of R wage 
( 1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
(K/week) ( K/week) (K/week) (per cent) (per cent) 
Unski l led nominal wages 
U rban , regulated 56.02 55.64 79.42 4 1 . 8  42.7 
U rban , unregulated 40.57 40.41 37. 1 3  -8 .5  -8 . 1  
U rban, average 44.70 44 . 5 1  45. 83 2.5 3.0 
Rural 22.96 22 .86 23.54 2 .5  3 .0  
Unskil led real wages ( 1 995K) 
U rban , regulated 56.02 56 .02 79.49 4 1 . 9  4 1 . 9  
U rban, unregulated 40.57 40. 68 37. 1 6  -8.4 -8.7  
U rban , average 44.70 44.8 1  45.87 2.6 2.4 
Rural 22.96 23.01 23.56 2.6 2.4 
Memo items 
C P I ,  base = 1 00 1 00.0 99.33 99 .9 1 0.6 
Wage ratio, urban: rural 1 .95 1 . 95 1 . 95 
Notes: The three situations B, E, and R are described in the text. Numerica l  estimates 
are taken from Levantis (1997a). 
Source: Levantis, T., 1997a. The labour market of Papua New Guinea: a study of its 
structure and policy implications, PhD Thesis, The Australian National University, 
Canberra. 
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The distribution of skilled (and semi-skilled) employment between 
the urban and plantation sectors is affected little by the simulation. 
Since unskilled employment in the regulated sector is less than a 
quarter of total employment in the regulated urban sector (29,400 out 
of 127,100 workers in the base situation), the 16 .9 per cent fall in 
unskilled urban employment in the regulated sector is accompanied 
by a fall of only 3.2 per cent in total regulated urban employment. It is 
interesting to compare this result with the actual change-urban 
private sector formal employment in 1 992 was 4.3 per cent lower than 
in 1995.13 Employment therefore increased after the reforms of 1992 
reversing the fall in employment between 1972 and 1992. 
Table 3.2 Papua New Guinea: est imated effects on employment of 
wage regu lation 
Situation B E R 
Base Welfare High min.  I ncrease Increase 
equiv. of R wage B to R E to R 
( 1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5 ) (6 ) 
( 'OOOs) ('OOOs) ( 'OOOs) (per cent) (per cent) ('OOOs) 
Number of unski l led workers 
U rban , regulated 29.4 29.4 24.4 - 1 6 . 9  - 1 6 .9  -5 .0  
Legal , unregulated 26.7 26.5 27.3 2.3 3. 1 0.8 
Crime 53.8 54.2 67.2 25.0 24. 1 1 3.0 
U rban , unregulated 80.5 80.7 94.5 1 7. 5  1 7.2  1 3. 9  
Vil lages 586.0 585.3 569.5 -2 . 8  -2.7 - 1 5 . 8  
Plantations 55 . 1  55.4 53.9 -2 . 1  -2.8 - 1 . 5  
Rural 641 . 1  640.7 623.4 -2. 8  -2.7 - 1 7.3 
Total unski l led 751 .0 750.8 742. 4  - 1 . 1  - 1 . 1  -8.4 
Total unski l led 855.0 855.0 855.0 
(wei ghted) 
Number of skilled workers 
U rban 1 27. 1 1 27. 1 1 27. 1 
Plantations 1 0. 4  1 0.4 1 0.3 -0.4 - 1 . 1  -0 . 1 
Total ski l led 1 37.5 1 37.5 1 37.4 
Total ski l led 295.9 295.9 295.9 
(wei ghted) 
Total skil led and u nski l led 
U rban regulated 1 56 . 5  1 56.5 1 5 1 .5 -3.2 -3.2 -4. 9  
U rban unregulated 80.5 80.7 94.5 1 7.5 1 7. 2  1 3.9 
Rural 651 . 5  651 .2 633.8 -2 .7 -2.7 - 1 7.4 
Total ski l led 888.4 888.3 879 .8 - 1 .0 - 1 .0  -8 .5  
and unski l led 
Notes: The three situations B, E, and R are described in the text. 
Source: Authors' estimates. 
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Table 3.3 shows the response of some other variables of interest. If 
the welfare effects of raising the minimum wage are not removed by 
adjusting foreign grants, that is in the movement from B to R, the CPI 
falls only by 0.1 per cent; with traded goods as numeraire, this means 
that the real exchange rate scarcely changes. Restoring the 1992 level of 
the minimum wage would reduce real GDP by 0.6 per cent; the bulk of 
this fall is accounted for by the displacement of labour from rural 
employment and regulated urban employment into crime. The values of 
the marginal product of labour in the two former activities is relatively 
high, whereas in crime it is negative. For an uncompensated increase in 
minimum wages (the movement between B and R), the absolute fall in 
real GDP is matched by an equal fall in real consumption; this occurs 
because government expenditure, investment, and the trade balance are 
held constant. The proportionate fall in real consumption is 1 .4 per cent. 
In the case of a compensated increase in minimum wages (the 
movement between E and R), consumption stays constant in real terms 
and the fall in GDP shows up in a fall in net exports, financed by the 
increase in foreign grants needed to hold welfare constant. In all cases, 
net capital outflow is held constant by assumption. 
Not surprisingly, the main welfare effects of raising minimum 
wages arise from changes in the unskilled labour market. The intuition 
behind these welfare effects is shown in Table 3.4, and the actual 
welfare effects are shown in Table 3.5. Column 1 of Table 3.4 shows the 
estimated earnings per week in each part of the unskilled labour 
market; column 2 shows the corresponding values of the marginal 
products of each category of unskilled labour. The earnings levels 
shown in column 1 are simply the averages of those in situations E 
and R of Table 3 .1 .  Column 4 measures the annual average (in 
situations E and R) of the distortion in each labour market, defined as 
the excess of the values of the marginal product of that type of labour 
over its opportunity cost in terms of plantation labour. 
By construction, this distortion is zero for plantation labour. It is 
large and negative for labour engaged in crime-most of the 
magnitude of the distortion in crime is due to the opportunity cost of 
labour in plantations. 14 The large positive distortion for labour in the 
regulated urban sector arises because minimum wages artificially 
restrict employment in the urban regulated sector. Employment in the 
legal unregulated urban sector is inefficiently large because workers 
take unregulated urban jobs while searching for regulated urban jobs; 
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it is too high in the village sector because workers stay there to avoid 
losing their share of household rents. 
Column 5 of Table 3.4 shows the absolute changes in each type of 
unskilled employment as a result of a compensated wage rise between 
situations E and R. Column 6 is the product of columns 4 and 5; that is 
each employment change is multiplied by the corresponding average 
distortion between E and R. The items in column 6 therefore correspond 
to the terms on the right side of Equation 6, and their sum therefore 
corresponds to the increase in the value of output due to the re­
allocation of labour between situations E and R: the transfer of workers 
from villages, plantations, and high-wage, regulated, urban jobs into 
low-wage urban jobs and crime reduces output by an estimated K32 
million. This is roughly equal to the actual fall in real GDP due to 
raising the minimum unskilled wage between B and R, or E and R. 
Table 3.3 Papua New Guinea : effects of wage regulation on selected 
variables 
Situati on B E R Increase I ncrease 
Base Welfare High min .  B to R E to R 
equiv. of R wage (per cent) (per cent) 
CPI (base situation = 1 00) 1 00.0 99.3 99.9 -0. 1 0 .6  
Real G D P  (mi l l ion kina) 5 ,709 5 ,706 5 ,675 -0. 6  -0 .6 
Real  consumption 
(mil l ion kina) 2 ,422 2,387 2,387 - 1 .4 
Nominal consumption 
(mil l ion kina) 2,422 2,37 1 2 ,385 - 1 . 5  0 . 6  
(mi l l ion ki na) (mi ll ion kina) 
Trade surplus (mil l ion kina) 906 938 906 -32 
Foreign grants (mi l l ion kina) 1 77 1 45 1 77 32 
Net capital outflow 
(mil l ion kina) 1 ,083 1 ,083 1 ,083 
Notes: Consumption and GDP are measured after deducting goods wasted in crime. 
Investment and government expenditure, net of  goods purchased by government and 
stolen by criminals, are held constant throughout in real terms. Net capital outflow is 
held constant a t  border prices. Foreign grants are held constant between B and R, but 
adjusted endogenously to keep welfare constant between R and E. Since relative and 
absolute prices change very little, real consumption is an almost perfect indicator of 
welfare, and the absolute fall in real GDP between E and R is almost exactly equal to 
the increase in foreign grants between E and R, and to the fall in consumption between 
B and R. In small changes these equalities would hold exactly, in large changes they 
hold only as approximations whose accuracy depends on the constancy of prices. 
Source: Authors' estimates. 
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Table 3.4 Papua New Gu inea : distortions in  the unski l led labour 
market 
Variable Earnings V M P  Urban/ Distortion Employ- Emp. rise 
p/w p/w rural wt. ment rise *d istortion 
Situati on Average Average Average E to R E to R 
of E and R of E and R of E and R (Table 3.3) (4) x (5) 
Units K/w K/w K/yr 'OOOs K'OOO/yr 
( 1 ) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Urban , 
regulated 67.53 67.53 1 . 95 1 , 1 54 -4. 98 -5,746 
U rban , legal 
unreg ulated 38 .77 38.77 1 . 95 -34 1 0.82 -280 
U rban crime 38.77 -3.35 1 . 95 -2 ,531  1 3.04 -33,020 
Vi l lage 23.29 1 4. 8 1  1 .00 -44 1 - 1 5 . 76 6947 
Plantations 23.29 23.29 1 .00 - 1 .54 
Total unski l led -8 .41 -32 ,098 
Notes: The earnings data in column (1) are taken from Table 3. 1 .  Except for crime and 
the village sector, the values of the marginal products in column (2) are assumed to 
equal the corresponding levels of earnings; the direct values of the marginal product of 
crime (i .e., excluding the value of the criminal's own time) is conservatively estima ted 
to be minus 8.6 per cent of earnings per criminal (see note 10). The value of the 
marginal product of village labour is assumed to be only 63.5 per cent of the earnings 
in this sector because of the 'Manoilescu-effect.'  The weights in column (3) correspond 
to the [1 + a ] weights in Equation 3; the estimate a =  0.95 in urban sectors is taken from 
the premium, noted in Table 3 .1 ,  of the average urban wage over rural earnings. The 
'distortions' in column (4) are the values of the marginal products in column (2) minus 
those in the plantation sector, multiplied by the column (3) weights, and therefore 
correspond to the coefficients of the employment change terms on the right side of 
Equation 6. The employment changes in column (5) are taken from Table 3.3. Column 
(6) is the product of columns (4) and (5); each entry therefore corresponds to a term on 
the right side of Equation 6. 
Source: Authors' estimates. 
Table 3.5 collects together our complete estimates of the welfare 
effects. The first part of the table shows the labour market effects. 
Column 1 reproduces the approximations derived in column 6 of 
Table 3.4, while column 2 gives the actual welfare estimates. In all, a 
return to labour market regulations and a minimum unskilled wage at 
the level of 1992 would cause a fall in welfare equal to 1 .35 per cent of 
consumption. Of this, 0.01 per cent is due to changes in areas of the 
economy subject to tax distortions. The primary aspect of the loss in 
welfare is due to the diversion of labour resources into crime which 
contributes a loss in welfare of 1 .38 per cent of consumption. 
Clearly, the usual argument of raising minimum wages on equity 
grounds is flawed. The fortunate are those in urban formal employment, 
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and intervention to improve their conditions acts to reduce the 
number of fortunate in urban formal employment and increase the 
number of poor in the unregulated urban sector while reducing their 
wage. The previous minimum wage regulations caused the twin 
detriments of increased inequity and reduced economic performance. 
Re-imposing the pre-1992 conditions would not only be detrimental 
for economic performance, but would significantly reduce equity and 
would cause a substantial increase in the law and order problem. 
Table 3.5 Papua New Guinea: welfare effects of min imum wage 
regulation 
Gains in efficiency, 
E to R 
Table 3.4-approx. Components of EV 
K 'OOO 
(1 ) 
Unskil led labou r market distortions 
U rban , regulated -5 ,746 
U rban , legal unregulated -280 
U rban , crime -33,020 
Vi l lage 6 , 947 
Plantation 
Total unski l led labour -32,098 
Tax distortions 
Production tax (including tariffs) 
I mported intermediate inputs 
Consumption taxes ( including tariffs) 
Income tax 
Total tax distortion effects 
Equivalent variation 
K 'OOO % of consumption 
(2) (3) 
-5 ,569 -0.23 
-296 -0. 0 1  
-32,636 - 1 .38 
6 ,756 0.28 
-31 ,745 - 1 . 34 
- 1 32 
-394 -0.02 
201 
68 
-257 -0. 0 1  
-32,002 - 1 .35 
Notes: column (1) gives the approximations derived in column (6) of Table 3.4, while 
column (2) shows the exact estimates from the CGE model. In deriving the column (2) 
estimates, the movement between E and R is divided into many separate small steps, 
within each of which the methodology of Table 3.4 and Equation 6 holds almost 
exactly; the differences between columns (1) and (2) a rise because the magnitudes of 
each distortion vary throughout the movement from E to R, and the average of each 
d istortion at  E and R, which is used in Table 3.4 and column ( 1 ), is not identical to the 
average of the same distortion over all the steps between E and R, each weighted by 
the change at that step. As in Harberger (1974), each tax distortion effect in column (2) 
measures the tax wedge times the change in the corresponding tax base. The sum over 
all distortions in column (3) gives the equivalent variation of  increasing minimum real 
wages from their level in B to their level in R. This, in tum, is equal to the increase in 
foreign grants between B and E. Column (4) expresses the items in column (2) as 
percentages of consumption in the base situation. Note that the equivalent variation is 
-1 .35 per cent of consumption, which is approximately equal to the fall  in real 
consumption between B and R (see Table 3.3). 
Source: Author's estimates. 
Labour market reform in Papua New Guinea I 61  
Notes 
'Labour market reform in Papua New Guinea: a quantitative 
assessment of the welfare effects' is an edited version of an earlier 
paper reprinted from Economic Modelling, Levantis, T. and Fane, G. ,  
'Labour market regulation and deregulation in Papua New Guinea' 
(forthcoming), with permission from Elsevier Science. 
Derived from McGavin (1991), Tables 1 . 2  and 1 .3 .  
Before taking logarithms, both series were indexed to 100 in 1975. 
The observations for average weekly wage in 1993 and 1994 were 
missing; since anecdotal evidence suggests that real wages fell 
sharply at first, and then more gradually following deregulation in 
1992, these observations were interpolated to give the following 
values for average weekly wage from 1992 to 1996, inclusive:  
86.2; 75·; 7ff; 66.2;  66.0. The interpolated values are indicated with 
asterisks. 
This arises when the established workers (insiders) use various 
means to protect their position from new workers (outsiders) .  See 
for example Lindbeck and Snower (1986) . 
Had full indexation been maintained, the minimum wage would 
have been raised from K61 .60 to K62.83 per week in 1992, and then 
kept  at that level in real terms. Instead, the de facto minimum 
nominal wage for unskilled workers had fallen to K56 .02 per week 
by 1995; and between 1992 and 1995, the CPI rose by 26.5 per cent. 
To restore the minimum wage to K62.83 in terms of 1992 prices 
would therefore have required an increase in real terms of 41 .9 per 
cent: 1 .419 = 1 .265 x 62.83 I 56.02. 
According to the 1990 Census, 29.3 per cent of the urban work­
force were unemployed . The Census form left respondents to 
decide how to define unemployment; and a survey by Levantis 
(1997c) of those who regard themselves as being 'unemployed' 
argues that most of those recorded by the Census as being 
unemployed are actually engaged in activities undertaken for pay 
or profit in the unregulated sector; if all such people are excluded, 
the revised level of unemployment is only 4.6 per cent. Since the 
crowding of workers into unregulated activities artificially 
depresses their earnings and productivity, these workers can more 
accurately be described as being 'underemployed', rather than 
'employed' or 'unemployed'. 
In the case of skilled workers, it was estimated from relative wage 
data that each unit of urban labour was equivalent to 2.2 units of 
rural labour. 
In these equations, round brackets ( ) are used to denote functional 
forms; square brackets [ ] are used to collect terms which are 
multiplied or divided. 
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This effect, which was first described by Manoilescu and was 
subsequently analysed by Nurkse (1957) and others, acts as a 
subsidy to village employment. In the CGE model it is assumed 
that the values of the marginal product of village labour comprises 
only 64 per cent of earnings per person in villages, and that rents 
on household assets comprise the remaining 36 per cent. The 
resulting distortion in the village sector, defined as the direct 
efficiency gain due to moving a worker to it from the plantation 
sector, and therefore measured as the VPM of labour in the village 
sector minus the wage in the plantation sector, is -K441 per person 
per year (Table 3.4). Such a shift would leave the worker as well off 
as before, but would make other family members better off by the 
amount of the rents transferred, assumed to be K441 per year. 
10 Levantis (1997c) found that nearly 15 per cent of the urban 
workforce in Papua New Guinea in 1995 relied on crime as the 
main source of income, and the average cash earnings from 
criminal activities was just under K38 per week. 
11 Let T denote the-net-of-waste total earnings of all criminals. Since 
y is the elasticity of earnings per criminal with respect to the 
number of criminals, the increase in T per extra criminal is 
therefore (1 + y )  times net earnings per criminal, wu. Waste 
(defined as the total cost of crime to its victims minus T) is 
assumed to be S T, where e is a constant; therefore the marginal 
waste per criminal is 8(1 + y )wu. Using estimates derived from the 
Report on Law and Order in Papua New Guinea by Clifford et al. 
(1984), Levantis (1997a) obtains y = -0.35 and e = 0.14. 
12 Since the exchange rate is assumed to be held constant throughout, 
and since most goods are assumed to be tradable, the effect on the 
price index is very small; and because an increase in regulated 
unskilled wages results in a fall in the nominal wages of skilled 
workers and of unskilled workers in the urban unregulated sector% 
and because the prices of non-tradable are relatively sensitive to 
the wages of these groups%an increase in the nominal regulated 
wage of unskilled workers actually reduces the consumer price 
index very slightly. 
13 See Levantis (1997:15) .  The estimates of private sector employment 
in 1992 and 1995 are derived using the Bank of Papua New 
Guinea's employment index. 
14 Because of the difficulty in assessing the full extent of the external 
costs of crime, the model takes a conservative approach taking 
account of only a small component of the total-hence external 
costs of crime as measured by the model are relatively small. 
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Building productivity culture in 
Papua New Guinea: changing 
labour market roles for government 
P.A. McGavin 
Achieving improvements in the delivery of public services, 
improving the use of abundant rural resources, addressing supply­
side constraints, and achieving expansion in quality and quantity of 
labour skills, requires sustained commitment by governments to 
constant and consistent scrutiny of public policy influences on 
labour market outcomes-so that these are assessed in terms of 
policy significance for achieving broad-based, sustainable and 
internationally-competitive development for Papua New Guinea. 
Government labour market policy is traced from early regulation, 
through transition toward Independence, and post-Independence­
with a focus on the implementation of the 1992 Minimum Wages 
Board Determination. This analysis assesses attempts at building a 
national productivity culture and practical ways quickly to increase 
labour skills for Papua New Guinea. Recent losses of fiscal control by 
the Papua New Guinea government have caused reversals in gains 
made. There is a need for re-assertion of incipient improvements 
following the 1992 Minimum Wage Board decision and for another 
start at re-building a productivity culture in the delivery of 
government services and in the contribution of government to public 
understanding of productivity improvement in Papua New Guinea. 
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Government and labour market pol icy and regu lation 
Early regulation 
Indigenous production in Papua New Guinea is highly localised. As in 
1884 when British annexation of the Eastern part of the main island of 
New Guinea and the adjacent Coral Sea islands occurred, production 
continues overwhelmingly to occur in local-area agricultural societies 
where land is held under local customary property rights. From early 
days, there was considerable variability by area in the intensity of land 
use. Plantations were developed in areas of relatively low-intensity 
land use that were suited to the production of tropical agricultural 
export commodities. A key production problem for plantations was the 
securing of an adequate and reliable labour supply. Local communities 
in areas contiguous to plantations typically needed available labour to 
sustain customary agricultural production, and were disposed to 
withdraw labour services from plantations according to the priorities of 
these local communities-priorities that differed from the priorities of 
foreign plantation interests. 
From 1906 in Papua, and 1914 in New Guinea, and from 1946 in the 
combined Territory of Papua New Guinea, early Australian 
administrations were concerned to regulate the recruitment of 
indigenous persons for fixed-period plantation work. Fixed-period, 
rather than 'casual', labour contracts were preferred by plantation 
interests because of the prevalence of quitting by indigenous 
employees once 'target incomes' for the acquisition of desired 
market products were achieved. Various Native Labour Ordinances 
governed the system of contract plantation labour ( the 'indenture' 
system), and regulated the length of the indenture, food and 
accommodation, termination payments, and penalties for breach of 
contract. The first legal minimum wage for the combined Territory of 
Papua New Guinea was determined by the Native Labour (Wages and 
Employment) Ordinance of 1 946. Under this ordinance, the indenture 
system was replaced by an 'agreement' system with civil penalties 
for breach of contract. The minimum wage specified minimum 
accommodation, clothing and equipment, daily rations, and Kl .SO 
per calendar month, with a proportion of the cash payment deferred 
until the end of the contract .  The ordinance was revised in 1950 to 
provide for weekly monetary payment for casual workers of K3.30 
for a five-and-a-half-day week of 44 hours ( 'casual' here meaning not 
employed for a contract period of a specified number of years). Thus, by 
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the end of the 1950s, the transition to a cash wage was well under way 
(McGavin 1991a:3lf) .  
Transit ion toward i ndependence 
At the time of the major wage enquiries of 1970-the Cochrane Report 
and the Isaac Report (Territory of Papua and New Guinea 1970a,b )­
the rural minimum cash wage was Kl.00 per week and, with imputed 
cash values for non-cash components, was estimated at K4.83 per week 
on an inclusive cash plus in-kind basis. During the preceding years, the 
growth of urban labour markets led to widespread disregard of 
ordinances, since employers were prepared to pay more than minimum 
rates. In 1961 the Administrator promulgated an urban cash award 
wage of K6.00 per week (McGavin 1991a:32). These developments led 
the Administration to introduce the Industrial Relations Ordinance 1962 
and the Industrial Organisations Ordinance 1 962, providing for industrial 
councils of employers and employees, the institution of boards of 
inquiry, setting-up of compulsory conferences and arbitration tribunals 
for the resolution of industrial disputes, and procedures for registering 
industrial organisations. 
The Cochrane Report counselled against the adoption of a 
contemporary Australian system of compulsory arbitration, and 
proposed a tripartite board comprised of representatives of 
employers, employees, and government, with an independent 
chairman (Territory of Papua and New Guinea 1970a: 176f) . This 
recommendation was implemented by amendment of the Industrial 
Relations Ordinance and the first Minimum Wages Board was 
constituted in 1972. 
After considering 'the problem of a living wage through the basis 
of needs', the Cochrane Inquiry concluded 'in the end it is the ability 
of the economy to sustain a particular level of [wage] expenditure that 
decides the matter . . .  ' (Territory of Papua and New Guinea 1970a:59) . The 
1972 Minimum Wages Board rejected this position, and expressed the 
'primary principle' of achieving a 'family wage' (Minimum Wages 
Board 1972: 15), with the minimum urban wage increasing from KB.00 
to Kll .50 in September 1972 and to Kl3.80 in September 1973. Thereby, 
wage determination in Papua New Guinea was shifted to an 
Australian-style 'needs' basis. This shift was reinforced by the 1974 
Minimum Wages Board that determined a 'needs' basis minimum wage 
of K25.80 for level-1 urban centres as of July 1975 (Minimum Wages 
Board 1974:4:7) .  In addition, the 1974 Minimum Wages Board applied a 
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12.5 per cent loading to the rural minimum wage as a partial move to a 
'family wage' (Minimum Wages Board 1974:3:3) .  The 1974 Minimum 
Wages Board also institutionalised the then Australian practice of 
'indexation', and established six-monthly automatic cost-of-living 
minimum wages adjustments (Minimum Wages Board 1974:3:9) .  
During the prelude to Papua New Guinea independence, wages 
policy became partly an instrument of incomes policy, thereby 
weakening its employment policy effectiveness. With this, there 
occurred large increases in minimum wages that were determined 
along Australian quasi-judicial lines and that were locked-in by 
contemporary Australian-style wages indexation. An inappropriate 
and inflexible wages policy that was detrimental to economic 
growth and development was set in place (Minimum Wages Board 
1992:37). 
Independence to 1 997 
During the period between 1975 and 1992, triennial Minimum Wages 
Board determinations provided 15 adult and 3 non-adult wage minima, 
covering rural and youth minimum wages, and urban adult and youth 
unskilled minimum wages, and minimum urban wages for skill classes 
1 to 6-with urban minima separately set for level-1 and for level-2 
urban centres (McGavin 1993a:80). Until 1992, Minimum Wages Board 
determinations also stated formulae for automatic adjustment of wages 
with reference to the consumer price index (CPI) over the three-year life 
of the determination. Wages indexation has varied between indexation 
by the full movement in the CPI, 'full indexation', indexation of a 
proportion of the movement in the CPI, 'partial indexation', and 
indexation up to certain percentage changes in the CPI, 'plateau 
indexation'. Respective Minimum Wages Board determinations have 
provided base-level wages and adjustment formulae that have found 
corresponding application in public sector wages determination. 
Minimum Wages Board determinations for unskilled employees 
set base-level wages for formal sector employment. The use of 
variable piece rates and daily task quotas, or 'marks', in rural formal 
sector employment allowed an implicit deregulation of rural wages 
that was regularised in the 1989 Minimum Wages Board Determination 
(Minimum Wages Board 1989 :121) .  The nature of non-formal markets 
means that conditions of employment outside regulated or formal 
markets reflect the interaction of supply and demand for market labour 
services. The presence of lengthening queues for unskilled or low-skills 
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formal market employment leads to selection by quality-and resultant 
wide disparities between formal and informal sector wages (McGavin 
1991a:167) . At least since 1986, market rewards for skilled labour 
services have generally exceeded wage minima and have reflected skills 
scarcities (McGavin and Gill 1987:20; McGavin 1991a:161) .  
The 1992 Determination of the Minimum Wages Board marks a clear 
shift in perspective from viewing wages policy as an incomes policy (or 
as an uneasy mix of incomes and employment policies), to viewing 
wages policy as chiefly an instrument for labour market policy. 
Whereas the unskilled adult minimum wage for level-1 centres had 
been 2.7 times the rural unskilled adult minimum wage (McGavin 
1993a:80), the 1992 Minimum Wages Board found no valid basis for 
earlier skills differentials or grading of urban centres (Minimum Wages 
Board 1992:38,67) . For newly-recruited employees, a national 
minimum adult rate was set at the then existing rural adult minimum 
rate of K22.96 a week, and a national youth rate for persons aged 16-21 
years, inclusive, was set at 75 per cent of the adult minimum. The 
Determination included a once-only 2 per cent increase effective 18 
September 1992 of the 18 minima covering existing employees, but 
made no provision for indexation (Minimum Wages Board 1992:4) . This 
was described as 'part of the transition process toward deregulation 
and collective bargaining between employers and employees' 
(Minimum Wages Board 1992:66). Anything above the minimum wage 
is subject to negotiations between employers and employees and their 
respective industrial organisations, and is to be based on productivity 
(Minimum Wages Board 1992:62,67) . On 11 November 1996 at the 
suggestion of the then responsible Minister, the National tripartite 
Consultative Council discussed whether or not to reconvene a 
Minimum Wages Board, and appointed a committee comprising 
employer and union interests headed by the Secretary of the 
Department of Industrial Relations to consider the issue. Instead of 
recommending a reconvening of a Minimum Wages Board, the 
committee presented a Memorandum of Understanding dated 3 October 
1997 that was crafted as a Supplementary Agreement to the 1992 
Minimum Wages Board Determination, and proposed the notification 
of this in the National Gazette, so that it would have the status of a 
'Common Rule' Agreement. This Memorandum of Agreement was 
adopted at the 23 October 1997 meeting of the National Tripartite 
Consultative Council, and provides for a 7.5 per cent increase of the 
National Minimum Wage from K22.96 a week to K24.68 a week. The 
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notification in the National Gazette was 6 November and the new 
National Minimum Wage was effective at that date. 
So far, efforts again to convene a Minimum Wages Board have been 
resisted and the 1996 Budget states that the government intends to 
uphold the 1992 deregulation of wages (Papua New Guinea 1995:50) . 
Contemporary roles for government in labour market pol icy 
Implementi ng possibi l ities opened up by the 1 992 Minimum Wages Board 
determination 
Where wage regulations are reduced, rapid adjustment of wages seems 
unlikely. Production systems adjust over time to regulatory frameworks, 
and quality selection and on-job skills formation mean that wages of 
existing employees (called labour market 'insiders') may be maintained 
even where effective competition from job-seekers (labour market 
'outsiders') is increased as a result of deregulation of conditions of 
employment. Even for non-formal sector employees, rapid wage 
reductions should not necessarily be anticipated (McGavin 1993a:3) . 
This is because these 'unskilled' people have social skills that are 
developed through job tenure and have reputations for reliability, that 
also give them 'insider ' advantages that are not had by 'outsiders' .  
Over time, however, deregulation should lead to wages adjustments, 
and 1995 survey data from Levantis (1997a:103-6, 1997b) gives 
evidence of downward flexibility in wages, including nominal wages. 
It is important that the influence of government policy on wage 
deregulation should not be seen in itself as a sufficient labour market 
policy response. Because of 'insider ' advantages, job growth through 
lower wages is first likely to occur through formal-sector 
recruitment of new employees who are not much in competition 
with existing employees (such as employing security guards instead of 
contracting-out security services), or by the expansion of informal­
sector firms (such as expansion of 'trade stores' into more sophisticated 
retailing activities). Often this employment growth will not be captured 
in survey data that uses out-of-date sample files that do not include 
new firms or sample files dominated by formal-sector firms. Some 
Papua New Guinea observers did not anticipate that employment 
indicators for Papua New Guinea should show weak indications of 
gains in employment since the 1992 Determination (McGavin 1997:72, 
1997b:ll) .  Expansion of employment at lower wages depends, however, 
on 'other things remaining constant' (on ceteris paribus assumptions). 
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The period since the gazetting of the 1992 Determination has been one 
during which investment in greenfields mineral and hydrocarbon 
resources exploration has ground to a halt (McGavin 1994a:xiii), with 
serious repercussions for the Papua New Guinea economy, and where 
fiscal mismanagement has harmed national economic performance. 
Estimates of responsiveness to changes in real wages such as those 
made by Zeitch et al. (1993) and Levantis (1997) set other things 
constant. Noting this, deterioration of employment outcomes, in the face 
of reductions in nominal or in real wages for new recruits to the labour 
market, is to be expected where other key determinants of employment 
are contracting. Levantis (1997:235) estimates that urban unskilled 
formal sector employment at 1995 was 16.9 per cent higher than would 
have been the case in the absence of wage adjustments following the 
1992 Determination of the Minimum Wages Board. 
But recent government policy and the strategy of the 1992 Minimum 
Wages Board Determination is not simply one of employment 
expansion at lower wages. Indeed, that is not at all the thrust of the 
Determination. Rather, the 1992 Determination promotes a strategy for 
employment expansion through productivity improvement that adds 
value to market labour services, and thereby shifts-out the demand for 
market labour services, leading to increases in wage employment. 
The key instrument for productivity improvement as proposed in the 
1992 Minimum Wages Board Determination is workplace reform 
(McGavin 1993b:66). In publicising the 1992 Minimum Wages Board 
Determination, the Employers' Federation of Papua New Guinea stated, 
' [ t]he Employers' Federation strongly recommends that members 
introduce [consideration of] productivity or performance criteria', and 
declared, 'we are all going to have to go through a learning process' 
(Employers' Federation of Papua New Guinea 1992). The Federation 
has subsequently conducted training sessions for members to promote 
understanding of workplace productivity improvement and its 
implementation. Ways further to foster developments of this kind are 
expanded during discussion of the role of the National Training Council. 
The Government of Papua New Guinea has used the 1992 
Determination as an occasion to further workplace reform for govern­
ment employees. The Deparbnent of Personnel Management 
successfully negotiated with the Public Service Association a new three­
year agreement that provided for 1993 salary increases of 3 per cent 
effective 1 January 1993 (of which 2 per cent was backdated to 1 July 
1992), conditional on the acceptance of a performance based salary 
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structure for public sector employees. The 1994 agreement provides for 
a further 3.3 per cent increase available through individual 
performance appraisal. 
The three-year agreement achieved by Department of Personnel 
Management in 1993 has clearly broken the linking, inherited at 
independence, of public sector wage increases with CPI increases. 
Grade increments now form part of the negotiated public service wage 
increases, and these grade increments are dependent on satisfactory 
individual performance appraisal. This performance appraisal 
involves closer scrutiny for those who move beyond the mid-points of 
grade structures. Under conditions of normal staff turnover, wage 
increases that are in part achieved by grade increments become partly 
self-funding (because retiring employees are replaced by base-grade 
employees), while enhanced delivery of public services as a result of 
performance appraisal gives rise to increases in the overall product 
value of public sector services. That is, productivity is raised and 
product unit costs are reduced. Improved public service productivity 
has the potential for substantial direct impact on national productivity, 
since government is the largest employer in Papua New Guinea. Public 
service employment is about a quarter of total wage employment, about 
a third of private or market sector employment, and about 60 per cent of 
private sector employment exclusive of agricultural wage employment 
(McGavin 1993a:82f, 1993b:74). 
Bui ld ing national productivity culture 
The three-year 1993 Performance Based Salary Structure agreement 
provides for annual review and negotiation, and includes 
'productivity performance' (as yet undefined) in the agenda for 
negotiations. It is still early days in the development of a public 
sector productivity culture in Papua New Guinea, and it is essential 
that the motivation for change be sustained and / or renewed and that 
systems of sanctions and rewards to enhance public sector performance 
be strengthened and further developed (McGavin 1992b, 1993a). An 
important change that is likely to promote the success of these 
developments has been the extension in most departments of contract 
employment down to Assistant Secretary level, with accountability 
written into fixed-term contracts, and with employment rewards better 
reflecting market conditions. Work is being undertaken, and should be 
pursued, in the identification and the use of work performance 
indicators as a means of achieving productivity gains. These 
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developments increase and help to maintain the impetus for sustaining 
the 'top-down' management input into the productivity enhancement 
process within the public sector. This kind of 'accountability' in public 
sector employment should probably be extended from Assistant 
Secretary, or branch level, down to Director, or work unit, level. 
The Minimum Wages Board recommendation that 'the government 
should convene a national conference of major industrial groups to 
devise a national productivity index to be used in wage adjustments at 
enterprise and/ or industry level' (Minimum Wages Board 1992:72) was 
taken-up by Department of Personnel Management sponsorship of a 
conference on national productivity measurement. Even if a national 
index based on marginal value improvements could be constructed 
(and this is doubtful), it would be inappropriate to use to determine 
wage increases-because marginal values differ greatly across sectors 
and occupations (McGavin 1993a:9f,93f; UNDP /ILO 1992:47). The 
public service conference seems to have clarified these measurement 
difficulties, and to have highlighted the newness of value-added 
concepts to Papua New Guinea, and particularly to public sector 
activity. Fostering a significant cultural change in public sector 
employment has commenced. The tacit approval involved in the change 
to a Performance Based Salary Structure and the new awareness and 
climate for change requires sharper definition and understanding of 
key concepts for improved and sustained implementation of 
productivity improvement. The Employers' Federation of Papua New 
Guinea has been pushing for the formation of a National Productivity 
Council (McGavin 1991a:207) . 
The Performance Based Salary Structure and associated changes 
in government employment in Papua New Guinea have the 
potential to increase the product value of public services, and 
thereby to contribute to lower product unit costs, to improvements in 
national economic performance, and to growth in wage jobs. The start 
made in the public sector in creating better appreciation of productivity 
improvement notions, and in better appreciation of key concepts for the 
implementing of productivity improvement, points to the need for cross­
fertilisation between the private or market sector and the public or non­
market sector in the development of a national productivity culture. A 
significant role could be played by the National Tripartite Consultative 
Council. This Council was created by the Industrial Relations 
(Amendment) Act 1990, with membership drawn from key economic 
Ministers and six representatives each from the Employers' Federation 
Building productivity culture in Papua New Guinea I 73 
of Papua New Guinea and industry associations, and public and 
private sector unions (recently specified as including the Public Service 
Association and the Trade Union Council) . The National Tripartite 
Consultative Council functions include the improvement of workplace 
relations; interchange between government, employers, and employees; 
implementation of results of interchange between the parties; and the 
promotion of harmony between citizen and non-citizens in Papua New 
Guinea businesses. The sad fact, however, is that the National Tripartite 
Consultative Council did not meet until 1996, when three meetings 
occurred . As noted earlier, significant agenda discussions in 1997 
between employer and employee representatives were delayed while 
awaiting responses from the responsible Minister who convenes 
National Tripartite Consultative Council meetings. 
The National Training Council that was legislatively established in 
1991  with the purpose of developing and implementing the National 
Training Policy (Papua New Guinea 1989) . Legislation in 1993 also 
established an Institute of Public Administration with a charter that 
includes the provision of training courses relevant to the private sector. 
The long-standing Apprenticeship Board, after a period of apparent 
inactivity, has been re-activated through a joint project of technical and 
financial support funded by AusAID and the Papua New Guinea 
government. The National Training Council became active during 1993. 
Three meetings of the National Training Council were conducted in 
1994 and another three in 1995. Meetings were scheduled for the 
National Training Council Overseas Training Committee and for the 
National Training Council Accreditation Committee. Firm policy 
guidelines have been established covering courses delivered by 
distance delivery methods (including those imported from overseas), 
and interim registration has been endorsed for 23 private training 
institutions to conduct training in Papua New Guinea . A major 
development includes the engagement of a consultant in management 
and staff development as part of a Public Sector Training Project funded 
by the World Bank. Agreement has been reached between the National 
Training Council and the Internal Revenue Commission for the Council 
to screen all training programs prior to recommendation to Internal 
Revenue Commission for Training Levy exemptions. The National 
Training Council has established regular reporting practices to the 
Minister; sustained the activities of the Accreditations Committee that 
carries responsibility for ensuring that the programs of training 
institutions meet National Training Council standards; and is 
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finalising a 1996-2000 corporate development plan for the Council. 
These experiences suggest the criticality of Secretariat leadership. 
Legislative changes to the National Tripartite Consultative Council 
have been suggested to change government representatives from 
Ministers to Heads of Departments, but this could be achieved under 
existing legislation by recourse to the Alternatives clause. 
The success of National Training Council compared with the 
inactivity until 1996 of the National Tripartite Consultative Council 
shows that under existing administrative arrangements an energetic 
secretariat director can achieve change, but the system itself lacks an 
adequate governance structure to ensure sustained effective 
operations. This suggests the need for different administrative 
structures that provide both incentives and sanctions to support the 
interests of stakeholders. The Secretariat model successfully used by 
the Government Regulations Advisory Committee during the early 
1990s provides an alternative model. Secretariats located outside the 
public service structure and retained on a fee-for-service basis are more 
likely to be effective. Such secretariats are more likely to provide a 
governance structure that allows public sector, government, and private 
sector interests to ensure that accountability is maintained, and that the 
momentum of activity answers the commitment to achieving change by 
the multilateral parties that must be engaged in building a national 
productivity culture with a strong and sustained emphasis on human 
skills formation and development. 
Vigorous implementation of the functions outlined in the National 
Tripartite Consultative Council charter by a restructured Secretariat 
would contribute to the process of building understanding of the 
processes of productivity enhancement and consensus about its 
achievement. Fostering institutional development of this kind is a key 
role for governments in building a national productivity culture, and is 
a key contribution to be made by responsible government ministers and 
departmental heads. 
Practical ways to increase ski l ls quickly 
Increasing human skills in Papua New Guinea involves big cultural 
changes, and big institutional changes in primary, secondary, and 
tertiary education (McGavin 1991b,c,d, 1992a, 1995) .  These changes 
take time. The best avenue for quick results is to improve on-job delivery 
of skills formation in both private and public sectors. Mobilising and 
sustaining this possibility requires a restructuring of the Secretariat of 
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the National Training Council along lines just argued for the National 
Tripartite Consultative Council Secretariat. It is highly desirable that the 
Secretariat for the National Training Council be located outside the 
public service and operate on a fee-for-service basis that gives effective 
governance to public sector, government, and private sector 
stakeholders. Public funds from the 1 per cent Training Levy introduced 
in 1990 (if necessary, supplemented from general revenues) should be 
dedicated to resourcing the activities of a restructured National 
Training Council. 
The objectives of a restructured National Training Council have 
been argued in McGavin (1990) as promoting enterprise human 
capital formation. Skills formation that occurs within enterprises 
('on job') is to be viewed as investment to which both employers and 
employees contribute. The 1992 MWB Determination of single national 
minimum adult and youth wages for labour market entrants set at 
previous rural minimum rates now makes possible low 'training-wage' 
job offers by urban formal sector employers. The possibility of 'training 
wages' allows an effective split of training costs between trainee 
employees and training employers. Thus, the 1992 MWB Determination 
now makes possible a practical implementation of the economics of 
enterprise-based human capital formation in Papua New Guinea. 
A restructured National Training Council that is adequately 
resourced from public funds and has an effective governance 
structure should be expected to achieve significant changes in employer 
perceptions about the possibilities for quickly achieving increases in 
investment by trainers and trainees in on-job human skills formation in 
both private and public sectors. Such a restructured National Training 
Council should make significant contributions to the promotion of 
increased enterprise human capital formation to 
• improve the evaluation of training programs by employers 
and employees 
• achieve better integration of training programs and 
localisation policies 
• improve location decisions between in-house and out-house 
training, and on-job and off-job skills formation 
• help to identify and to choose appropriate training, and the 
use of appropriate technologies in training 
• facilitate the construction of training modules 
• promote the close tying of training with on-job use of new 
labour market skills 
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• foster the integration of training programs with employee 
placement policies 
• assist in the diffusion of transferable best-practices in training 
from overseas firms and training and business councils to 
Papua New Guinea situations (for example through 
cooperation with the Australia-Papua New Guinea Business 
Council) 
• encourage appropriate pooling of training facilities and 
programs 
• promote the reform of schooling to improve the foundations 
for enterprise-based training (McGavin 1990) .  
Such a restructured National Training Council offers the 
possibility for promoting training as an integral part of best-practice 
business activity that can give a fillip to the quick increase in the 
delivery of labour market skills for private and public sector 
employment in Papua New Guinea. Provided that this fillip is well­
managed, these developments in enterprise-based skills formation 
could, in part, become self-sustaining and spontaneous developments, 
and thereby achieve real inroads that relieve constraints on 
development and employment growth that arise from limited and 
inadequate labour market skills. 
Support for institutional development to service national pol icy analysis 
Papua New Guinea has benefited from international development 
policy experience through the policy advice of multilateral agencies 
and through the negotiation of development cooperation programs 
with donor countries (including Australia). In-country analytical 
capacity nevertheless remains important for effective government 
policy formulation and public policy implementations that are 
appropriate to Papua New Guinean goals and priorities. 
Labour policy advice shifted in the 1980s from the Department of 
Labour to the National Planning Office within the Department of 
Finance and Planning. It next moved to the Manpower Planning 
Unit within that Department, with analysis of and advice on overall 
labour market policy being formulated within the General Economic 
Policy Branch of Department of Finance and Planning. With the 
creation of Treasury, and National Planning and Implementation as 
seperate departments, a Human Resources Unit was located in the 
Department of Planning and Implementation (now the Office of 
Planning and Implementation). The limited capacity for labour 
Building productivity culture in Papua New Guinea I 77 
policy ad vice has thus been weakened by diffusion of and instability in 
organisational structures. The shortage of capacity for advanced policy 
advice in Papua New Guinea suggests the wisdom of maintaining the 
location of most economic policy advice and analysis within a 
Department of Finance and Planning, and preferably not in a 
manpower-planning-type unit with mechanistic and formal sector 
labour market perspectives. Alternative in-country critical advice 
should come from analysis published by centres outside the public 
service, such as the National Research Institute and the Institute of 
National Affairs, and these institutes maintain active research 
publication programs. The Submission to the 1992 Minimum Wages 
Board by the Government of Papua New Guinea, prepared in 
Department of Finance and Planning, shows significant development 
in in-country policy advice capacities . Further development of research 
and analytical capacities for labour market analysis should be targeted 
for institutional development within a Department of Finance and 
Planning. It is important that assistance in institutional development 
and technical assistance be of an 'appropriate technology' kind that 
meets Papua New Guinean needs and possibilities. 
Responsibility for labour market statistics shifted in 1982 from the 
Department of Labour to the National Statistical Office within 
Department of Finance and Planning (now within the Office for 
National Planning and Implementation) . The backlog in the 
updating of sample files, in data processing, and in statistical 
publications still had not been cleared, and was again transferred to 
the Department of Industrial Relations in 1996. The opening 
sentence of McGavin (1986: 12) 'the first thing to note in any analysis 
of labour activity in Papua New Guinea is the parlous state of 
statistical information' remains apposite in 1997. This statement 
remains valid-despite the efforts of staff of the National Statistical 
Office and the Office of the Director of National Census, in the face of 
the limited resources at their disposal, and the recent publication of a 
collation of labour statistics (Department of Industrial Relations 1997) .  
There continues to be a great need to develop the effectiveness and 
efficiency of national statistical collections, processing, and 
publication. The Bank of Papua New Guinea through its Quarterly 
Economic Bulletin remains a significant source of up-to-date data that 
has improved in quality and has maintained timeliness in publication. 
The results of surveys conducted by the Employers' Federation of 
Papua New Guinea and published in their Newsletter also provide 
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useful and timely supplementary employment indicators. The shortage 
of capacity for statistical collection and processing in Papua New 
Guinea suggests the wisdom of maintaining the location of government 
statistical services (including national labour market data) within the 
National Statistics Office. Support for institutional development of the 
National Statistics Office within a Department of Finance and Planning 
would greatly enhance accurate and timely policy analysis of the 
Papua New Guinea economy and labour market. 
Another significant area for institutional support is developing 
public service capacity for effective legislative revision. The amendment 
of section 28f of the Employment Act 1 981 promised in the Government 
Submission to the 1992 Minimum Wages Board (Department of Finance 
and Planning 1992:9) and supported in the Minimum Wages Board 
Determinations of 1986, 1989, and 1992 (Minimum Wages Board 
1986 :160, 1989 :120f, 1992:50,70) has not been forthcoming (McGavin 
1993b:62). Indeed, the whole Employment Act has changed little since 
independence and shows much redundant concern for indentured 
('agreement') labour, and is long overdue for rewriting to reflect 
contemporary labour market circumstances of Papua New Guinea. 
Need for governments to push 'big picture' labour market ana lysis and 
maintain key strategies for improved outcomes 
Even with inadequate statistics, certain 'big picture' issues stand out in 
labour market analysis in Papua New Guinea, and call for correspond­
ingly big policy responses. Four 'big picture' issues are of note. 
Reversing inefficiency and ineffectiveness in the delivery of public 
services. Despite recent gains the general inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness in the delivery of public services in Papua New Guinea 
means that a large proportion of resources available to governments are 
directed to non-rural outlays, and these urban services are delivered at 
high unit-costs. Improvements in effectiveness and efficiency in the 
delivery of government services allows resources to be released from the 
bureaucratic industry in Waigani and other urban centres, while 
increasing resources for rural development and reducing the unit cost 
of urban inputs into rural production. Production and employment in 
rural Papua New Guinea suffers from the high cost of urban domestic 
inputs-such as high-cost wholesale and retail distribution of imports, 
and high-cost government police, schooling services, and general 
public administration. Since prices for rural products are set in 
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international commodity markets, reductions in unit costs of urban 
inputs improves the profitability of rural production, and thereby 
directly contributes to the expansion of rural employment. Since 
about 85 per cent of the population is rural, policies that help the 
expansion of rural jobs must take top priority. 
Utilising abundant resources for rural development. Papua New 
Guinea is relatively abundantly endowed with land and human 
resources for rural development .  Research that improves 
understanding of the reasons for deterioration in rural export 
commodity production in Papua New Guinea, and how to reverse 
this requires support. The key role of women in rural development 
and means to improve women's involvement in export crop 
production also requires research. Expansion of production in rural 
commodity exports means growth in jobs that use skills that are 
relatively abundant in Papua New Guinea. As argued in McGavin 
and Millett (1992:31), the cost in terms of human and physical 
infrastructure investment involved in expansion of jobs in rural 
industries is far less than the infrastructural investment cost 
involved in expansion of urban jobs (such as through the expansion of 
manufacturing industry) . It is thus crucial that Papua New Guinea 
governments understand that for given resources devoted to human 
and physical infrastructural development (McGavin 1994a), more jobs 
can be generated through rural development than can be generated 
through urban development. Recent industry policy developments have 
taken policies enunciated in the Medium Term Industry and Trade 
Development Action Plan (Papua New Guinea 1991 :38) in inconsistent 
directions that reduce employment growth. The virtual import bans that 
were introduced to support the establishment of a clinker cement plant 
and a mackerel canning plant in Lae are examples of high-cost urban 
job creation. Such policies quickly lead to increased costs of urban 
inputs into rural production, and quickly reduce the purchasing power 
of rural producers and wage-earners. These inconsistent developments 
in industry policy highlight the case that governments can increase 
rural jobs at much lower cost per job than occurs with policies that 
favour the creation of urban jobs. Resources that are directed to 
increasing human and infrastructure capital in rural areas lift rural 
productivity. Manning (1993: 116) and (1994:137) has argued that 
governments can achieve increases in rural productivity at 
substantially less costs than increases in urban productivity. Increases 
in rural productivity lift the wages at which labour resources are drawn 
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Figure 4.1 Papua New Guinea: vi l lage-based and non-vi l lage-based 
productivity improvements to reduce unemployment and 
increase wages 
Product per un it of la bour 
regulated wage 1 = rw 1 
market wage 3 = 1UJ 
market wage 2 = 1U2 
market wage 1 = 1UJ 
reservation 2 = r2 wage 
reservation 1 = r1 wage 
0 d 7  
I 
I < )Iii I reduced u-e from 
��r����vof !1:g� ro� uctivi ty 
I< )!ii i 
I reduced u-e from improved v i l lage I prod uct iv i ty 
demand for labour 
0 7  from non-village sector 
m2 market labour services supp lied and demanded 
1< )!iii measured wage unemployment 
(u-e) under regu lated wage I 
Notes: Village-based productivity improvements l ift the market labour supply 
function as rural-based activities improve non-wage prospects. Non-village-based 
prod uctivity improvements l ift the market labour demand function as market­
based activities improve wage prospects. Wage unemployment is reduced. 
'Reservation wage' is the wage at or below which labour remains in village-based or 
informal sector production. Increases in village-based rural labour productivity 
increase the reservation wage (from r1 to r2), and reduce measured wage 
unemployment shown as d1m2 to d1m1 under regulated wage conditions (nv7). 
Increases in both village-based and non-village based labour productivity reduced 
measured wage unemployment to d2m1 under regulated wage conditions. Reduction 
in regulated wage nv1 achieves further reductions in measured wage unemployment 
(provided these unemployment-reducing effects are not offset by demand-reducing 
efforts as a result of economic downturn causing Dl to shift leftward).With Dl and 
Sl the market-clearing wage is wr With improvement in village-based labour 
productivity, the market-clearing wage is shown as increasing to w2, and with 
improvements in village-based and non-village based labour productivi ty, the market­
clearing wage is shown as increasing to w3• 
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from informal to formal sector activities and from mainly rural to 
mainly urban locations. This argument is illustrated in Figure 4.1 in the 
increase of 'reservation wage' from r1 to r2 and in the contraction in 
measured formal sector wage unemployment from d1m2 to d1m1 • 
Addressing supply-side constraints in jobs growth. Expansion of rural 
employment is also important because population densities to arable 
land vary greatly by province and within provinces in Papua New 
Guinea. Customary land ownership generally does not allow transfer 
of land property rights. With the cessation of tribal warfare, including 
warfare over land claims, the expansion of rural employment depends 
on the expansion of export commodity production that is managed by 
communities that are relatively well-endowed with arable land, and using 
wage labour from communities that are relatively well-endowed with 
labour for rural production. So, for example, expansion of production of 
export crops outside Simbu province achieves low-cost creation of wage 
jobs for Simbu people while easing pressure on land in Simbu province; 
reduces urban-rural migration and the growth of unemployed low-skilled 
urban populations; and allows expansion of otherwise supply­
constrained output in areas of relative under-utilisation of arable land. 
Expansion in quality and quantity of labour skills. The unfavourable 
effect of high urban minimum wages on rural-urban drift in Papua 
New Guinea was significant in the 1992 Minimum Wages Board 
decision for a single national minimum wage for adults and a single 
national minimum wage for youths (Minimum Wages Board 1992:44). 
There is a continuing need for curriculum development at both primary 
and secondary levels to increase skills and enculturation for enhancing 
agricultural development and for growth in agricultural jobs (McGavin 
1991d). Despite the apparent inappropriate focus on urban labour 
market skills in existing school curricula, the fact remains that skills 
that are used intensively in urban labour markets in Papua New 
Guinea remain in short supply. The understandable policy of 
accelerated localisation of employment (and employment of foreigners 
is almost entirely urban employment) necessarily sharpens these skill 
shortages. Localisation has also contributed to inappropriate extensions 
to citizens who gain localised jobs of employment rewards that are 
appropriate to the fixed-duration employment of persons from overseas­
with resultant increases in costs and curtailed growth in these jobs. 
Regulation of differential conditions of employment for citizens and 
non-citizens will not adequately address this problem. Organised 
urban labour must be expected first to represent the interests of those 
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who already have jobs ('insiders '), and not first the interests of those 
who seek jobs ('outsiders') . This 'insider ' influence on labour market 
outcomes is best countered by public policies that increase the quality 
and quantity of the supply of citizen labour skills. The first need is for 
expansion in quality and in quantity of citizen labour market skills. It is 
not price regulation (in this case, through the regulation of conditions 
of employment) that will best contribute to reducing the cost of labour 
skills in Papua New Guinea. It is expansion of supply (both quality 
and quantity) that will most contribute to lowering the high cost of 
skilled and mainly urban labour services in Papua New Guinea. 
Expansion of human resources development through quality education 
and training (off-job and on-job) thus remains critical for overall labour 
market policy in Papua New Guinea (McGavin 1990, 1991a:199f,210,224). 
Summing up 
I t  i s  wrong analysis to  assume that labour costs will fall rapidly 
through deregulation of minimum wages. High wages reflect high costs 
of living and shortages in quality and quantity of human skills.  Policies 
that reduce the cost of government services (which mostly are urban 
labour services) also reduce domestic input costs for rural producers 
who face internationally-determined product prices. 
Policies that promote rural development generate more jobs per kina 
spent than do policies that promote urban jobs. Policies that promote 
rural employment allow people with skills in rural production to locate 
in areas where expansion of rural output is otherwise constrained by 
labour shortages among customary landowners. 
The labour market policy issues confronting the Papua New Guinea 
governments are quite major. Unless this is recognised, difficult policy 
decisions will not be grasped and pursued, and inappropriate policies 
that retard development and job growth will eventuate. An essential 
contribution of government to labour market development in Papua New 
Guinea is that these 'big picture' issues be constantly and consistently 
promoted. This calls for consistent commitment to building a national 
productivity culture through sustained government support for the 
activities of a National Tripartite Consultative Council and a National 
Training Council with governance structures that achieve answerability 
to stakeholders' interests in enhancing productivity change. 
Promoting these 'big picture' labour market improvements in Papua 
New Guinea calls for sustained budgetary and policy commitment to 
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quantity and quality improvement in human skills through appropriate 
education and through appropriate on-job training. It also calls for 
sustained budgetary commitment so that public resources are directed 
to uses that most contribute to job growth per kina spent-which 
mainly means the direction of resources to rural job growth. 
Achieving these aims requires sustained commitment by 
governments to constant and consistent scrutiny of public policy 
influences on labour market outcomes in terms of their policy 
significance for achieving broad-based, sustainable, and 
internationally-competitive development in Papua New Guinea. 
This is a major task requiring strong, consistent, and sustained 
commitment in order that lasting results may be achieved. 
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Productivity challenges in Fij i's 
sugar and garment industries 
Satendra Prasad 
The productivity development discourse in Fiji has been affected by a 
variety of political, institutional and economic factors. Several of these 
are quite unique to Fiji. This paper discusses key factors that shape the 
productivity discourse and provides some pointers for the 
enhancement of Fiji institutional capacities for productivity 
development. These assessments are made with specific references to 
Fiji's main manufacturing sectors-sugar and garments. 
It is argued that in vulnerable developing island states, productivity 
improvements require strong social consensus and stable institutional 
environments (World Bank 1995) . Because long-existing consensual 
institutional arrangements have been fractured, and confidence in the 
market-coordinating capacities of various state agencies reduced, 
productivity programs have been held back in spite of the high priority 
given to them by the government. This level of priority is exemplified in 
Fiji by the declaration of 1997 as the �year of productivity' and the 
adoption of a national productivity charter by its social partners 
(Government, the Fiji Employers Federation and the Fiji Trades Union 
Congress) and the establishment of a national productivity movement 
(Fiji Government 1995). These initiatives are backed by a 
macroeconomic policy environment conducive to the promotion of 
competitive growth (World Bank 1991; Fiji 1995). Combined, these 
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factors provide a setting that is at least theoretically favourable to 
productivity building across the economy. 
In spite of such initiatives, productivity development in Fiji has had 
very mixed successes. Significant improvements in productivity have 
been confined to a relatively small number of export-oriented 
manufacturing enterprises and finance sector institutions (World Bank, 
1995). By discussing the sugar and the garment sectors in greater detail, 
it is demonstrated that social and economic factors have held back 
productivity development. While, in response to the rapid changes in 
the global environment both sectors have begun to implement medium­
term productivity improvement strategies, they still face a variety of 
institutional and non-institutional constraints. 
Fiji's efforts to promote productivity growth have had even lesser 
impact in the small and medium-scale enterprise sectors. However, it is 
more difficult to make generalised observations about these sectors 
because of the complexities associated with size, product, ownership, 
location and other variations. For example, while labour productivity 
has been generally higher in multinational companies, wide differences 
exist within them at the same time (Chandra 1996). Fiji needs to deal 
with the productivity challenge in this sector much more seriously than 
it has done because its long-term economic prospects depend on 
growth in the small and medium-enterprise sectors. It is imperative 
therefore that the productivity framework that applies to this sector 
more specifically is developed by policymakers in Fiji .  
The national productivity sett ing 
An economic overview relevant to  discussions about productivity 
needs to take account of three issues. First, Fiji's post-independence 
development experience to 1987 is characterised by a strong 
commitment to a mixed economic developmental strategy, high levels of 
state intervention, and the development of selective export industries to 
reduce dependence on the traditional mainstays of sugar and tourism. 
Second, the short-term impact of the military coups of 1987 have 
required painful responses to restore stability. Third, structural 
adjustment and restructuring programs have been implemented since 
1987. Industrial development, employment creation and productivity 
growth to a large extent have been shaped in distinct ways by the 
variations and shifts in the policy environment associated with these 
contexts. 
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In spite of a generally favourable economic policy environment after 
1991, productivity development has been generally dismal. One of the 
more significant elements of the present socio-political context that has 
contributed to this poor performance has been the continuing lack of 
business confidence. At the same time, productivity development has 
been constrained by the lack of confidence in government capacities. 
Frequent shifts in policy, regular change of administrative heads and 
excessive political intervention in public administration have affected the 
corporate environment. Business confidence has also been undermined 
by major financial scandals in the National Bank of Fiji and emerging 
problems in other financial institutions. Fiji is also experiencing dramatic 
demographic changes. Its population composition has changed rapidly 
as a result of the continuing lack of confidence by its lndo-Fijian 
population and high levels of emigration (Bureau of Statistics 1997) .  Both 
the rapid skill depletion and shrinking of the entrepreneurship base that 
have resulted have had undesirable consequences for productivity 
development as well as for industrial development strategies. 
Another issue that affects the productivity discourse in Fiji is the 
institutional setting for productivity-related institutions. While 
economic policy formulation has remained a core function of the 
Central Planning Office, its direct role in developing productivity 
agenda is poorly established. This is further worsened by its weak links 
with industry bodies and institutions such as the Fiji National Training 
Council, and the Fiji Institute of Technology. 
Moreover, the focus given by the Fij i  National Training Council to 
productivity issues in Fiji is often narrowly concentrated on enabling 
International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) certification and 
promoting quality improvements for a relatively small number of 
enterprises. Its training initiatives rarely connect to the broader regional 
and global issues that affect industry. Additionally, while tertiary 
institutions such as the Fiji Institute of Technology have begun to focus 
greater attention to productivity issues, their programs have been 
undermined by the slowdown in recruitment by large employers such 
as the Public Works Department and the Fiji Sugar Corporation. 
Because recruitment cutbacks by such public sector organisations are 
likely to continue, the industry-specific skill upgrading programs 
provided by institutions such as the Fiji  Institute of Technology and the 
Fiji National Training Council are at some risk. 
There were some hopeful signs that the increased foreign direct 
investments that resulted from trade liberalisation after 1991 would 
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have positive impacts on productivity. It was generally anticipated that 
investments in new sectors would contribute to a diffusion of improved 
work practices and thereby help improve productivity (Fiji 1995) .  There 
have been mixed results on this front. 
The institutional productivity discourse and agenda have also been 
open to external influences. Fiji's productivity discourse has been 
strongly affected by developments in Singapore and Japan (Prasad 
1997) . Their productivity frameworks have been the subject of 
comprehensive discussions locally particularly by its tripartite labour 
market institutions (Probert 1995; Singh 1995) .  The challenge for Fiji  is 
to create an institutional setting that supports learning from 
international experiences and translating then into practical programs 
at the enterprise level. 
The productivity chal lenge in Fij i 's sugar sector 
Sugar has dominated commercial agricultural activity throughout Fiji's 
colonial and post-independence history. The sugar industry as a whole 
is currently worth approximately F$280 million; approximately 12 per 
cent of GDP. Sugarcane farming accounts for more than 40 per cent of 
the total agricultural sector, while processing accounts for almost 30 per 
cent of the manufacturing sector. This industry provides direct 
employment for more than 25 per cent of the economically active 
population. Farming is done on more than 22,000 mainly small-holder 
farms that average 4.2 hectares in size. Sixty per cent of farmers produce 
less than 150 tonnes of cane per year, while 24 per cent produce less 
than 50 tonnes of cane a year. Sugarcane is processed by the Fiji Sugar 
Corporation, in which the Fiji government owns 70 per cent of shares. 
Uncertainty surrounding the expiry and renewal of land leases is an 
urgent issue confronting Fiji's sugar industry. The majority of the 
30,000 leases administered by the Native Land Trust Board on behalf of 
indigenous Fijian land-owning groups are under sugar cultivation. 
Insecurities concerning the renewal of leases affect investments in the 
farming sector, and therefore productivity development. 
It is now widely accepted that significant improvements are 
necessary in the cultivation, harvesting, transportation and processing 
sectors of the industry. The industry rapidly expanded in the 1970s. But 
this expansion was also associated with increasing inefficiencies in the 
farming sector. The problem of declining efficiency was worsened by 
three interrelated factors. First, payment systems are based on the 
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quantity rather than the quality of cane produced. Second, the level of 
burned cane being harvested has been growing. This reduces the sugar 
content of cane and lowers mill efficiency in sugar extraction. Third, as 
a consequence of transport, mechanical problems and scheduling 
problems Fiji has high cut-to-crush times. Some 40 per cent of cane takes 
more than 24 hours to crush, reducing the sugar content of the cane. 
Productivity in the industry has also been affected by the increasing use 
of unimproved planting material, weakened research and extension 
support systems, emerging labour shortage in the farming sector, 
declining investments in rail and milling sectors, and an unfavourable 
industrial relations environment (Prasad and Lodhi 1997). 
An even more urgent problem facing the industry is the impending 
decline of sugar prices as a result of changes in Fiji's main European 
markets. Sugar prices in the EU market are determined through the EU­
ACP (Asia, Caribbean and Pacific) Sugar Protocol. Because the Sugar 
Protocol is unlikely to survive beyond 2010, Fiji's sugar industry needs 
to be able to become competitive at the world market price of sugar 
(Prasad and Lodhi 1997) .  
In Fiji, policymakers have long recognised that in the longer term the 
country needs to develop an internationally competitive sugar industry. 
However, attempts at restructuring have been frustrated by the problems 
of distance from markets, a complex system of land ownership, complex 
interest group pressures and weakened institutional capacities. 
Nevertheless, major initiatives aimed at efficiency improvements in both 
the milling and farming sectors have been undertaken over the past 
decade with mixed success. The industry has also faced the additional 
problem of expansion of farming into lower grade lands generally 
located outside the traditional sugar regions. This was an outcome of 
the higher prices obtained as a result of the preferential prices. 
Rather than expanding the area of cane cultivation in order to boost 
production, restructuring at the farm level aimed at improving yield 
and productivity is likely to involve a gradual concentration of farm 
enterprises into larger units. Productivity improvements on farms with 
a larger scale of operations may be secured through a transition to semi­
mechanised harvesting, improved cultivation methods and 
improvements in harvesting and transportation of cane. However, these 
processes would also have unfavourable social consequences. Fiji also 
needs to use preferential trade to develop a range of sugar byproducts. 
This will help the industry deal with employment adjustments that 
result from labour productivity initiatives. The displacement of farmers, 
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reduction in the level of employment, and land concentration are all 
likely to affect rural poverty and inter-communal harmony (Prasad and 
Lodhi 1997) .  Thus a balance between productivity improvement and 
the social and equity outcomes of productivity-related reforms will be 
necessary in any restructuring program if it is to be sustained. 
In spite of a favourable trading environment, productivity gains 
during the lifetime of the Sugar Protocol in both the milling and farming 
sectors have been dismal. For example, cane yield in Fiji is still low by 
comparison with Fiji's nearest ACP competitor, Mauritius with 52 and 72 
metric tonnes per hectare respectively (Chand and Abello 1997:7). Yield 
per hectare has been declining by 0.6 per cent annually over the past two 
decades (Sugar Commission of Fij i  1997) . Uncertainties about land lease 
renewals have also affected the tum over of ratoons having an adverse 
impact on yield . A tightening of credit to sugar farmers has also held back 
productivity. There is also anecdotal evidence that a growing shortage 
of casual and harvesting labour has led to some decline in farming 
standards. 
The impacts of these are compounded by growing inefficiencies in 
the milling sector. Inefficiencies in the milling sector are derived from 
the depletion of skilled personnel, a relatively long crush season, and 
industrial disputes. Gradual declines in the sugar extraction ratios 
have also resulted from a gradual lengthening of the cut-to-crush times 
and increases in the volume of burnt cane. 
The milling sector faces one further important obstacle. For historical 
reasons, the transportation of cane by rail has remained in the hands of 
the millers. Investments in rail tracks and trains have fallen behind 
required levels (Davies 1997) . However, the railway system remains fully 
funded by the Fiji Sugar Corporation-even though its share from the 
total sugar proceeds has declined from 40 per cent in 1970 to an average 
of 27 per cent. Major new investments in both the milling and 
transportation sectors will therefore be required to affect productivity. 
The 2020 productivity challenge for Fij i 's sugar industry 
Fiji sugar industry institutions have now begun to respond to the 
productivity challenge presented by the impending demise of the 
Sugar Protocol. 1 The industry's 1997 strategic plan notes that 
restructuring the sugar industry to a globally competitive 'best practice 
culture' will require a sustained effort to increase sugar per hectare 
efficiency from existing tonnage by 20 per cent, raising farm 
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productivity by growing up to 20 per cent more cane per hectare, 
raising mill capacity by 1 5  per cent to cater for the additional farm 
production and lowering farm and mill production costs by 1 5  to 20 
per cent (Sugar Commission of Fiji 1997:7) . 
A far-reaching reform program reflecting these goals is presently being 
operationalised by industry institutions. This is the first time that Fiji 
sugar industry institutions have rallied behind a common reform 
agenda. It is also significant that the reform project has the support of 
both the government and opposition parties. 
Several features of this productivity program are outlined here. The 
first involves the costs of reform. The Sugar Commission of Fiji has 
found it difficult to locate appropriate sources of funding for the reform 
program. For example, its proposals for upgrading the milling and rail 
sectors are estimated to cost F$80 million. Only half of that cost could be 
realistically derived from within the industry. It is difficult to price and 
co-ordinate the cultivation segment of productivity plans for a number 
of reasons. First, the amalgamation of very small holdings into larger 
units requires the support of growers, land-owning communities and of 
government. Moreover, the alteration of harvesting arrangements 
requires a review of a collective agreement between grower institutions 
and the Fiji Sugar Corporation. Besides the costs involved, these 
reforms will thus also involve consensus building and prior agreement 
of the affected parties. Finally, farm level efficiencies will depend on 
capital investments in cane supply road upgrading, improvements to 
drainage, and in the tum-over of aged ratoons among others. Commercial 
credit has been squeezed quite dramatically. For example, commercial 
bank advances to the sugar sector had declined from F$82 million in 
December 1994 to F$46 million by June 1996 (Bureau of Statistics 
1996:49). It is unlikely that the commercial sector will provide the 
resources that are so necessary for efficiency improvements in that 
sector. Much therefore depends on the Fijian government's ability to 
subsidise productivity measures through the channelling of a sugar 
export tax into the industry institutions . Its ability to impose such a tax 
however remains to be seen, especially as Fiji is likely to prepare for 
fresh general elections early in 1999. Moreover, it is unlikely that the 
already overexposed public sector financial institutions such as the Fij i  
Development Bank and the Fiji National Provident Fund will be  able to 
support adjustments in the industry in the present environment. 
Restructuring also depends on the ability of sugar industry 
institutions to manage the process of change. Already, sugar industry 
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institutions have played a marginal role in the vital land lease 
discussions on which so much rests . Grower and Fiji Sugar 
Corporation relations remain strained. These factors are likely to 
constrain the implementation of reforms in the cultivation sector. 
Moreover, many growers feel a sense of alienation, as a result of being 
unable to secure new leases, or influence the terms under which new 
leases are to be given to them. This contributes to an environment that is 
less receptive to reform. 
No where is the productivity agenda more exposed to contestation 
than by the potential opposition of unions. Trade union and Fiji Sugar 
Corporation relations are presently at a low ebb. It is estimated that the 
industry will need to shed approximately 25 per cent of its present 
workforce. Such a level of dislocation is likely to result in further 
industrial disputes. Industrial disputes have already taken a high toll 
on productivity. Both the Sugar Commission of Fiji and World Bank 
attribute the greatest blame for productivity decline to industrial 
disputes and wage settlements in the sugar industry. But this 
perception is faulty given that wage settlements in the industry had 
been set by national wage guidelines during the decade of the tripartite 
forum (Chand and Abello 1997) and by a dispute settling machinery 
that was quite perceptive to the commercial realities of the sugar 
industry after wage controls were lifted in 1992. However, the 1997 
industrial dispute amplifies how strained relations between the main 
sugar industry union and the Fij i Sugar Corporation has become. This 
is likely to affect the reform program. The 1997 dispute arose from the 
Fiji Sugar Corporation's inability to respond favourably to relatively 
modest and below inflation wage claims by the general workers union 
on account of the cost of restructuring. A four-week campaign by the Fiji 
Sugar and General Workers Union had a debilitating impact on sugar 
harvest and manufacture early in the 1997 season. This dispute may 
recur even more strongly in 1998 wage rounds. In order to create 
support for reforms, organised labour will need to be more closely 
included in both the formulation and implementation of reform 
agendas. The productivity agenda therefore clearly needs to be 
underwritten by an improvement in the prevailing industrial relations 
climate. 
Fiji's sugar sector directly affects national politics and inter-ethnic 
relations. Industrial turbulence has immediate consequences for non­
sugar sectors, as well as for inter-communal harmony. A settlement of 
the worrisome constitutional divisions provides a favourable 
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environment for the implementation of a far-reaching reform program. 
In spite of this, reform programs are likely to remain contested, as the 
1997 Fiji Sugar and General Workers Union strike amplifies. It is widely 
recognised within the industry that the unsettled problem of land 
leases could hollow out the precarious social consensus that currently 
exists. Competing pressures arising from the reform process could also 
undermine the productivity consensus. It is anticipated that any re­
introduction of an export tax on sugar (to deduct some proportion of the 
preferential income and target it towards productivity improvements) 
will be severely contested, particularly by political parties that will 
compete for grower votes in the crucial elections that will follow the 
implementation of the new constitution in early 1998. 
But the implications for the national economy arise from other 
considerations as well. First, it is evident that improvements in milling 
and farming sectors will have to be subsidised by the state. This is 
worrisome given the weaknesses in Fiji's public finances. Moreover, 
sugar is not the only sector that will require state support to deal with 
the challenges posed by a changing global economy. The other main 
employment sector, the garment industry also faces similar problems. 
Productivity issues in Fij i 's garment and texti le sectors 
The productivity challenge in Fiji 's tax free garment and textiles sector 
is no less intense than sugar. In spite of the grave challenges that this 
sector faces as a result of global changes, it continues to lack a 
framework for reform. The garment and textile sector has emerged as 
the single largest employment sector after sugar. At the end of 1996, the 
sector comprised more than 110 enterprises and it employed over 10 per 
cent of the total wage and salaried workforce. Unlike sugar, the garment 
industry has generally witnessed significant productivity improvements 
since 1990 (Chandra 1996), but these are unevenly spread across the 
sector and are likely to be eroded by the impending changes in the 
external trading environment such as the unwinding of the advantages 
associated with SPARTECA. 
The key contributors to rapid productivity growth in this sector were 
competition particularly for generalised system of preferences quotas, 
enhanced skill formation and deepening through industry training 
institutions and improved product certification (World Bank 1995). In 
spite of these favourable trends, this sector still relies excessively on a 
continuation of the tax free preferences and preferential market access 
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available under SPARTECA, Generalised System of Preferences and the 
Lome Convention. Like sugar, a very small fraction of Fiji's garments and 
textile sector products are openly traded and the productivity agenda in 
the garment sector is driven by unfavourable external considerations. 
There is wide agreement that improvements in productivity in the 
garment and textiles sectors of the economy have resulted from 
improvements in labour productivity (Chandra 1996). But in order to 
sustain improvements in productivity, the industry requires stable 
export outlets. This is problematic given the progressive unwinding of 
preferential market access. The impending expiry of the 13-year tax free 
concessions has also retarded the development of a longer term 
productivity agenda. Both the advantages that derive from SPARTECA 
and the tax-free concessions begin to expire early next decade. 
It is estimated a productivity improvement of the order of 25-35 per 
cent will be needed over seven years to maintain the industry's share of 
the Australasian market (Fij i  Employers' Federation 1995). However, 
unlike sugar, diversity (in terms of size, product, ownership and 
location) in the industry makes it difficult to coordinate and implement 
a national productivity strategy. Moreover, because entrepreneurs 
shuffle the selection of advantages that come from the many preferential 
arrangements, the scope for pursuing a long-term restructuring agenda is 
less well laid out. 
It is broadly accepted that the garment sector will need to focus on 
securing greater wage competitiveness, securing a supply of skilled 
employees as well as developing Fij i  brand/ quality images among 
selected suppliers and distributors (Chandra 1996; World Bank 1995). 
The prevailing wages structure in manufacturing overall also imposes 
comparative disadvantages for the garment sector in relation to its 
competitors in Southeast Asia. Manufacturing wages in Fiji are higher 
than those in Thailand and Malaysia, for example. At the same time, 
labour productivity is lower (World Bank 1995) . 
A low wage strategy for enhancing international competitiveness is 
problematic for Fiji. In the post-SPARTECA period, it is unlikely that 
Fijian enterprises will be able to compete with lower wage, volume 
producers in China, Indonesia and elsewhere for the Australasian 
markets. Fiji's garment sector will therefore need to take a broader view 
of reform than it has done thus far, and develop a more co-ordinated 
productivity response than has been possible thus far (Fij i  1995). 
The productivity challenges in Fiji 's garment sector are likely to 
involve two key factors. First, government and policy support 
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institutions need to develop a framework to enable manufacturers to 
make the transition towards high value-added products while the 
benefits of SPARTECA, Generalised Sys tern of Preferences and Lome are 
still favourable. Second, entrepreneurs need to be assured that the skill­
deepening programs necessary to make this transition will be sustained 
during the transition period. These require a rapid resolution of many 
of the institutional and non-institutional constraints to productivity 
development. 
Developing an enabl ing productivity environ ment 
A key challenge for post-liberalisation Fiji remains the need to restore 
private sector confidence (World Bank 1995:2). Because of the continuing 
lack of private sector confidence, especially in the small and medium­
scale sector, 'adjustment fatigue' has been aggravated. A non­
discriminatory approach to private sector investment has meant that 
state resources, incentives and support have become too diluted to have 
a strong impact on productivity in any one sector. Continuing anxieties 
about land tenure have also inhibited private sector confidence. As a 
result entrepreneurs prefer to invest in short-term corporate strategies. 
Such strategies often drive high levels of capital transfers, erode 
productive capacities and restrain technological modernisation. The 
garment sector exemplifies this paradox very well. 
A number of other institutional factors continue to constrain 
productivity development. One glaring institutional shortcoming is the 
dispersed nature of institutions that relate to productivity building. 
Overlapping institutional responsibilities, and the absence of sectorally 
targeted strategic programs often result. Institutional dispersion also 
means that the productivity discourse is too dispersed to have a strong 
impact on prevailing corporate or labour attitudes at both the national 
level and enterprise levels. This situation is not helped by the absence 
of centralised labour market data that can support the formulation of 
productivity policies. It is important that a coordinated approach be 
developed that relates both to the actual experiences of enterprises and 
that takes account of the pertinent changes in the global/ regional 
environment. 
In the development literature much attention is now focused on the 
enabling environment for productivity growth. A critical feature of this 
environment relates to the regulatory framework of labour markets. As 
part of Fiji's structural adjustment, significant labour market reforms 
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have already been introduced; including changes to the Industrial 
Association 's Act 1 991 , Trade Union Regulations Act 1 991 and Trade 
Disputes Act 1 991 and 1992 . These changes have restricted the scope for 
direct industrial action, reduced the scope for bargaining by industrial 
associations and imposed tighter balloting procedures on industrial 
actions. Labour market reforms have generally promoted flexibility in 
Fiji's labour market and avoided outright union hostility. An 
International Labour Office (1997) report concludes that the labour 
market reforms of 1988-92 are generally favourable to productivity 
growth but it was unclear what impact further reforms in the regulatory 
framework would have. Some of the factors that inhibit productivity 
growth lie beyond Fiji's regulatory framework and are highlighted below. 
The first is an absence of a coordinated approach to human resource 
development in Fiji, in spite of severe labour market shocks experienced 
over the past decade. Fij i's labour markets will continue to experience a 
large outflow of skilled/professional persons, increasingly reflecting 
labour market considerations in recipient countries. Second, 
institutions that improve labour force skills cannot be sustained on the 
narrow base provided by a relatively small proportion of full-fee paying 
students. Comprehensive strategies need to be developed in 
consultation with industry. Industry-specific training needs to be 
accommodated within an overall training framework. The absence of 
labour market data also weakens labour force strategies. 
Wage settlements have also affected productivity development. The 
deregulation of labour markets in 1992 weakened industry level 
settlements in a number of sectors. By 1997, the labour market reforms 
of 1992 had gradually worked their way through the industrial 
relations system. Wage fixing had become visibly more decentralised, 
although the level of differentiation in the public sector was less 
significant (International Labour Organisation 1997). Over the past few 
years, the tripartite Labour Advisory Board has been considering 
replacing the 13 separate minimum wage awards with a national 
minimum wage floor. The likely impact of such a transformation on 
productivity and employment remains to be seen. 
The connections between cultural factors and managerial behaviour 
also need to be better understood. Reddy (1995:34) concluded that 
'indigenous Fijian cultural factors were generally non-supportive of 
managers, management, and business based on conventional models of 
business, management and capitalism'. But this overlooks the cultural 
constraints on entrepreneurship within the Indo-Fijian and Fiji 's 
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'other ' communities. It has been quite apparent that Fiji has relied too 
closely on a very thin segment of its population for its entrepreneurial 
energies. This needs to be expanded and the constraints to its 
expansion need to be better understood. 
While cultural factors do constrain productivity improvements, or 
impose a social cost on business, they need not be seen as restrictive. 
Cultural factors can be aligned to obtain specific goals in the market 
sectors. Cultural factors appear to have a disproportionate impact 
when other enabling institutions for a market economy are weak. By 
focusing too much on cultural factors, the desirable level of emphasis 
on accountability, transparency in procedures, and enhanced 
institutional capacities has not been achieved. 
This is not to deny the unfavourable impact of cultural factors on 
productivity. Clearly, cultural pressures have eroded efficiencies in 
Fiji's public services (World Bank 1995) .  Public sector productivity 
improvements have been constrained by the high turnover of ministers, 
permanent secretaries and department heads over the past few years. 
At the same time, the impact of interest groups and political bargaining 
on public service delivery remains an area of concern. Staff redundancies 
have periodically led to intense industrial unrest. These often occur in 
direct contravention of established industrial relations processes. 
Because some disputes require political settlements, it has often been 
difficult to coordinate and implement the necessary reforms. For example, 
the Fijian Government was unable to implement its initial restructuring 
program for the National Bank of Fij i  following its recent debacle. The 
price it paid was a F$250 million bail out. A prolonged industrial 
dispute, interest group pressures, and intense political bargaining all 
served to weaken the corrective interventionist capacities of institutions 
such as the Reserve Bank of Fiji and the Auditor General's office in this 
case. Fiji needs to critically assess both its institutional setting as well as 
understand the impact of social/ cultural practices on productivity, if 
productivity building measures are to have higher chances of success. 
Concl usion 
Fiji 's Prime Minister observed that 
Productivity in Fiji still remains a concept-a concept that is generally 
welcomed by some employers for reasons of greater efficiency, 
competitiveness and profitability, but viewed with suspicion by others 
because of the apparent misconception . .  . lt is clear . . .  that the concept of 
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productivity as an economic development strategy in Fiji has . . . fallen 
short of expectations. However, the absence of a definite national 
policy on productivity and resource support for it must be seen as the 
greatest drawback. It is apparent that efforts to promote productivity 
in Fiji and obtain its general acceptance as a viable and dynamic 
economic strategy, have been frustrated by the absence of a national 
strategy (Rabuka 1995:5-6) . 
But a well thought through productivity strategy can only go so far. 
It will need to be delivered by institutions that have been hollowed out 
as a consequence of a number of influences over the past decade. 
Events of recent years suggest strongly that Fiji needs social and 
political deregulation as much as economic deregulation . .  . In 
economics the benefits of deregulation depends on a crucial 
mechanism of free competition in markets which resolves alternate 
bids for supply and demand into an economically efficient equilibrium 
price and quanity. A critical question is: how does a society learn, 
socially and politically, when its public economy decisions go wrong? 
(Narsey, quoted in Chand and Naidu 1997:1 32) . 
Those who will frame the productivity policy debates in Fiji need to 
reflect carefully on the macro-institutional weaknesses that have 
become so glaring in Fiji over the past decade. 
The two sectors that are scrutinised in detail have amplified a wider 
concern that Fiji may be wasting favourable opportunities for 
productivity building. Over the remainder of this decade, favourable 
external factors can contribute to stabilising the reform programs the 
sugar and garment sectors of Fij i's economy. Early into the next decade 
Fij i will have lost the security of favourable external trading 
environments. It is conceivable that Fij i might also lose a supportive 
political environment domestically if the productivity challenge is not 
translated into policy with a much greater sense of urgency. 
Note 
These include the Sugar Commission of Fiji, Fiji Sugar Marketing 
Company, Fiji Sugar Corporation, the Sugar Cane Growers 
Association and the Sugar Industry Tribunal. 
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Divided loyalties in the workplace: 
a case of employee motivation 
in Fiji 
Eci K .  Nabalarua 
With mounting pressure aimed at increasing deregulation in the Fijian 
economy for greater economic growth, strategies of public sector reform 
with an emphasis on enhanced productivity, continue to face an uphill 
battle in the area of human resource management. In an attempt to 
understand the behavioural tendencies of workers in a partially 
industrialising economy and its impact on anticipated productivity 
level, I address some of the issues facing the use and difficulties of 
employee motivational strategies as tools for enhancing productivity in 
economic development with a particular emphasis on motivation in the 
workplace of the Fiji public sector. 
The proposition on which this study has been based asserts that 
Fiji's industrialising experience has led to the development of a 
benevolent work culture which in tum has resulted in the emergence of 
an acquiescent workforce that ultimately influences the degree to which 
public management systems are able to maximise worker potential for 
greater economic growth. In the context of this discussion, a benevolent 
work culture is defined as a system of norms and values that emphasise 
feelings of happiness and goodwill as being the pervasive philosophy 
that guides organisational behaviour and human relationships in the 
workplace. The notion of an acquiescent workforce may be described as 
a categorical manifestation of employee behaviour that displays 
willingness and acceptance in the workplace. 
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The initial interest for this concern emerged from two directions. The 
first stems from a Fijian managerial perception of the worker as being 
'lazy' and the second has its origins in the argument that the 
particularities of the Fijian context which have resulted in the 
emergence of such worker stereotypes, are better redressed through a 
greater commitment to human resources management. It is being 
suggested that by placing human resource management at the centre of 
reform initiatives, there is a greater possibility of developing viable 
alternatives to enhancing governing capacities in situations where 
traditional orthodoxy has failed in terms of service delivery. 
Whilst these two conceptual strands have formed the basis of 
discussion, on a broader level they illustrate two basic assumptions 
underlying the linkages between productivity and economic 
development. The first is that while economic development implies 
change and growth through productivity, the latter is only achievable 
when there is a motivated workforce in place. The second assumption 
states that change is necessary and in practical terms is brought about 
by people in organisations who change the way they do things. 
Inevitably this means that while there is a willingness to change, the 
capacity to implement these changes is an equally crucial component in 
this process if strategies aimed at raising productivity levels for 
accelerated economic growth are to be achieved. 
An overview of work motivation and industrial isation 
The relationship between work motivation and industrialisation is 
portrayed in a comprehensive study on Industrialism and Industrial Man 
undertaken by Kerr, Dunlop, Harbison and Myers (1960) . One of the 
main conclusions that these scholars put forward with regard to the 
nature of an industrial workforce is that the level of commitment of 
workers is determined by the level of industrialisation in society. If it is 
accepted that this is so, then it may be argued that since Fiji is a 
partially industrialising economy, so one may expect to see a partially 
committed workforce in place. 
The notions of work and motivation as it is currently perceived and 
practiced in the Fijian workplace have emerged as a result of the 
experiences of a British colonialism and a form of British industrialism. 
While the value orientations of this political legacy have been imparted 
through an institutional arrangement of 'divide-and-rule', the 
associated policies of economic development were equally nurtured 
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through the establishment of a network of key interests who control and 
direct economic activity in the country. Although these stakeholders 
have evolved in many forms their key functions have essentially remain 
unchanged. In Fiji 's case these stakeholders are the state as the ultimate 
manager of economic development, the employers as owners of capital, 
trade unions as representatives of workers and, playing prominent and 
influential roles alongside these core interests, the more senior and 
prominent chiefly families as the perceived custodians of indigenous 
interests and the Church as the 'watchdog' of common basic societal 
values espousing equality and justice. 
While the actual role of the workers themselves as providers of 
labour are assumed in this stakeholding network by those who purport 
to promote, manage, control, represent and protect the broader interests 
of economic development, the end result has lacked a consistent 
commitment of legal and institutional support towards restructuring 
initiatives that have the potential to maximise human resources fully 
for greater economic growth. If this orchestrated show of strength had 
initially set out to achieve some measure of control and economic order, 
it has certainly succeeded in cultivating an overwhelming respect for 
authority which in turn has shaped the emergence of benevolence and 
acquiescence in the work environment. 
If one were to link the particularities of the Fijian experience to the 
broader discourse on work and motivation, there are two thematic 
issues in the latter which have implications for economic growth in this 
developing market economy. They are the notion of work and the degree 
of applicability of work motivation theory. While it is not possible to 
enter into a more comprehensive discussion of these issues at this stage, 
the following highlights are sufficiently placed in illustrating the 
underlying basis of the main arguments for this study. 
The early anthropological studies of traditional and non-market 
based economies (Malinowski 1922; Evans-Pritchard 1940) make 
reference to the tradition of work as it was perceived and practiced in 
these societies. In essence, the fusion of work into the cosmology of 
society itself, meant that as traditional societies became exposed to the 
forces of change through the process of industrialisation, the structures 
and normative frameworks that provided the basis for the unit(s) of 
production were challenged and reshaped to meet the new demands 
and needs of a changing society. So while in non-market cultures, 
people do not see their 'productive' roles as being separate from their 
social environment, it has been concluded that in such societies, the 
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individual's role in work is basically determined by their standing in 
all spheres of life (Applebaum 1984:3-12). So rather than the nature of 
work determining the human relations at work, it is the nature of social 
relations manifested in the kinship networks in society which 
determines why, how and with whom work is conducted . 
In the context of a partially industrialising economy like Fiji, 
Applebaum's (1984) view would be particularly relevant where the 
motive to work to fulfill a range of communal obligations within the 
social network, are perceived as part of the core components of an 
economic necessity that is aligned with and conducive to the norms of 
maintenance and existence in the community (Ravuvu 1987) .  This 
implies that the motive to work is multifaceted incorporating an 
interdependent relationship between social and economic values. In 
addition it is also possible to assume that the kinds of motives that 
determine employee behaviour in the workplace are partially influenced 
by the individual's interpretation of his or her status in the social order 
as perceived in the normative framework of their respective community. 
Of equal significance is the fact that this process of interpretation is a 
dynamic activity which evolves and redefines itself within the myriad of 
social groupings that individuals align themselves with, as they 
periodically traverse both the subsistence and non-subsistence sectors of 
the developing market economy (Chandra 1996). 
While the notion of work in predominantly non-market oriented 
societies has tended to reflect this feature, studies of work in more 
market oriented communities have tended to reflect a more individual 
position. It has been suggested however, that 'as far as industrial 
workers are concerned, the concept of workers' needs varies in different 
schools of thought, depending upon the assumptions and values that 
are taken for granted' (Hirszowicz 1981 :75). Perhaps the strongest 
influence on management practice has been the scientific management 
approach which argues that workers are almost exclusively motivated 
by monetary rewards. The model of 'economic man' underlying this 
school of thought suggests that 
since economic incentives are controlled by the organization, man is 
essentially a passive agent to be manipulated, motivated and 
controlled by the organization (Hirszowicz 1981 :75) . 
Although counter arguments to this rationalist model of economic 
man were reinforced by the findings of the famous Hawthorne experiment 
in highlighting the importance of group norms on individual behaviour 
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in the workplace, it has been pointed out that despite the criticisms of 
scientific management being economic-oriented and fairly mechanistic in 
nature, it predominates managerial practises because it encapsulates the 
very essence of capitalist production (Hirszowicz 1981 :255), which is 
deemed to be in line with the pervasive sense of economic rationalism 
that forms the basis of the capitalist spirit. 
So whilst it can be seen that in non market-oriented societies, work 
is fused with all other spheres of life, in market-oriented economies, 
work is isolated from these activities and situated on a particular plane 
within its own order of necessity. When that happens, it is given its 
own rhythm which might be inconsistent with the rhythm of work in 
traditional societies. It is given its own timeframe which is inconsistent 
with the nature of work and time in traditional societies. And now, it is 
enumerated and recompensed on the basis of gratification systems 
which place greater emphasis on the solo effort as compared to the in­
group performance of the individual in traditional societies. 
While the partially industrialising nature of its economy illustrates 
the coexistence of an old order and the new, the range of dualistic 
modes associated with this economic scenario would significantly 
influence the extent to which work motivation thinking may be used as 
a strategic tool for maximising the contribution of human resources to 
economic growth. If the notion of work in a partially industrialising 
economy is influenced by the norms and belief systems of a pronounced 
social tradition, then the highly transient nature of a workforce which 
participates in and is regulated by the codes of existence in both the 
traditional subsistence and modern sectors, is bound to reflect itself in 
worker behaviour and attitudes in the workplace and ultimately, in 
lower productivity. Linking this to the level of management systems 
requires an acknowledgement and recognition of the shifting levels of 
worker commitment in this transitional phase of economic development. 
The Fijian managerial perception of the 'lazy worker ' is steeped in a 
history of colonial perceptions and practices. Thompson's (1967) work, 
Time, Work-Discipline, and Indus trial Capitalism is particularly relevant in 
this respect. His general arguments on the nature of time as seen in the 
distinction between 'natural' time (governed by the sun) and 
'industrial' time (governed by the clock, and manifested by the factory 
or plantation hooter), provide significant insights into the extent to 
which these new work habits, featuring strong elements of self­
discipline and self-regulation, are internalised into a normative 
framework that is steeped in newly acquired expectations and notions 
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of work. While the inherent logic in this form of British industrialism 
may have been relevant for defining the parameters of the new work 
regime, there is an inherent assumption that this 'new' environment 
ought to be distinctly separate and insulated from the employee's social 
(or home) environment. 
In linking this to the Fijian situation it may be argued that this view 
of British industrialisation may have had some L.""lfluence in shaping 
colonial expectations of industry and work. It may also explain part of 
the rationale behind the system of divide-and-rule and the subsequent 
importation of a whole workforce to meet the labour requirements of a 
young plantation economy. In doing so, this colonial notion of laziness 
has latched on to the perception and practices of labour-management 
relations in post-colonial management systems. The stigma associated 
with this form of paternalism has resulted in stereotypes of the 
indigenous Fijian as a potential 'lazybones' and the Indo-Fijian as 
typically 'industrious '. While past generations may have silently 
shouldered this impositioned view, the systematic loss of face 
experienced by both ethnic groups in due process has impacted 
significantly on the culture of benevolence that currently permeates the 
workplaces of contemporary Fijian society. 
Having examined the implications of work for economic growth in 
Fiji, an overview of motivation theory will highlight the established 
orthodoxy in the field and the extent to which the particularities of 
context has a determinative impact on the replication of ideas for 
socioeconomic change. The two schools of thought which form the 
basis of work-motivation thinking and which have subsequently 
influenced the development of new directions in the field are 'content 
theories' and 'process theories' .  While content theories focus on what 
motivates the individual at work (see Maslow 1954; McClelland 1961; 
Herzberg 1966; Alderfer 1972), process theories pay special attention to 
how the component variables are interrelated with an emphasis on the 
actual process of motivation (see Vroom 1964; Locke 1968; Porter and 
Lawler 1968). 
Generally speaking, the trend in the development of motivation 
theories has shifted from an early emphasis on an inward-looking 
prescriptive approach to a more systems-oriented emphasis of the later 
developments in the field. The diagnostic nature of these new 
approaches (see Aungles and Parker 1988; Huo and Steers 1993; Brewer 
1994), reflect a growing recognition that current experiences of economic 
growth have a significant impact on changing labour demographics and 
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a changing work environment, which in tum influence individual effort 
and performance. So while organisational behaviour in general, and 
motivation in particular is subject to so many local factors, an exclusively 
macro focus is likely to completely miss the relevant details that mark the 
exceptional qualities of motivation in the workplace. 
The first issue arising from these insights into work motivation 
theory is that the dominant theoretical constructs have a significantly 
western bias, with a tendency towards a context that is directed at the 
promotion of free enterprise with a concomitant societal norm of 
individualist ethics. The concern that immediately comes to the fore 
revolves around the question of applicability of these industrial economy 
scenarios to developing economy contexts. This is an area commentators 
have struggled with since Kerr et al. (1960) applied the convergence 
thesis to employment relations in the late 1950s. The weakness of this 
approach, which sought to extrapolate the American experience 
internationally, lay in its lack of recognition of the particularities of 
national experience (Hess 1986) . 
If one were to follow the basic arguments of convergence theory, then 
there is a possibility of applying the basically 'western' theories of work 
motivation to the Fiji context. This might be particularly possible because 
of Fiji's conscious decision to seek to emulate western models 
characterised by attempts to rejuvenate stagnating and slow economic 
growth through trade, and the recognition by policymakers that national 
economic policies need to be more compatible with global market 
arrangements. It could be expected that this will eventually result in 
varying degrees of institutional reform and greater interdependency 
amongst the various groups that directly control economic activity in Fiji. 
Along the lines of convergence theory, it would be assumed that as 
Fiji moves towards increased industrialisation, the application of these 
western-based constructs in a non-westernised context would no 
longer be a central issue, as the industrialising system attains a level of 
compatibility with older industrialised nations in the mainly developed 
countries. While there is a logic to such an argument, it is simplistic. 
The theoretical literature reveals work motivation as a highly complex 
area even in western societies with their relatively long history of wage 
labour, technological innovation and market-oriented production. It 
seems likely that this complexity would increase rather than decrease, 
in situations of economic development where social relations in general 
and work relations in particular, may be expected to be affected by non and 
even anti-capitalist rationalities and tendencies (Hess 1990:2). This is 
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especially so in the case of Fiji where the partially industrialising state 
of its economy seems to reflect a particularly semi-permanent state of 
economic dualism. 
The Euro-American view of placing great emphasis on individual 
performance, contradicts the broader comrnunalistic notions of 
individual existence in a developing dualistic economy like Fiji. This is 
further accentuated by the underlying assumption of work motivation 
theories that the problem of low motivation is principally an individual 
problem that exists in isolation from the broader societal context. Where 
social psychologists have argued that low motivation is a problem that is 
best addressed at the individual level, industrial sociologists counter this 
and state that it is a structural problem that requires a reconstitution of 
institutional processes. The dualistic modes of existence in a developing 
market economy like Fiji imply that unless motivational strategies in the 
workplace are cognisant of the varying degrees of dualistic lifestyles of its 
employees, then the traditional management dogma of employing an 
economically rationalist position, will continue to fall short of 
anticipated outcomes directed at achieving enhanced productivity. 
This concern has in some way been alluded to by scholars writing 
on industrialisation who point out that the various constraints faced by 
an industrialising society constitute major dilemmas of economic 
growth and as such will have far-reaching implications for the extent to 
which productive human resources can be maximised (Hirszowicz 
1981 :21-2). In particular, it is possible to see motivational approaches 
in management theories, which were largely developed in the United 
States, as an expression of the extreme individualism, self-interest and 
even masculinity so characteristic of American culture (Sievers 1994:18). 
The implication is that despite the generic nature of work motivation 
theory and its attempts to maintain an element of universality, its 
applicability and degree of success in any context will be largely 
determined by the cultural parameters of the host society. The status of 
work motivation in the big economic picture varies considerably even 
amongst developed market economies, and may be expected to do so 
even more between those with a predominantly European background 
and those coming from a non-European context. 
The Fij ian context 
There are several key features of Fiji 's developmental process which are 
particularly relevant:  the nature of Fiji 's industrialising process; the 
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policy changes of the post-coup years after 1987; and the uniqueness of 
the societal context into which all these features emerge and interact. 
Although these features are inextricably linked in a mutually 
reinforcing and complex relationship, a brief discussion on each 
attempts to provide issues of relevance to this focus on employee 
motivation. 
There are two significant features of Fiji's industrialising process. 
The first relates to historical trends and the second to current processes. 
Fiji's industrialising experiences from a historical perspective are well 
documented in the different fields. When viewed within the framework 
of key stakeholders and their impact on the control and direction of a 
developing market-oriented economy, these studies include the economic 
implications of a divisive system of administration reflected in policies 
of divide-and-rule (Spate 1990), the British colonial interpretation of a 
Fijian orthodoxy (France 1968), relationships between ownership and 
production (Plange 1985; Bain 1988), the role of the state (Sutherland 1992), 
the experiences of indenture (Lal 1986), and labour-management 
relationships in the early plantation period of a colonial economy 
(Leckie 1990a,1990b), portray how the dominant institutional interests 
through the colonial administration, employers, unions and the chiefly 
system utilised various strategies in ensuring that their interests were 
being protected and propagated amidst a well orchestrated structural 
arrangement that catered for the labour requirements of a developing 
colonial economy. 
In terms of current moves to rejuvenate the stagnating economy, 
policymakers and planners now recognise that the stereotyped myth of 
industrialisation as being a non-viable development strategy for small 
economies is a non-issue. The experiences of other small economies like 
Mauritius and the ' Asian Tigers' are proof of the potential that may be 
achieved in pursuing this strategy of economic growth (Chandra 
1996:47). In accepting this line of thinking it follows that as the process 
of industrialisation continues to shape and direct the thrust of a 
developing system of market-oriented production, the transformation 
reflected in this transitional state of development is 
bending and shaping the lives of men (and women) into new channels; 
a view particularly related to the roles of the managers and the 
managed in new societies (Kerr et al. 1 960:2). 
So while industrialisation has a determinative impact on human 
motivation in general, it also has a particular impact on work motivation. 
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The current economic policy orientation of Fijian governments in the 
post-coup years after 1987 provides a second aspect of background to 
this study. In general terms these policies have been characterised by a 
move away from a heavily regulated protectionist stance, to one of 
deregulation and a more open economy. This change is seen in policies 
that promote export-led growth, support and incentives for export­
oriented foreign investment, an incremental reduction of direct State 
participation and control and, the pivotal role given to the private 
sector in the development process as the government 'has embarked on 
a program of privatisation or corporatisation of its extensive 
commercial interests' (Forsyth 1996:2). 
The implications of these trends for human resource management in 
general and employee motivation in particular have not been made 
explicit in policy documents. In fact it appears that economic growth 
that is expected to emerge naturally, is a result of the anticipated 
progression in restructuring and reform. Nonetheless it seems likely 
that issues of maximising employee contribution to productivity will 
gain greater prominence. This appears to be particularly likely in public 
sector organisations where restructuring will inevitably require a move 
from the traditions of public personnel culture to a more strategic use of 
human resources in the achievement of organisational goals aimed at 
greater productivity. In this respect, employee motivation assumes a 
significant role as a strategic tool for maximising worker potential. 
The third feature of Fiji's developmental process which is relevant 
for this study on employee motivation is the nature of Fiji's socio­
cultural context. Although it is not possible to detail a broader coverage 
of this issue here, it is worth noting here that the uniqueness of context 
as a determining factor in the industrialising process of any society has 
been widely acknowledged. In the case of Fiji, the norms and values of 
the workforce in a context of economic dualism have been shaped by 
the influences of a fairly centralised system of bureaucratic authority, 
chiefly leadership in an indigenous social order, a tokenistic form of 
multiculturalism which overlies a distinct separation of the two main 
ethnic groups, and a politically sensitive and fragile situation currently 
recast in the processes of constitutional reform. In this context an 
emphasis on employee motivation is particularly relevant because of 
the need to understand employee attitudes, if a strategic role is to be 
successfully assigned to human resources in overall organisational or 
indeed national growth strategies. So while in essence, the context for 
economic growth in Fiji constitu tes a range of circumstances that 
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directly impact upon employee behaviour in the workplace, an 
overview of the public sector attempts to illustrate the significance 
of this particular focus. 
Why the publ ic  sector? 
Whilst there may have been initial doubts in my mind as to the viability 
of this particular research interest, these have been gradually 
superseded by an obligation to impart an informed layman's 
perspective on the state of play in the Fijian workplace. It is hoped that 
through this process of sharing, confidence, self esteem and pride in 
public service will be gradually restored amongst managers and 
employees in the workplace of public sector agencies. Although in 
general terms the particularities of the Fijian context affect 
organisations in both the public and private sectors, there are certain 
aspects of the public sector which make it particularly relevant for 
establishing this interest here. 
On a regional level, the implications for policy and further research 
arising out of such a study are vast and hold great potential for further 
expansion in this field. Fiji, along with other South Pacific states, is 
often described by commentators as suffering from low labour 
productivity, and whilst for most of these small island economies, 
human resources are the only real resources yet to be fully utilised, it is 
important that the public sector as a (the) major employer, be staffed by 
employees who are sufficiently motivated, so as to ensure a level of 
productivity that is conducive for economic growth. Given the 
importance of human resources in development, a study of this nature 
holds great potential in laying an intellectual framework for developing 
comparative insights amongst other South Pacific island states which, 
like Fiji, are also experiencing problems of low motivation and low 
productivity amongst employees in the public sector. 
On a national level, while the core of the civil service comprises a 
little over 40 line agencies of government currently administered in a 
fairly centralised system, there are between 25 and 30 statutory bodies 
that together with the civil service make up the public sector. A major 
determinant here is the fact that the current system of administration is 
a reflection of a colonial legacy, in which the policies and procedures 
for implementation are hampered by the existence of restrictions 
embodied within the legal and administrative framework of the 
Westminster model. This organisational heritage runs counter to those 
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macro-level policies aimed at deregulating the economy. The latter have 
resulted in a growing expectation and indeed pressure from the private 
sector, the employers' federation and even from within the ranks of 
Cabinet itself (Fiji 1994a), for a more efficiently managed public service. 
Whilst it may be expected that the effect of the latter would 
ultimately impact upon the broader management culture of other 
organisations that come under the umbrella of the public sector, it is 
less certain what effect these trends will have on perception and 
interpretation amongst employees in the public sector. In particular, 
issues on which a gap in management and employee perceptions 
appear likely include service in and for the public interest, issues of 
public and private choices, the expectations of government as an 
employer and, the expectations inherent within the public client and 
public servant relationship. Yet it will be public sector employees upon 
whom the burden of implementing changes will fall. Their attitudes 
will be vital to the success of reform. 
As it is a key provider of goods and services in the Fijian economy 
and, as the largest employer in the formal wages and salaries sector, 
'total public sector employment has grown from around 8,000 in 1970 
to 29,5000 accounting for almost forty per cent of paid employment' 
(AusAID 1995:31) .  As such, changes for the public sector may also be 
seen as having a crucial impact on the wider agenda of moves to the 
more market-responsive framework of a market-oriented production 
system. A further level of complexity in the challenges of developing 
human resource management policies in development management 
initiatives needs to be added because of the existence of economic 
dualism. So while the issue of work motivation may have considerable 
potential as a strategic economic tool aimed at developing and 
maintaining commitment levels of a partially industrialising workforce 
that are considered feasible to sustain the anticipated growth in a 
developing economy like Fiji, simplistic solutions are unlikely to work. 
In terms of developing an human resource management framework, 
work motivation is an extremely important area of concern that is 
under-rated, taken for granted and often relegated a peripheral and non 
strategic role in the operational framework of mainstream management 
functions. That this is more so in the public rather than the private 
sector makes it even more important that the issue of low motivation be 
addressed in a more systematic way in the public sector. When linked 
to the current demands for public sector reform, work motivation as an 
aspect of human resource management, has a particular relevance to 
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the dynamics of dualistic modes of existence characteristic of 
developing market economies in the South Pacific. In this respect, a 
study of this nature has the potential of developing strategies that may 
bridge the ' old ' structures of post-colonial administrative systems with 
the new more innovative public management systems required for good 
governance and development which draw much of their inspiration 
from private sector practice (Yntema 1 993). 
While the particularities of context in a partially industrialising 
economy like Fiji have a direct impact on individual behaviour in the 
workplace, the various cultural dimensions that exist within the 
framework of organisational systems illustrate a microcosm of the 
broader environment which has the potential of being effectively 
addressed through collective action at micro level . These cultural 
dimensions include; the culture of silence, the culture of subservience, 
the culture of 'face' and the culture of kin. While these cultural 
phenomenon are commonly reflected in employee behaviour in 
organisations operating in both public and private sectors, it is likely to 
be more pervasive in the workplaces of the public sector because of the 
close affiliation between the state and public administration. So while 
the state impacts upon the operations of the private sector in a fairly 
general way, it is to the workplaces of the public sector that the value 
orientations of a system of governance filters into more readily. 
In saying this it is worth noting that in the public sector, the key 
interest groups that direct and control productivity in the workplace 
are; in the case of statutory bodies, the board as representative of the 
state's economic interest, and inclusive of all government line agencies, 
senior management as initiators of policy and controllers of 
organisational resources and, trade unions as representatives of 
workers' interests. The highly unionised nature of the public sector and 
the existence of this stakeholding network at micro-level implies that 
there is a potential basis for reconstituting a consultative framework 
that may be better suited to addressing the particularities of a changing 
work environment in a situation of socio-economic change. 
On a personal level, the challenge of managing divided loyalties is 
partly linked to the intellectual challenge of dismantling and 
demystifying the current intellectual myopia that perpetuates 
stereotypes and misconceptions regarding Pacific islanders' notions of, 
and attitudes to, work; a challenge that has emerged from dual 
concerns. The first of these is that while the development literature has 
paid lip service to the role of human resources, the reality of explaining 
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public sector management in Fiji has been influenced significantly by 
the historical specificities of a British colonial experience and the 
associated norms of British industrialism reflected in the dominant 
benevolent work culture and an equally acquiescent workforce. The 
second being that much of the management commentary and practise(s) 
assumed that indigenous employees and indeed public servants are 
'lazy' by nature, with a tendency towards ' irrational' and 
'unproductive' behaviour. While both issues seemed important, neither 
were well explained by the stereotypes. So while the answer lies in a 
systematic study of employee motivation, of equal importance is the 
development of a more informed perspective secured from within the 
Fijian viewpoint, on this issue of work motivation. 
Future d irections 
Having examined some of the issues of employee motivation that are 
particular to the Fijian context, the following conclusions illustrate 
some key findings that hold significant implications for future 
directions in research and policy in this field. The first of these is that 
the level of motivation is directly linked to the level of commitment of 
the workforce, which in turn is determined by the level of 
industrialisation. So while Fij i  is a partially industrialising economy, 
one may expect a partially committed workforce in place. Second, work 
motivation is largely influenced by external factors and cannot be 
effectively managed through a sole emphasis on intrinsic factors. 
The degree of partial commitment of Fiji's workforce means that the 
nature of workers' attitudes and behaviour will be influenced by strong 
external factors that are often beyond the powers of management to 
control. The third finding is linked to the notion of development 
semantics. In the Fijian context the distinctively dualistic base has a 
determinative influence on the perception and practice of work and 
motivation. This being the case, western notions of 'rational' and 
'productive' behaviour would need to be sensitised to the particularities 
of existing production and knowledge systems in partially 
industrialising contexts, if strategies like motivational techniques aimed 
at enhancing productivity in the workplace are to be effectively utilised. 
With regards to the universal rule of applicability in management 
concepts a note of caution is offered here. While it may be argued that 
the generic nature of motivation as a management concept is generally 
applicable to organisational systems in all sectors, its actual relevance 
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will be largely determined by an understanding of the particularities of 
context in which employees exist. For policymakers and public sector 
managers in the Fijian economy, the degree of success in utilising work 
motivational thinking as a strategic tool of economic development 
depends on a number of factors. The first lies in an open 
acknowledgement that divided loyalties and partial commitment to 
work in a developing system of market-oriented production are real 
issues that exist in the workplace which needs to be appropriately 
addressed. Having recognised this, management systems can no longer 
claim ignorance by taking things for granted in the area of employee 
behaviour as a variety of training modules in the field can easily 
restructure and revamp human resource management requirements for 
respective agencies. 
The second suggests that amongst employees, the need to be 
equipped with a level of confidence and expertise that would enable 
them to cope with the conflicting expectations and demands of work as 
it is perceived and practiced in a partially industrialising framework of 
economic dualism, implies a level of knowledge and skills that are 
responsive to the dynamics of labour demographics in this changing 
economic environment. It is particularly more significant and more 
urgent amongst workers in the public sector who in the context of 
authoritarian-style administrative frameworks, see themselves in public 
offices which are closely associated with the custodianship of public 
interest. So while productivity has traditionally been equated with the 
private sector, its emphasis through a greater and more strategic human 
resource management component in the public sector would provide more 
viable alternatives for maximising human resource potential that currently 
marrs productivity levels in the workplace of public sector agencies. 
Whatever the outcome, the one obvious factor that has emerged in 
this focus on the Fiji public sector is the need for greater consultation 
between the key stakeholders who direct and control economic activity 
in the workplace. In the Fij ian context these are management, union 
representatives in the workplace and the employees themselves. 
Consultative processes that exclude any one of these parties at any 
stage of reform are bound to face delays in the implementation of any 
proposed initiatives aimed at enhancing workplace productivity. It 
serves us all with a reminder that the human factor in any productivity 
formula is an equally significant component in this process which can 
be effectively addressed through an increasing human resource 
management emphasis in strategic management functions. 
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Constraints to productivity in 
Tonga 
Michael Hess 
This chapter is concerned with the contribution of employment to 
achieving the aims of economic development in Tonga. In particular, 
it takes a management perspective and identifies human resource 
constraints impacting on the productivity of labour in Tonga. It does 
not attempt to measure productivity in terms economists will find 
familiar but simply attempts to see how human resource difficulties 
affect the contribution of employees to the objectives of the 
organisations in which they work. In theoretical terms this may be 
seen in two major areas. The first is the capacity and willingness of 
employees to work effectively. The second is the ability of managers to 
motivate and structure the effort of employees to maximum effect. 
Employment in Tonga 
In a general sense employment in Tonga needs to be understood in the 
light of a long history of organised production and exchange. Tonga's 
major natural resources are in its fertile soils and the vast area of both 
shallow and deep sea within its national boundaries. Like capital, 
however, neither land nor sea produce economic benefit without the 
application of the mental and physical resources of the human 
population. The 'adaptive and devoted manpower ' of the Tongan 
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people (Latu 1991 :5) formed the basis of a traditional economy capable 
of producing 'lavish surpluses', to support a non-productive 
aristocracy and non-consumable craft production (Campbell 1992:225). 
This did not, however, translate into a universally high standard of 
living with villagers experiencing periods of famine, for instance in pre 
and post-Pacific war decades. 
In the modem era this relative affluence has continued. In terms of 
basic social development indicators Tonga compares favourably with 
nations with similar GDP and income levels. With a GDP per capita 
level of US$1,630, Tonga is in the lower middle income bracket of 
nations (Asian Development Bank 1997:224). By orthodox economic 
measures, however, Tongans are considerably better off than other 
Pacific islanders (World Bank 1994:228) .  The growth rates in the early 
1990s were strong with GDP per capita averaging annual growth of 6.9 
per cent (Asian Develpment Bank 1994: 15) .  In the middle of the decade, 
however, this trend has stalled with GDP growth rates falling from 
around 4 per cent to 2.6 per cent in 1995 and 1 .6 per cent in 1996 (Asian 
Development Bank 1997: 161) . The major contributing factors were a fall 
in squash prices and subsequent under production. ADB projections 
envisaged a recovery in 1997 with greatly increased production, 
improved quality and a slight rise in prices. Tourism was also expected 
to continue its improved performance. 
Such macroeconomic indicators are, however, inadequate in 
themselves in establishing the potential of employment as a creator of 
wealth through productivity and as a distributor of wealth through job 
opportunities. The extent to which economic activity reflected in the 
general indicators creates job opportunities depends heavily on the 
way in which the activity is organised, the level of technology 
employed and the structure of ownership. In the case of Tonga 
understanding the relationship between levels of economic activity and 
job opportunities is further complicated by the definition of 
'employment' used with so much economic activity taking place 
outside the framework of formal work arrangements (Hess 1996:3-4). 
In terms of measures of productivity it may be possible to calculate 
value-added production as the difference between total inputs at each 
stage of production and total outputs for various sectors as Johnson has 
done for the late 1980s and early 1990s (see Table 7.1 ). The result will be 
the realisation of the dominant performance of agriculture in other than 
drought years. 
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Table 7.1 Tonga: rea l percentage changes in va lue added by sector 
(per cent) 
1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991 /92 1 992/93 1993/94 
Ag ricu ltu re , forestry 
and fishing 3.9 -4.5 9.7 5 .0  6 .2 3.3 
Manufactu ring 1 0 . 5  -3 .8 - 1 0 . 0  0 .8  2 . 5  1 . 5 
Construction -2 .4  -7 .8 - 1 5 . 4  - 1 1 . 7 2 .5  2 .0  
S e rvices -0 .6 0 .4 7.0 0 .8  2 .0  2 .8  
Source: Johnson, Michael, 1993. Economic Survey: Tonga, Public Services 
International, Ferney Voltaire. 
While agriculture is a good absorber of labour there are two 
problems which make it a poor prospect as an employment generator 
for Tonga. The first is that many of those for whom agriculture is the 
major economic activity work without formal employment 
arrangements either on their own behalf or with relatives. The second is 
that many permanently employed Tongans also engage in agricultural 
activity to supply their own needs or to supplement their cash income. 
In terms of productivity agriculture is also a poor prospect in Tonga 
where limited supplies of land and capital mean that an increase in 
labour absorption will result in a lowering of productivity. 
Given the record of agriculture as an employer internationally it is 
hardly surprising to find that it has little impact on labour absorption 
in Tonga. Of more concern is the performance of those areas with the 
potential for higher levels of employment generation. In particular 
manufacturing has been severely limited by capital and market 
conditions. The result is that successful operation of particular 
enterprises seems to be only possible for a brief period in which capital 
conditions are favourably affected by government incentives or market 
access is gained by a combination of temporary factors. With a few 
exceptions, manufacturers have not continued to operate beyond, or 
even to the limit of, the application of tax and other incentives. 
This dismal picture is not, however, the totality in terms of factors 
impacting on the prospects for and productivity of employment. If we 
step back from the demand side and look at the supply for a moment 
some encouragement may be gained from Tonga's indicators of social 
wellbeing. Tongans live longer than the average for lower middle 
income countries (World Bank 1994:228; .Khalidi 1 994:29) .  Primary 
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health care indicators show extremely high levels of access to safe 
drinking water, medical treatment, and availability of medicine (all 100 
per cent), which are reflected in the 70 per cent decline in child mortality 
rates recorded over the last three decades (Khalidi 1994:30) . More 
sophisticated measures such as persons per hospital bed and persons per 
physician are well above average for both the region and the national 
income level. Even more impressive are the statistics on nutrition which 
show Tongans having daily protein and calorie in-takes which compare 
favourably with those of much richer nations (Asian Development Bank 
1994:12) .  Concerns that the overall standards of services are declining 
and that western health problems-heart disease, alcoholism, and so 
on-are increasingly balancing this picture. 
While such general social indicators help in establishing the 
physical capacity of a population for employment, education may be 
seen as being equally central to the creation of direct opportunities for 
employment. Schooling is also a major determinant of the capacity and 
willingness of employees having a significant impact on both the 
specific skills and the general orientation towards work with which 
potential employees enter the labour market. Here again Tonga is well 
off with primary (39.5 per cent) and secondary (55.8 per cent) school 
completions above average and a resultantly high literacy rate. By 
contrast the percentage of tertiary level attainment ( 1 .5 per cent) is 
disappointing (Tonga 1993:115) .  There may also be a question mark 
over the orientation to work with which Tonga's school leavers enter 
the labour market. 
Of greater concern in terms of employment, however, is the general 
nature of the education offered to Tongans. While literacy and 
numeracy may be a sufficient preparation for entry into the lower levels 
of public sector administration, it is more specifically targeted 
occupational training which has been seen as the key to creating the 
skilled workforce required to attract investment. For this reason, the 
difference between general education and vocational training has 
become entrenched in the human resource orthodoxy of advanced 
market economies, with the former being seen as insufficient from the 
viewpoint of both individuals seeking work and employers seeking 
skilled labour (Phillips 1987: 149-50). At an official level the need for 
action in this area has long been recognised in Tonga. In 1975, the 
Department of Labour prepared a survey of labour needs on Tongatapu 
for incorporation in the 3rd Five Year Plan (Tonga 1975) . The needs­
based assessment has been repeated in greater detail in subsequent 
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planning exercises and has spawned several major reports by foreign 
experts associated with the ILO /UNDP interest in employment in the 
Pacific region in general. 1 It is not the intention here to offer a detailed 
critique of these efforts. Instead, attention is focused on the performance 
of the Tongan economy in response to the two decades of calls for more 
attention to vocational training as a means of supplying the workforce 
with the skills that would make them attractive to employers. 
In statistical terms at least, teacher training has been a successful 
area of occupationally oriented training. In 1992 there were 223 
students enrolled in Tonga's single teachers' college. This represented a 
90 per cent increase over the preceding five-year period (Tonga 1993:113). 
With an even gender distribution this must rank as a considerable 
success in terms of both equity and efficiency arguments associated 
with national level human resource development planning. It must be 
noted, however, that this training is closely linked with a career path in 
the area of employment which has been most successful in terms of its 
sustained growth-the public sector. 
This success is not replicated in terms of more general occupationally­
oriented training. Statistics for technical and vocational course enrolments 
are particularly alarming with wild fluctuations indicating the lack of a 
consistent approach to this fundamental area. In 1991-92, for instance, 
enrolments in these courses declined from 811 to 358. The lack of 
systematic attention to technical training and the orientation of schooling 
combine to produce a generally well-educated population, but one which 
lacks the specific skills to partner capital in commercial development and 
whose normative attitudes to work do not reflect a market orientation. 
International experience (Wan et al. 1989) and the views of aid donors 
(Bilney 1994) regarding the centrality of human resource development are 
reflected in the rhetoric of planning documents but not in the practice of 
either public or private sector management. 
While there have been minor efforts to improve the capacity of the 
workforce, the question of the willingness of employees to expend 
effort in their jobs seems to have been almost entirely limited to the 
rhetoric of planning documents and courses attended by senior, or at 
best middle-ranking, public servants. So while the Ministry of Labour 
was reporting from the early 1970s on the need for greater attention to 
motivation, its stated view at the time that wage levels need to reflect 
and stimulate productivity does not seem to have found any reflection 
in subsequent employment practice . Even more seriously its warning 
that lack of appropriate reward stimuli will 'eventually . . .  cause many 
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people to work at a depressing half- time' (Tonga 1974:3) is echoed as 
current fact in the anecdotal evidence of managers. 
Human resource theory based upon international experience 
establishes a strong link between training needs and human resource 
management practices designed to improve the motivation of employees. 
A major difficulty for organisations operating in a Tongan environment is 
the fundamental role of merit and perceptions of equity involved in such 
basic management functions as recruitment, promotion and the 
monitoring of performance. In each instance these practices rely for their 
success on the perception that there is a link between employee 
performance and reward. This link becomes problematic where social or 
indeed organisational hierarchy is so entrenched that the merit of 
individuals counts, or is seen to count, for less than their social position. 
Anecdotal evidence indicates that attitudes rooted in Tongan culture 
impact on management practices breaking the nexus between effort and 
reward acting as a disincentive to employee performance. 
Organisational hierarchy may operate in a similar fashion. Within 
the Tongan public sector the insights of the new public management 
have been slow to have an impact. So the structure and employment 
practices continue to reflect a traditional bureaucratic orientation with 
the observation of rules and procedures taking precedence over the 
assessment of organisational and individual performance. The lack of 
an incentive structure means that public employees can work at the 
'depressing half-time' without loss of entitlements and possibly 
without loss of prospects. 
The implications of this for the economy can be seen vividly in the 
crude statistics which show a public sector growing in numbers and 
cost. In 1996 personnel costs accounted for 46 per cent of total 
government expenditure. In 1997 this is projected to increase to 51 per 
cent (Asian Development Bank 1997:162). 
In theory the Government of Tonga continues to be committed to 
reducing the size of the public sector. In practice this can be achieved 
only through more efficient operation. The point of this chapter is that 
the preconditions for greater efficiency-a well trained and highly 
motivated workforce, employed in organisations which are managed 
for performance-do not seem to be present. 
The prospects for improvi n g  employment and productivity 
Whatever commentators and planners might have hoped for, there are 
only two areas in which employment of Tongans has shown sustained 
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growth. The first is in the provision of services, largely located in 
Tonga's public sector, but also significantly represented in private 
sector finance and tourism enterprises. The second is in overseas labour 
markets. In both cases the chances of increasing or even maintaining 
levels of employment depend upon productivity improvement. Locally, 
improved skills and motivation of employees are necessary to attract 
foreign investment into the private sector and to provide improved 
services at less cost in the public sector. Internationally Tonga's migrant 
workers need improved skills to maintain their success in increasingly 
competitive overseas labour markets. 
In terms of its prospects for employment growth, Tonga's public 
sector is not merely the major source of local employment, it also sets 
the standard for management practices throughout the national 
economy. So if, for instance, public sector employment is 
characterised by a high wage/low performance regime rather than 
by a commitment to the efficient delivery of high quality services, 
this will certainly have a negative impact in other areas of 
employment. Internationally, public sector reform has aimed to 
make public sector organisations purveyors of best practice, with 
savings in national budgets, increases in the quality of service and a 
practical example for private sector management and employees 
being amongst the achievements claimed for such reform. As far as 
Tonga's public sector employment is concerned, continued growth 
seems likely and necessary in terms of maintaining current rates of 
labour absorption. However, such a trend will be threatened by 
budgetary realities if that growth does not incorporate increases in 
efficiency, productivity and effectiveness with changes to how 
Tongan public servants work being a major factor. Clearly more 
research is required to be definite about policy recommendations in 
terms of necessary changes in public sector employment. It would, 
however, be fair to say that the effectiveness and efficiency 
principles of the new public management are yet to receive sector 
wide attention in Tonga. 
In the local private sector, despite some recent and projected 
growth (Asian Development Bank 1997: 161), tourism must be seen as 
an underachiever in terms of its potential. Not only is it outstanding 
amongst service sector areas in terms of bringing money into an 
economy, but also its labour-intensive nature has made tourism 
particularly attractive to governments seeking to encourage economic 
development through higher levels of employment. In this regard, 
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Tonga's failure to make serious inroads into the international market 
requires attention. The lack of international-standard facilities and the 
failure to capitalise on the natural beauty of the country clearly need to 
be addressed at a policy level. It seems that the most likely source of 
progress here would be an agreement between the government and a 
large international tourist company to develop and promote enclave 
style facilities which would bring tourists into the country. 
Internationally, examples of success in this area include Fiji and the 
Maldives. 
The range of jobs generated by successful tourism industries is 
extremely wide but relies on a basic approach of giving service. 
International practice includes examples of both private and public 
sector provision of training to produce the specific skills and the 
general commitment required for success in this area. Tonga appears 
unlikely to attract the level of international investment required 
without making a commitment to the development of the necessary 
human resources. The high general levels of education and health in 
the community, however, give Tonga a substantial base from which 
to launch such an effort. 
The current and historical success of Tongans in the overseas 
labour markets also demands close attention. The importance of 
these earnings in terms of overall national economic activity may be 
seen in the increase of net transfers from 3 per cent of current 
account receipts in 1991 to 12 per cent in 1996 (Asian Development 
Bank 1997:162) . In fact this measure possibly continues to reflect the 
undervaluing of remittances of overseas workers, which in addition to 
cash amounts include quantities of re-saleable goods (Brown and Connell 
1993) not to mention building materials and goods for domestic use 
which are difficult to quantify. Anecdotal evidence points to the 
importance of these non-cash remittances as well as access to medical and 
educational services outside of Tonga for families of migrant workers. 
Further anecdotal evidence from managers of enterprises in 
Sydney which employ Tongans sees them compared favourably with 
other migrant groups in terms of their English language abilities and 
their willingness to learn and work hard. The Sydney Tongan 
community's rate of unemployment also seems to be considerably 
less than that of other migrant groups (Hess 1996: 11 ) .  It seems likely 
that this is also the case in Los Angeles and Auckland where 
continued Tongan migration has historically been attributed to 
success in the local labour market (Ahlburg 1991 :29).  
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All of this argues for the continued potential of migrant employment 
as an important factor in Tonga's economy. It would be wise, however, 
not to presume that this current success will continue without efforts to 
improve the skills of these workers. Additional attention at the level of 
secondary education to the skills needed in these labour markets would 
therefore seem worthwhile. In particular the inclusion of basic 
education in areas such as commerce and legal studies may help orient 
young Tongans towards a labour market ethos conducive to continued 
success in the overseas situations and also helpful in terms of 
increasing productivity at home. 
Such a skills-based approach would seem to have greater potential 
in terms of improving access than policy based on attempts to gain 
bilateral agreements. The latter would be fraught with political 
problems and in any case seem unnecessary. In practice the market will 
decide who is employable and who is not regardless of international 
agreements. The large number of Tongans who overstay their formal 
visas but continue to find favour in the eyes of employers indicates that 
those market realities are operating in favour of Tongan employees. 
Exactly why this is so calls for further research. So too do the effects of 
spatial risk diversification evident in the practices of Tongan families 
which place members in both overseas and local labour markets. 
In any case at both local and international labour market levels 
increased skills-based training will improve the attractiveness of 
Tongans as employees. This ought to begin at school with a move in 
senior years to more specific training with an emphasis on technical 
and commercial skills. There is also urgent need for attention to 
industry specific training such as that provided by the Maritime and 
Polytechnical Institute. German aid funds provided the source of 
initial capital expenditure and the Ministry of Education meets the 
running costs for trade and short courses of particular relevance to 
this industry. A similar approach would have potential for tourism 
with the possibility of training being provided in the off-season. 
Some clear lessons may be drawn for overall labour policy from 
international experience. It is noticeable that those nations that have 
achieved high levels of economic development have also been 
characterised by labour force commitment to productivity. The 'East 
Asian miracle' (World Bank 1993) is not just a miracle of policy or 
even of management. It is also a miracle of labour and employment 
relations. Labour policy has played a vital part in the achievement of 
this most spectacular economic growth with the emphasis on the 
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development of a committed workforce willing and capable of 
partnering capital in the achievement of economic development. It 
involves a new approach to the development and management of 
human resources which regards workers and their skills as a key 
variable in the achievement of better economic performance. It is fair to 
say that this human resource management approach has had little 
impact on management in Tonga or indeed the Pacific island nations 
generally. Rather than focusing on the positive contribution human 
resources can make both to the efficiency of particular organisations 
and through this to the achievement of goals of economic development, 
labour policy in Tonga has emphasised the role of labour demand and 
the need to create more jobs. The consequence of this approach is that 
the attention of those concerned with labour issues has been drawn to 
population growth projections and the creation of jobs to absorb the 
increasing numbers of school leavers on the one hand and the 
performance of overseas labour migration on the other. An approach 
centred on maximising the contribution of existing human resources to 
economic growth has greater potential for addressing the productivity 
issue which is seen as being central to an understanding of labour 
constraints to development. 
Such an approach would also be able to accommodate the 
difficulties mentioned above in how 'employment' is defined. If the 
orthodox definition of work in return for cash payment is accepted, 
clearly much work which creates wealth in Tonga is excluded. This 
work-typically in agriculture and traditional handicraft 
production-does absorb much labour but its product is not 
measurable in orthodox economic terms. Ironically, as Tongan 
communities overseas become larger and more wealthy the demand 
for and price of the handicraft products of this work has increased. 
Thus this non-employment finds a growing market for its product. 
This is clearly an area that would repay further research but is 
beyond the scope of this study. 
Conclusion 
Tonga faces major difficulties in respect of productivity on both sides of 
the employment bargain. In respect of employees the neglect of 
technical and in-service training results in a workforce lacking the 
capacity for improved performance. In respect of management the lack 
of incentive structures provides little positive motivation for employees. 
1 30 I Productivity performance in the South Pacific islands 
De-motivational factors include status rather than merit-oriented 
attitudes and are particularly evident in public sector employment 
where management practices encourage jobs to be regarded as 
sinecures in which performance is of relatively minor importance. 
On the other hand the spectacular performance of Tongans in 
overseas labour markets shows a potential capacity and willingness 
as workers not always evident within national employment 
structures. This surely indicates that there are considerable gains to 
be made from reforming those structures. 
A skilled and committed workforce is clearly part of the package 
which is vital to attracting investment, maintaining access to overseas 
labour markets and sustaining levels of public sector employment. The 
acquisition of occupationally-oriented skills needs to be part of school 
education and should also be the subject of industry-specific training. 
Workforce commitment on the other hand will only come from 
management practices which motivate employees to use their skills 
productively. In addressing this issue of maximising the contribution of 
labour to the production of goods or services the emphasis needs to be 
as much on the training of management as it is on the training of labour. 
Note 
See for instance the Asian Employment Program (ILO-ARTEP) 
Report, Employment and Structural Change in Tonga: Issues of the 
Fifth Five Year Plan (1 986-90), Central Planning Office, Kingdom 
of Tonga, March 1985. 
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The island nations of the South Pacific, 
including Papua New Guinea, are different in all 
respects except for their common poor 
economic performance. T his book addresses 
the issue of productivity performance in the 
South Pacific islands with case studies from 
Papua New Guinea, Fiji and Tonga, and draws 
lessons from theory that are applicable to the 
region as a whole. 
Productivity Performance in the South Pacific 
Islands grew out of the June 1997 seminar on 
Productivity Growth in Papua New Guinea and 
the South Pacific held at the National Centre 
for Development Studies, the Australian 
National University. It is part of ongoing analysis 
of development in the Pacific island countries 
supported by the Australian Agency for 
International Development (AusAID). 
